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This dissertation explores how the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) changed incentives for lawmakers and individuals. The
1996 welfare reform delegated primary rule-making authority over welfare to state governments and
changed the way the United States funds welfare programs. The passage of this reform provides an
opportunity to examine the role of federalism in government assistance programs. I explore several
questions related to the 1996 reform in three studies.
In the first study, I examine the effects of state-level welfare policy on disability acceptance
rates. The 1996 reform transitioned welfare funding from a matching grant to a block grant,
increasing the incentive for states to restrict welfare caseloads by increasing the opportunity cost of
welfare funds. Disability programs offer an attractive alternative for states to reduce the number of
welfare recipients because disability is federally funded. While disability policy is set at the federal
level, cases are reviewed by state-run offices. A state seeking to shift individuals off of welfare and
onto disability can restrict access to welfare while exerting institutional pressure on disability offices
to admit more applicants. Using state-level data, I investigate the degree to which states affect
the substitution of disability for welfare assistance. I find that, on average, the presence of welfare
time-limit policies increases a state’s disability acceptance rates by 1.77 percentage points, from
approximately 36 percent to 38 percent for the average state in my sample.
In the second study, I examine the role of the expectations in congressional decisions to
delegate power to the states. I use measures of the restrictiveness of state welfare rules as a proxy
for the expectations of members of the House. I find evidence that Democratic members of the
House from more conservative districts were more likely to vote for welfare reform. Additionally,
I find that for more conservative members of the House, reasons to expect that their state would
become more restrictive on welfare policy increased the probability that they would vote for welfare
ii
reform.
In the final study, I test whether welfare funding exhibits political spending cycles. Using
state-level data from the post-reform period, I examine welfare spending at three levels of detail.
I find that states with Democratic governors running for reelection have higher welfare spending,
broadly measured. However, when analyzed with more detailed welfare financial data, this effect is
no longer statistically different from zero. Overall, I find little evidence of political welfare spending
cycles.
These studies contribute to our understanding of delegation within a federalist system of
government. Delegating authority to states will lead to more heterogeneous laws, as states change
their policies to better reflect constituent preferences and changing incentives. Rational legislators
will take these changes into account when making their decision to delegate authority. These changes
do not occur in a vacuum but interact with existing state and federal programs, which is particularly
important if states have some de facto control over federal programs.
iii
Dedication




The process of writing a dissertation is long and arduous, and I am indebted to many people
without whose support, advice, and encouragement I would certainly not have finished. First and
foremost, I thank my advisor Professor Robert Fleck. Professor Fleck took my often-disorganized
ideas and showed me how they could fit into a coherent story. I have always left his office with more
curiosity and understanding than I had when I walked in. His kindness, knowledge, and character
are the very best the economics discipline has to offer.
I would also like to thank Professor William Dougan, whose comments and insights on my
papers have been invaluable. I have gained so much from his classes, discussion, and the many hours
he dedicated to carefully reading and commenting on my work. I am grateful for the advice and
enthusiasm of Professor Michael Makowsky. I never left a conversation with Professor Makowsky
with fewer than five new research ideas. Thanks are also due to Professor Patrick Warren for his
advice and instruction.
One of the best things about the John E. Walker Department of Economics is how every
professor invests in the academic progress of graduate students. Of particular importance to my
time at Clemson has been the Public Economics Workshop. It is no overstatement to say that sitting
and participating in this workshop has been the most valuable experience I have had in graduate
school. In particular, I would like to thank workshop participants Professor Howard Bodenhorn and
Professor Molly Espey for their comments and insights over the years.
My time at Clemson has been made so much more enriching by my friends and classmates.
I would never have made it through the first year, much less finished my dissertation, without the
support of my Clemson friends. I thank Roksana for her friendship and the kindness she has shown
me. She is a fantastic economist, and she has made me a better one along the way. Thanks to Ben
for putting up with me through the ups and the downs of the program. We struggled a lot, but it
v
always helped to be struggling together. For their friendship and encouragement, I thank Liuna,
Narendra, Adam, Andy, and Majid.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, whose support has been instrumental at every step
of my education. My mother, Violet, sacrificed so much to give me every educational opportunity.
She pushed me in times when I was less than the ideal student. My father, Charles, always took




Title Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 The Effect of State-Level Welfare Policy on Disability Acceptance Rates . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Voting on Delegation: Evidence from the Passage of the 1996 Welfare Reform . 29
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6 Extensions and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3 Is State-Level Welfare Spending Subject to Political Cycles? . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Election Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Alternative Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A Additional Chapter 1 Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B Additional Chapter 2 Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C Additional Chapter 3 Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
vii
List of Tables
1.1 Summary Statistics for SSDI Acceptances and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2 Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest and Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates . . . 24
1.5 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Acceptance Rates . . . . . 25
1.6 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Acceptance Rates . . . . . 26
1.7 Wald Tests for Difference in Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptances . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 House Votes by Party on PRWORA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Limitation Rules Changes . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Behavioral Rules Changes . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Eligibility Rules Changes . . . . . . . . 57
2.7 Out-of-Sample Predictions AK1-FL10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.8 Out-of-Sample Predictions FL12-LA7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.9 Out-of-Sample Predictions MA3-NY20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.10 Out-of-Sample Predictions NY22-WY1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.11 Predictive Margins from Equation (2.5) as Shor McCarty Scores Change (Average
of Lower House) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.12 Predictive Margins from Equation (2.5) as Shor McCarty Scores Change (Average
of Lower House Majority) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1 Summary Statistics: By Incumbent Running . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Summary Statistics: By Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 Summary Statistics: By Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 State Political Spending Cycles by General Spending Categories . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 State Welfare Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.6 State Welfare Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.7 State Welfare Spending Per Capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.8 State Welfare Spending with Lead in Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.9 State Welfare Spending Without Year Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10 Condensed Vocational Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
11 Minimum Earnings Requirement for SSDI Work Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
12 Number of Work Credits Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
13 Standard of Substantial Gainful Activity by Year and Disability Type . . . . . . . . 96
14 Maximum SSI Benefit by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
15 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
16 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . 102
17 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Vocational Disability Acceptance Rates . . . 103
viii
18 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Meets Disability Acceptance Rates . . . . . 104
19 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Equals Disability Acceptance Rates . . . . . 105
20 Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptance Rates . . . . . . 107
21 Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates . . . . 108
22 Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . 109
23 Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Acceptance Rates . . . . . . 110
24 Disability Acceptance Rates and Deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
25 Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates and Deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
26 Disability Meets Acceptance Rates and Deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
27 Disability Equals Acceptance Rates and Deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
28 Disability Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
29 Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits . . . . . . 118
30 Disability Meets Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits . . . . . . . . . 119
31 Disability Equals Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits . . . . . . . . . 120
32 Three Year Leads (Disability Acceptance Rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
33 Three Year Leads (Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
34 Three Year Leads (Disability Meets Acceptance Rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
35 Three Year Leads (Disability Equals Acceptance Rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
36 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptance Rates . . . . . 127
37 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates . . . 128
38 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Listing Acceptance Rates . 129
39 Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Listing Acceptance Rates . 130
40 1st and 2nd Order Factor Variable Analysis (De Jong et al. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . 132
41 1st and 2nd Order Factor Variable Analysis (De Jong et al. 2005) Continued . . . . 133
42 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
43 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
44 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
45 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
46 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
47 Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
48 Average Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Welfare and Disability Recipients Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Disability Application Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Percent Increase in Total Disability Acceptances 1996-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Initial Acceptances by Reason for Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Initial Acceptances by Reason for Decision as a Percentage of Total Acceptances . . 9
1.6 Application Outcomes by Decision Level Reached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.7 Percent Decrease in Welfare Caseloads 1996-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8 SSI Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.9 SSDI Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.10 Concurrent Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.11 Total Acceptance Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Cost of Passing Policy Conditional on State Ideal Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Behavior Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 Eligibility Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Limitation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.9 Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Basic Assistance As a Fraction of TANF Expenditures Over Time . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Welfare Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Election Cycle and Public Welfare Spending (Democratic Governors) . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4 Election Cycle and Public Welfare Spending (Non-Democratic Governors) . . . . . . 73
3.5 Election Cycle and Total Welfare Spending (Democratic Governors) . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Election Cycle and Total Welfare Spending (Non-Democratic Governors) . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Election Cycle and Basic Assistance Spending Spending (Democratic Governors) . . 76
3.8 Election Cycle and Basic Assistance Spending (Non-Democratic Governors) . . . . . 77
3.9 Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.10 Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.11 Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
12 SSDI Expenditures Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
13 SSDI Expenditures Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
14 Diagnosis Prevalence Among Disabled Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
15 Behavior Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
16 Eligibility Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
17 Limitation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
x
Chapter 1
The Effect of State-Level Welfare
Policy on Disability Acceptance
Rates
1.1 Introduction
In the summer of 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which transitioned the funding of welfare from a matching grant
to a block grant. From the perspective of state governments, this change increased the opportunity
cost of welfare funds because the funds could be used for purposes other than cash transfers such as
tax rebates or work training programs. In contrast, disability benefits are directly federally funded,
and thus, disability funds have a lower opportunity cost to states. Given the institutional structure,
states have some scope for freeing welfare funds for other uses by shifting caseloads from welfare
to Social Security Administration (SSA) disability programs. Whether an applicant for disability is
granted benefits depends on federal rules and local decisions. While disability policy is set at the
federal level, applications are reviewed by state-run Disability Determination Services (DDS) offices.
Therefore, state employees decide who gets onto federal disability rolls. This institutional design
allows for interstate differences in de facto disability acceptance standards while no de jure basis
exists for such differences (Michaud, Nelson, and Wiczer 2016; Keiser 2010).
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In this chapter, I will answer two questions. First, do more restrictive welfare policies induce
substitution to disability? Second, when the incentive to shift caseloads increases, do DDS reviewers
change their de facto disability acceptance standards? The answers to these questions depend on
the degree to which welfare policy influences substitution among welfare recipients, and the degree
to which DDS reviewers are influenced by state-level constraints.
The 1996 welfare reform delegated primary control over welfare policy to the states. As a
result, states have many options available to them to raise the costs of being on welfare for recipients.
One important type of policy many states have adopted is welfare time-limit policies. For example,
some time-limit policies place restrictions on how long individuals can receive welfare benefits over
the course of their lifetimes while others restrict the number of consecutive months individuals can
receive benefits. Time-limit policies have been shown to have a large, negative effect on welfare
caseloads.1 I exploit variation in state-level welfare time-limit policies (formal policy mechanism) to
estimate the degree to which more restrictive welfare policies induce substitution to disability.
States may also change the way in which disability applications are reviewed by DDS offices
(informal policy mechanism). DDS reviewers face political pressure from states to admit more
applicants and pressure from the SSA to apply disability standards in a consistent manner. While
the SSA conducts regular audits, DDS reviewers still have significant discretion. Indeed, one state
DDS director stated he “would probably be discharged if he followed a strict interpretation of SSA
guidelines” (Berkowitz 1987). Thus, when there is increased political pressure from the state, DDS
reviewers should increase their disability acceptance rates.
I cannot directly observe changes in de facto disability policy. However, I can exploit
state-level data on the reasons for acceptance to disability programs to estimate how the acceptance
rate changes by the reason for decision. Some reasons for decision involve more discretion on the part
of the disability reviewer. Thus, when facing increased political pressure, I should observe the largest
effect for decisions that involve more discretion. I proxy for times of increased political pressure by
using state-level fiscal stress, when states have less funding available than officially projected. Thus,
I employ variation in state-level fiscal stress to identify changes in disability acceptance standards.
Using a panel of state-level data from 1996-2015, I explore how welfare policies and fiscal
1Most of the work on welfare time limits has focused on the lifetime limit. Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003),
Grogger (2003), Mazzolari (2007), and Low et al. (2018) show that these time limits push individuals off welfare
through a “banking effect”, in which individuals save years of welfare eligibility for future use, and a direct effect
where individuals are removed from welfare roles by hitting the time limit.
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stress affect disability acceptance rates. I find that the presence of welfare time-limit policies leads
to an increase in disability acceptance rates of 1.77 percentage points. I also show that increases
in per capita fiscal stress lead to higher disability acceptance rates. I show that these results hold
when I restrict my analysis to vocational acceptance rates, a type of disability acceptance involving
more reviewer discretion. In contrast, time-limit policies and fiscal stress have little or no impact
on other types of acceptances with less reviewer discretion.
1.2 Institutional Background
The number of disabled workers has grown substantially over the past 30 years (see Figure
1.1). This trend remains even after accounting for demographic changes such as population growth,
the aging of the workforce, and increases in female workforce participation (Duggan and Imberman
2009; Stapleton, Wittenburg, and Astrue 2011). This has led to a substantial increase in the cost
of disability programs, particularly Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Between 1970 and
2015, the cost of payments to SSDI recipients has increased six-fold in real, per capita terms.2
2See the Congressional Budget Office Social Security Disability Insurance: Participation and Spending, 2016. For
SSDI expenditures since 1992, see Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 1.1: Welfare and Disability Recipients Over Time
SSDI data from The 2015 Annual Statistical Supplement Table 5.A17, SSI data from The 2016 Annual Statistical
Supplement Table 7.A9, and Welfare data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children and Families.
During the past 30 years of disability recipient growth, favorable application determinations
on the basis of vocational factors have increased in relative importance (shown later in Figure 1.5).
These determinations are characterized by greater reviewer discretion (discussed in detail below).
Therefore, understanding the growth in highly discretionary acceptances is crucial to understanding
the growth in disability caseloads.
1.2.1 Social Security Disability Programs
The Social Security Administration administers two programs for disabled individuals:
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) and SSDI.3 SSI is a means-tested disability program, while
3According to 42 USC 423(d)(1) “The term disability means (A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; or (B) in
the case of an individual who has attained the age of 55 and is blind (within the meaning of blindness as defined in
section 416(i)(1) of this title), inability by reason of such blindness to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring
skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he has previously engaged with some regularity
and over a substantial period of time.”
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SSDI provides disability insurance to almost all workers. While the determination process of these
programs differs in the first stage (determination of financial eligibility), the determination process
is the same for each subsequent stage. Applicants who are financially eligible for both programs
are automatically reviewed for both when submitting an application. Such applications are called
“concurrent” applications.
If an applicant’s SSDI case is approved, the disabled individual’s payout depends on their
pre-disability earnings. On average, a SSDI recipient received $1,197 per month in 2018 and the
maximum payout was $2,788 per month.4 Two years following approval, the recipient also receives
Medicare coverage. SSI recipients receive a maximum payout equal to the federal benefit rate (FBR),
which was $750 per month in 2018.5 SSI recipients also qualify for Medicaid as soon as they are
approved.
To be eligible for SSDI benefits a worker must have sufficient work credits. Work credits for
SSDI are earned each year by having income that meets a minimum requirement. For example, in
2018 the requirement was $1, 320 per credit.6 A maximum of four credits may be earned in a given
year.7 A 50-year-old worker applying for SSDI must have 28 work credits, 20 of which must have
been earned in the 10 years preceding disability.8Additionally, an applicant may not be engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.”9 This creates a significant work disincentive for applicants awaiting a
decision.10
An individual is eligible for SSI if their monthly earnings (including any SSDI benefits
they receive) do not exceed the FBR. Half of wage income does not count towards this limit, but
the recipient must not be deemed to be involved in substantial gainful activity. Additionally, SSI
recipients cannot have wealth in excess of $2,000, excluding durable assets such as their home and
vehicle.
4Disability Insurance benefits are indexed to national average wages. Upon approval, applicants receive back pay
going back to the time when they initially applied for disability. The approval process can take many months.
5See Table 14 in Appendix A.1 to see the FBR for eligible individuals and couples. The FBR increases by a cost
of living adjustment based on the Consumer Price Index.
6See Appendix A.1 Table 11 for the minimum earnings requirements for every year going back to 1978.
7Therefore, the full four credits can be earned in 2018 by having an income of at least $5,280.
8For the corresponding credits required for every age, see Appendix A.1 Table 12.
9Substantial gainful activity standards require applicants to earn no more than $1,180 per month in 2018 for
non-blind individuals. Substantial gainful activity standards are more lenient for the blind. Table 13 in Appendix
A.1 contains a breakdown of these standards by year and disability type.
10To address this work disincentive, the SSA has tried many experimental programs to reduce the costs of transitions
back to work for disability recipients. None of these programs have had a substantial effect on increasing employment
among disability recipients. The most prominent of these programs is the Ticket to Work program, where disability
recipients are matched with vocational training agencies that assist in their search for work. These recipients still lose
benefits if their earnings exceed substantial gainful activity standards. However, these recipients are allowed to keep
medicare eligibility as they enter the workforce.
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While disability programs are federally funded, initial applications are processed and decided
on by state-run DDS offices.11 At these offices, state employees follow a standardized decision
process, shown in Figure 1.2, to decide whether an application should be accepted or denied.
The first stage determines financial eligibility. Applicants who do not have sufficient work credits
are automatically denied SSDI at this stage, and applicants who fail to meet income and asset
requirements are denied SSI benefits.
Figure 1.2: Disability Application Review Process
Step 1: Financially eligible? Denied
Step 2: Severe Impairment? Denied





Step 4: Capacity for past work? Denied












The next stage evaluates the medical condition of the applicant. The reviewer requests
medical records from physicians listed in the application and reviews these records. However, merely
being diagnosed with a condition listed in the manual is not sufficient to be approved. The applicant
must have medically determinable impairments from the diagnosed condition. The reviewer consults
the SSA impairment listing manual to see if the medical condition meets or equals one of the listed
conditions.12 Applicants whose conditions are on the list and meet the other requirements are
approved through a “meets listing acceptance” (henceforth Meets acceptance). If a medical condition
11Some states offer supplementary SSI funds. These supplements are usually small and change little over time.
12To see the medical conditions listed in the manual and their prevalence among disabled workers, see Figure 14 in
Appendix A.1.
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is not in the manual but is equivalent in every way to the listed condition, the application is approved
through an “equals listing acceptance” (henceforth Equals acceptance). Allowances based on having
a medical condition that equals a listing are the rarest type of allowances.
Should an applicant’s condition not meet or equal the medical listing, the application is
passed on to the vocational stage. At this stage, factors outside of the medical condition of the
applicant are explicitly taken into account. Reviewers follow a grid of rules to determine whether
a vocational disability acceptance (henceforth Vocational acceptance) is appropriate. Table 10 in
Appendix A.1 shows a condensed version of this grid. While the vocational grid takes into account
age, education, skill, and the severity of the impairment, there is a significant amount of discretion
that remains in the decision process (Mashaw 1985).13 This discretion provides room for supervisor
influence and political pressures to influence the acceptance process.14
Figure 1.3: Percent Increase in Total Disability Acceptances 1996-2015
During the same time period that disability recipient growth has occurred, favorable
determinations on the basis of vocational factors have increased in relative importance. Figures
13Indeed, the federal code explicitly states that some grid factors are not be applied in a mechanical way (see 20
C.F.R. 404.1563(b)). For an extended discussion of the way in which the vocational grid is applied, see Capowski
(1983).
14There exists a literature in political science on “street-level bureaucrats” who have discretion in how to apply
broadly written laws. Keiser (2010) builds on this literature and uses survey evidence to show differences between DDS
employee decision processes. Reviewers who report their decisions are driven by “accountability to federal taxpayers”
in the survey have significantly lower acceptance rates.
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1.4 and 1.5 show this change over time. There is also significant interstate variation in vocational
acceptances, even when controlling for demographic factors (see Figure 1.7). Michaud, Nelson, and
Wiczer (2016) argue that demographic factors have played a role in the rise of vocational acceptances,
but they show that these demographic factors can account for only part of the increase in Vocational
acceptances. The remainder of the variation may be explained by differences in the application of
disability standards.
Figure 1.4: Initial Acceptances by Reason for Decision
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Figure 1.5: Initial Acceptances by Reason for Decision as a Percentage of Total Acceptances
If an applicant is denied a Vocational acceptance, the initial stage is ended. After being
denied, applicants have 60 days to file a Request for Reconsideration. Reconsiderations are also
handled by state-run DDS offices and proceed in the same way as the initial stage. Applicants who
are once again denied may request a hearing before an administrative law judge. In principle, the
judge will take into account the same factors and guidelines that the initial reviewer used to deny
the case. If the administrative law judge rules against the applicant, the applicant may appeal the
decision to the Social Security Appeals Council. If denied before the Appeals Council, the case is
closed.15
15Administrative law judges are appointed and employed by the federal government. An applicant denied by the
Appeals Council may challenge in federal court, though very few do.
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Figure 1.6: Application Outcomes by Decision Level Reached
Notes: Data represented in the figure comes from the Social Security Advisory Board Disability Chartbook. Data
in figure comes from 2008. The number of decisions is measured in thousands. Only the first two levels (Initial and
Reconsideration) are decided by DDS offices.
1.2.2 Welfare Reform and Changing Incentives
In the summer of 1996 President Clinton signed the PRWORA, fulfilling his campaign
promise to “end welfare as we know it.” The legislation changed welfare policy in three primary ways.
First, recipients of cash welfare (now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or TANF) had
some federal restrictions placed on them such as eligibility restrictions and work requirements.16
It is important to note that the law did not meaningfully distinguish between caseload reduction
for any reason and caseload reduction due to recipients finding employment, and states were given
16While the federal limit applies to cash assistance given through the TANF block grant, states may choose not to
impose this time limit and continue funding cash assistance beyond five years using state funds. In addition, up to 20
percent of a state’s caseload may be exempted from this requirement. By 2002, 50 percent of families were required to
be involved in a work activity. This could mean employment, participation in a work program, or some other activity.
States have significant discretion over what qualifies as a work activity.
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considerable leeway in how they implemented work requirements in their state (Blank 2002). Second,
welfare reform delegated primary rule-making power over welfare policy to the states. Third, the
PRWORA transitioned welfare funding from a matching grant to a block grant, which gave states
discretion in how they spend TANF funds as long as states work towards one of four goals given
in the legislation: (i) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their homes or those of relatives; (ii) end dependence of needy parents on government support by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (iii) prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies;
and (iv) encourage formation and maintenance of two-parent families.17 As a result of the policy
changes made by or enabled by welfare reform, welfare caseloads have fallen significantly (see Figure
1.1 and Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7: Percent Decrease in Welfare Caseloads 1996-2015
One important instrument states have used to reduce welfare caseloads since the passage of
welfare reform has been time-limit policies. Specifically, the legislation only allowed federal funds
to be used for cash welfare for a total of five years over a recipient’s lifetime. However, states may
17Under a matching grant, the federal government matches the spending of state governments at the matching rate.
The matching rate for welfare was tied to the Medicare matching rate in 1965. States with lower per capita income
received better matching rates. The matching rate could go no lower than 50%, and could go as high as 83%. Under
a block grant, the federal government gives a fixed amount to the states to spend at the state’s discretion. The size
of the block grant was determined for each state by taking the the largest grant amount from 1992-1995 and setting
the block grant equal to that amount. The size of the block grant has remained constant in nominal terms since the
passage of welfare reform.
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choose not to enforce this limit and continue giving assistance to individuals beyond five years using
state funds. Another common type of time limit used by states is a periodic time limit on the number
of months an individual can receive welfare benefits consecutively. Time-limit policies have had a
substantial impact on welfare caseloads (Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003; Grogger 2003; Mazzolari
2007; Low et al. 2018; Blank 2002). While most states had at least one of these types of time-limit
policies in place by 2015, there is within-state time variation in these policies in my sample.
Since the passage of the PRWORA, states have made use of the freedom of block grant funds.
In 2016, only 23.9 percent of funds were used for Basic Assistance compared to 70 percent when
TANF began.18 Funds not allocated to Basic Assistance are diverted to other uses such as pre-K
programs or tax credits. This change reflects the increased opportunity cost of TANF funds that
resulted from the transition to block grant funding. In contrast, federal disability programs provide
assistance with funds that have no opportunity cost for the state (Burkhauser and Daly 2011).19
While states do not directly control disability policy, the head of each DDS office is appointed by the
governor and the staff are state employees.20 Therefore, it is plausible that these state employees may
respond to state political forces when making disability determinations. Indeed, there is anecdotal
evidence of localities and states identifying TANF recipients who would be eligible for SSI, the
means-tested federal disability program, and assisting them with their disability application (Pavetti
et al. 2006).
While there exists a small literature on substitution between disability and welfare, much
of it has focused on the SSI disability program. For example, several papers have examined
sub-populations such as children (Kubik 1999; Garrett and Glied 2000; Schmidt 2012) and
female-headed households (Schmidt and Sevak 2004), finding that state-level welfare policy did
have a significant effect on SSI caseloads. Additionally, Schmidt (2012) shows that more welfare
sanctions, stricter time limit policies, and lower maximum benefits all caused SSI caseloads to rise
when controlling for economic and demographic factors. While several papers have also emphasized
the importance of state-level political variables on both SSDI and SSI applications (Iyengar and
Mastrobuoni 2014; Honig 2013; Coe et al. 2011; Keiser 2001), this chapter is the first to identify
each of the policy mechanisms used to shift caseloads.
While substitution between means-tested programs such as TANF and SSI is likely, there are
18TANF Financial Data - FY 2016 .
19See Section 1.5 for a discussion of how disability acceptance rates are related to changes in welfare spending.
20DDS office employees are paid out of state funds and their pay is set by the state government.
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several reasons to believe that SSDI may also be a substitute for cash welfare. First, both programs
primarily serve individuals near or below the poverty line. While SSDI is not means-tested, the
opportunity cost of not being employed prevents many high-earners from applying to the program.
Indeed, approximately 37% of accepted SSDI applicants have been concurrently accepted to SSI
and therefore meet the income and asset tests of that program. Therefore, it is plausible that
many low-income individuals may qualify for both cash welfare and SSDI. Second, while average
characteristics of individuals on welfare and SSDI may differ (e.g. work history, racial composition,
health status, etc.), it is the characteristics (and existence) of marginal individuals that matter for
substitution between these programs.
1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
State governments can use a formal and an informal policy mechanism to achieve caseload
shifting from welfare to disability. First, they can raise the cost of being on welfare through more
restrictive welfare policy (a formal policy mechanism). Second, they can influence DDS offices to
admit more disability applicants (an informal policy mechanism).
I cannot directly observe the informal policy mechanism at work. Therefore, I use three
approaches to show its existence and estimate its magnitude. First, I examine the rate of disability
acceptances as opposed to the stock of disability cases or the application rate. While many factors
influence the number of applications or the number of acceptances, only changes in the pool of
applicants or changes in the standards applied to the applications can influence the acceptance
rate.21
Second, I use data from the SSA on the total number of acceptances and denials by reason
for decision. Vocational acceptances are the margin along which this informal policy change is most
likely to happen. Due to the imprecise nature of applying the vocational grid, Vocational acceptances
involve more discretion on the part of the disability case worker (Mashaw 1985). Thus, pressure to
admit more applicants would have a larger effect on Vocational acceptances than Meets or Equals
acceptances.
Third, I employ a measure of state-level fiscal stress to capture times during which there is
21For example, if the pool of disability applicants becomes less healthy on average, one would expect to see an
increase in the disability acceptance rate holding other factors constant.
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an increased incentive for states to increase disability acceptance rates.22 Several papers have shown
the importance of fiscal stress to disability caseloads and acceptance rates (Kubik 1999; Schmidt
2012; Keiser 2001). I use the measure of fiscal stress employed by Kubik (1999) and Schmidt (2012)
that defines fiscal stress as
FiscalStress =(Actual State Expenditures − Forecasted State Expenditures)
− (Actual State Revenue − Forecasted State Revenue).
(1.1)
The direct effect of fiscal stress can only induce substitution through a change in the way in which
disability applications are reviewed. While states may wish to use both formal and informal policy
to induce substitution when experiencing fiscal stress, welfare policy requires legislative approval
and is too slow to respond to fiscal stress.23
I estimate
AcceptanceRates,t =α+ β1TimeLimitss,t + β2FiscalStressPerCaps,t+
+ γZs,t + δt + νs + εs,t
(1.2)
where AcceptanceRate is the fraction of disability applications that are accepted during the initial
stage in state s and year t. In alternative specifications, I use the AcceptanceRate subdivided by the
reason for acceptance to explore whether the variables of interest have different effects on Vocational
acceptance rates versus Meets or Equals acceptance rates. I examine SSI, SSDI, concurrent, and
total disability (SSI, SSDI, and concurrent acceptances combined) acceptance rates. The variable
TimeLimits equals one if state s has either a lifetime or periodic welfare time limit in year t.24 The
implementation of either of these time-limit policies raises the cost of being on welfare relative to
Disability Insurance. This variable is calculated from data in the Welfare Rules Database published
by the Urban Institute.25
My measure of fiscal stress is constructed using data from the National Association of State
Budget Officers State Fiscal Survey. Data on forecasted state revenue and expenditure come from
22Kubik (1999) and Schmidt (2012) refer to this measure as “Fiscal Shocks”.
23Indeed, when one regresses a dummy variable that captures whether a state has a set of TANF time limit policies
on fiscal stress, one cannot reject the hypothesis that fiscal stress has no effect on state-level welfare policy. This holds
with or without the inclusion of a basic set of state-level demographic controls.
24These periodic time limits include time limit policies that reduce benefits after some number of months of
consecutive receipt. See Appendix A.2 for more details.
25See Appendix A.2 for a detailed account of the variables used to construct this variable.
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the State Fiscal Survey.26 The vector Z contains a set of state-level control variables that include
the log of the working age population, the unemployment rate, personal income per capita, the
poverty rate, a housing price index, the fraction of the population that is black, the minimum wage
in the state, the log of the population age 55 to 64 (a demographic much more likely to apply for
and receive SSDI benefits), and the obesity rate (as a proxy for general health status in the state).
The fixed effects approach offers many advantages, including that I can model the
unobserved state-specific effects in a highly flexible way. However, there are drawbacks to this
estimation method. First, I impose linearity in the marginal effects. Second, it is possible to have
marginal effects that are nonsensical if the effects are quite large. In my case, neither of these are
a significant concern because the size of the effects are quite small in magnitude (less than three
percentage point changes). However, for each regression, I also estimate and present the results
of a non-linear model. Specifically, I use a Correlated Random Effects (CRE) Probit estimation
approach. This estimation offers the advantage of avoiding the incidental parameters problem that
fixed effects non-linear models incur when the time dimension is fixed.27 I follow the approach
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) by modeling the distribution of the unobserved effect (à
la Mundlak 1978) rather than estimating the unobserved effect directly through fixed effects. This
is done by including the time averages of each of the covariates in the regression. The linear fixed
effects estimation method and the CRE estimation method yield very similar results.28 In the CRE
regressions I estimate
E(AcceptanceRates,t|X ) =Φ(α+ β1TimeLimitss,t + β2FiscalStressPerCaps,t+
+ γZs,t + X̄s + δt)
(1.3)
The variable X̄s is a vector of the time-averages of each covariate and is included to account for the
unobserved heterogeneity among states.
I estimate Equations (1.2) and (1.3) using data from 1996-2015.29 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present
26Thanks are due to Jeffrey Kubik and Lucie Schmidt for providing advice regarding the calculation of fiscal stress.
27The number of time periods, T , is less than the number of cross-section observations, N . Thus, relying on the
asymptotic properties of T holding N fixed will fail to account for the incidental parameters problem.
28In the CRE specification, I also include a dummy variable to indicate whether a state has a SSI supplemental
program. In the fixed effects regression, this dummy variable is absorbed by the state fixed effects. Many states run
small SSI supplemental programs. These programs off a small increase in the cash assistance provided to SSI recipients.
Ideally, I would be able to account for the size of the SSI supplement. However, the SSA stopped collecting data on
this in 2011, and their data before 2011 were not completely accurate. However, including those data instead of a
dummy variable yields an almost identical result as my main specification (when only using a 1996-2011 sub-sample).
This is perhaps due to small size of these supplements.
29My panel begins in 1996, prior to the implementation of welfare reform. While welfare reform strengthened the
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summary statistics for the variables used to estimate Equation (1.2).
1.4 Results
Table 1.3 presents the results from the estimation of Equation (1.2). Panel A shows that the
presence of welfare time-limit policies leads to an increase in disability acceptance rates. The presence
of time-limit policies increases the total disability acceptance rate by 1.77 percentage points. The
impact on SSI acceptance rates (an increase of 1.74 percentage points) is smaller than the increase
in SSDI acceptance rates (an increase of 2.71 percentage points). These coefficients imply that
more restrictive welfare policies not only induce substitution to disability (from current or potential
welfare recipients), but those new applicants are accepted at higher rates.
Table 1.3 also shows that a $1,000 increase in per capita fiscal stress leads to a .91 percentage
point increase in the SSI acceptance rate, a 0.27 percentage point increase in the SSDI acceptance rate
(though the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level), and a .59 percentage
point increase in the total disability acceptance rate. This indicates that, during times of fiscal
stress, disability reviewers accept a higher percentage of applicants. While a $1,000 increase in fiscal
stress per capita is substantial (approximately 2.7 standard deviations), such an event occurs 12
times in my sample.
If state-employed disability reviewers are changing de facto disability acceptance standards,
one should observe the largest effect for acceptances that exhibit the greatest discretion (Vocational
acceptances). Table 1.4 shows the results of estimating Equation (1.2) for Vocational acceptances.
While the coefficients on the variables of interest are generally smaller than for the overall acceptance
rate, they remain positive and statistically significant. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results for Meets
and Equals acceptance rates. The coefficient on TimeLimit is statistically insignificant in each
specification. In Table 1.5, the coefficients on per capita fiscal stress are statistically significant for
the SSI, concurrent, and total disability acceptance rates, though these coefficients are smaller than
the corresponding coefficients in Table 1.4 for Vocational acceptances.
To test this hypothesis further, I use a Wald test where the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients of interest from Table 1.4 are individually equal to the corresponding coefficients from
incentive to shift caseloads from welfare to disability, that incentive existed under the matching-grant system as well.
Econometrically, welfare reform is a common shock to all states, which is absorbed by my time fixed effects. My main
results do not change significantly if I drop 1996 from my sample. Appendix A.2 contains a full list of the sources of
data used in my analysis.
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Table 1.5 or Table 1.6. In other words, I test whether the marginal effects of my variables of interest
are the same across Vocational and Meets acceptance rates and Vocational and Equals acceptance
rates. I present the results of these Wald tests in Table 1.7. In each case, I can reject the hypothesis
that the coefficient on TimeLimit is equal between Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 or Table 1.6, with
the exception of the coefficient on TimeLimit in the SSI Equals Acceptances regression, which is
only marginally significant. Table 1.7 tells a similar story for FiscalStressPerCapita. One can
reject the null hypothesis that a $1000 increase in per capita fiscal stress has the same effect on
the Vocational acceptance rate as for the Equals acceptance rate. For the Meets acceptance rate,
one can reject the null hypothesis for SSI and Total Disability acceptances, but not for SSDI or
Concurrent acceptances.
These results demonstrate that systematic changes in the way state-employed disability
application reviewers apply federal guidelines drove part of the increase in Vocational acceptances
(and acceptance rates). This effect is important for understanding the growth of disability in recent
years, as Vocational acceptances have become the primary mechanism behind that growth.
1.5 Extensions
The results shown in Section 1.4 demonstrate that time-limit policies and fiscal stress lead to
higher disability acceptance rates. However, if states are shifting caseloads, the number of disability
acceptances should also rise. Therefore, I estimate the effects of the variables of interest on the
number of disability acceptances. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1.8. The presence
of time limits increases the number of SSI, SSDI, concurrent, and total disability acceptances, though
the coefficient on time limits for concurrent acceptances is only significant at the 10 percent level.
In addition, a $1,000 increase in fiscal stress per capita leads to a 1.28% increase in SSI acceptances,
while only increasing SSDI acceptances by 1.02%. The coefficients on fiscal stress imply that states
not only induce substitution with welfare policy but change their de facto disability policy when
experiencing fiscal stress, leading to an increase in acceptances. These findings, along with the
results shown in Table 1.3, show that welfare time-limit policies and state-level fiscal stress increase
the number of disability acceptances and the acceptance rate.
The findings presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that states change formal welfare policy
and de facto disability policy to induce substitution from welfare to disability. If this process frees
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TANF block grant funds for other uses, one should observe changes in how states use welfare funds
when disability acceptance rates change. While causal inference is difficult in this context, Figures
1.8-1.11 show a clear relationship between disability acceptances and welfare spending, controlling for
state and year fixed effects and set of state-level economic variables.30 In particular, Figures 1.8-1.11
show that higher acceptance rates are associated with a lower percentage of TANF block grant funds
employed for Basic Assistance (traditional cash welfare). These correlations are consistent with the
findings of my causal analysis in the previous section.
Figure 1.8: SSI Acceptance Rates Figure 1.9: SSDI Acceptance Rates
Figure 1.10: Concurrent Acceptance Rates Figure 1.11: Total Acceptance Rates
I extend the analysis of this chapter in Appendix A.4 where I show that these results are
robust to alternative definitions of welfare restrictiveness (lagged welfare caseloads, lagged time
limits), alternative definitions of fiscal stress (deficits per capita), and the inclusion of state-specific
linear time trends. I also show a placebo test using three-year leads of the variables of interest.
30In particular, both welfare spending and acceptance rates are driven primarily by economic conditions. Therefore,
controlling for economic conditions would lead to bias in the coefficients on the variable of interest.
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1.6 Conclusion
The rise of disability caseloads over time has received much attention from policy makers
and researchers. Disability benefits have become the primary form of cash assistance in the U.S.,
providing more transfers to low-income individuals than welfare, food stamps, Section 8 housing
vouchers, or the Earned Income Tax Credit. In this chapter, I argue that the 1996 welfare reform
changed the incentives for states by changing the way cash welfare was funded. The shift to a block
grant system increased the incentive for states to move individuals off of welfare and onto disability.
This caseloads shifting take place through two policy mechanisms. The formal policy mechanism
involves raising the cost of being on welfare benefits through changes to welfare time limit policies.
The informal policy mechanism involves institutional and political pressure on state-run DDS offices
to approve more applications. Furthermore, this informal policy instrument is utilized to a greater
extent when states experience fiscal stress and has the largest effect on Vocational acceptances.
In this chapter, I have shown that welfare policy (specifically time limits) induce substitution
towards disability. I show that the presence of welfare time limits leads to a 1.77 percentage point
increase in the total disability acceptance rate. I also show that a $1,000 per capita increase in
the measure of fiscal stress of a state leads to a .59 percentage point increase in the total disability
acceptance rate. These changes can lead to substantial increases in the cost of disability programs.
A rough calculation reveals that if every state removed their welfare time limits and experienced
no positive fiscal stress, the federal government would have saved approximately $1 billion in SSDI
expenditures and $.18 billion in SSI expenditures in 2015.31 These savings only account for the
absence of the additional disability recipients in 2015 and do not account for previous years during
which the savings would have a similar magnitude.
However, examining disability acceptance rates by reason for decision reveals a crucial aspect
of these policy mechanisms. If state governments exert institutional pressure to admit more disability
applicants, that pressure should have the largest effect on Vocational acceptances because of the
increased reviewer discretion for these types of acceptances. I find that the presence of welfare
time-limit policies increase total disability Vocational acceptance rates by 1.9 percentage points and
a $1,000 increase in per capita fiscal stress leads to a .36 percentage point increase in total disability
31This estimate is imprecise in several ways. First, I am using both the estimated cost of an additional average SSI
and SSDI recipient. Marginal participants may have different costs. The same holds for estimating the additional
Medicaid and Medicare costs. In addition, I count Concurrent acceptances as only receiving SSDI benefits, as the SSI
benefits would be difficult to assess for these cases. This estimate is calculated using 2015 dollars.
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Vocational acceptance rates. My results show that both the effects of welfare time limits and fiscal
stress are smaller in magnitude for Meets and Equals acceptances. More generally, this chapter
contributes to the literature on institutional structure by estimating policy effects where there is no
de jure authority.
Future work that can exploit individual-level data holds the promise of more clearly
separating the effects of the two policy instruments discussed in this chapter. In addition, further
investigation into the specific mechanisms of informal policy change could provide valuable insight
for the design of assistance programs generally, and disability reforms going forward.
20
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for SSDI Acceptances and Applications
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
SSI Acceptances 3769.37 5106.183 141 36873
SSDI Acceptances 6391.405 6601.035 326 40229
Concurrent Acceptances 3894.56 4030.857 187 24974
SSI Vocational Acceptances 1657.167 2564.214 30 19196
SSDI Vocational Acceptances 3080.334 3569.321 117 22350
Concurrent Vocational Acceptances 1664.935 1987.287 48 14301
SSI Meets Acceptances 1832.197 2359.055 57 18178
SSDI Meets Acceptances 2773.445 2776.412 136 16875
Concurrent Meets Acceptances 1868.03 1869.929 79 10556
SSI Equals Acceptances 280.006 378.511 3 4971
SSDI Equals Acceptances 537.626 575.574 9 5301
Concurrent Equals Acceptances 361.595 407.284 8 3422
SSI Acceptance Rate 0.331 0.079 0.173 0.661
SSDI Acceptance Rate 0.466 0.075 0.094 0.705
Concurrent Acceptance Rate 0.282 0.067 0.159 0.570
SSI Vocational Acceptance Rate 0.134 0.045 0.046 0.302
SSDI Vocational Acceptance Rate 0.215 0.063 0.043 0.405
Concurrent Vocational Acceptance Rate 0.115 0.041 0.036 0.303
SSI Meets Acceptance Rate 0.168 0.049 0.079 0.477
SSDI Meets Acceptance Rate 0.205 0.046 0.04 0.4
Concurrent Meets Acceptance Rate 0.139 0.044 0.066 0.428
SSI Equals Acceptance Rate 0.028 0.018 0.004 0.162
SSDI Equals Acceptance Rate 0.04 0.021 0.004 0.131
Concurrent Equals Acceptance Rate 0.027 0.016 0.003 0.13
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest and Covariates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Time Limit 0.869 0.338 0 1
Fiscal Stress Per Cap -0.042 0.369 -7.635 3.701
AFDC/TANF Caseloads 52129.569 99945.362 266 919471
Population Age 18 to 64 3562535.088 4000636.454 279352 24810520
Unemployment Rate 5.649 1.88 2.3 13.7
Personal Income Per Cap 41.122 7.305 25.177 68.704
Poverty Rate 12.721 3.526 4.5 26.4
HPI 2.7 1.096 0.891 7.153
Fraction Black 10.688 9.532 0.275 38.233
Minimum Wage 7.342 0.763 5.888 9.470
Obesity Rate 23.602 5.333 10.1 36.2
Fiscal Stress Per Capita and Personal Income Per Capita are measures in thousands of 2015
dollars. Minimum Wage is measured in 2015 dollars.
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Table 1.3: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Acceptance Rates
Panel A: Linear Fixed-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.739** 2.709*** 1.097 1.770**
(0.813) (0.858) (0.837) (0.796)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.911*** 0.274* 0.540*** 0.585***
(0.121) (0.162) (0.131) (0.138)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.421 0.344 0.450 0.402
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes No Yes No
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Correlated Random-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRE CRE CRE CRE
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.974** 2.757*** 1.275 1.962**
(0.876) (0.867) (0.876) (0.840)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.857*** 0.272* 0.498*** 0.564***
(0.113) (0.157) (0.119) (0.132)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.499 0.536 0.445 0.537
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No No
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a
variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent
variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one unit
increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita. The
full regression results for Panel A, including coefficients for state control variables, can be found in Table 16 in Appendix
A.3.
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Table 1.4: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates
Panel A: Linear Fixed-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.404** 2.315*** 1.257** 1.903***
(0.530) (0.682) (0.494) (0.559)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.535*** 0.240** 0.305*** 0.364***
(0.0845) (0.108) (0.0838) (0.0914)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.319 0.514 0.364 0.356
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Correlated Random-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRE CRE CRE CRE
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.524*** 2.538*** 1.406*** 1.804***
(0.554) (0.754) (0.538) (0.591)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.465*** 0.229** 0.248*** 0.329***
(0.0719) (0.102) (0.0717) (0.0833)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.404 0.468 0.371 0.432
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No No
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that
a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that
equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has
$1,000 less funds available than expected per capita. The full regression results for Panel A, including coefficients for state control variables,
can be found in Table 17 in Appendix A.3.
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Table 1.5: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Acceptance Rates
Panel A: Linear Fixed-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit -0.0153 -0.0688 -0.379 -0.180
(0.452) (0.311) (0.358) (0.340)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.340*** 0.0646 0.195*** 0.197***
(0.0633) (0.0687) (0.0562) (0.0580)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.441 0.701 0.688 0.659
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Correlated Random-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRE CRE CRE CRE
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit -0.0201 -0.0673 -0.389 -0.178
(0.460) (0.313) (0.347) (0.343)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.302*** 0.0666 0.173*** 0.180***
(0.0556) (0.0600) (0.0471) (0.0487)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.453 0.600 0.490 0.545
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No No
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable
indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit
is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one unit increase in Fiscal Stress
Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita. The full regression results for Panel A,
including coefficients for state control variables, can be found in Table 18 in Appendix A.3.
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Table 1.6: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Acceptance Rates
Panel A: Linear Fixed-Effect Model
(5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.347 0.343 0.229 0.303
(0.322) (0.327) (0.286) (0.295)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.0696** -0.0330 0.0438* 0.0294
(0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0231) (0.0258)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.114 0.224 0.246 0.215
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Correlated Random-Effect Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRE CRE CRE CRE
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.363 0.318 0.203 0.291
(0.257) (0.327) (0.248) (0.269)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.0783** -0.0620 0.0483 0.0266
(0.0380) (0.0475) (0.0316) (0.0302)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.377 0.292 0.340 0.334
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No No
State Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable
indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is
a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap
indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita. The full regression results for Panel A, including
coefficients for state control variables, can be found in Table 19 in Appendix A.3.
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Table 1.7: Wald Tests for Difference in Coefficients
Independent Variable Outcome Variable SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Time Limit
Meets Acceptances
χ2(1) 4.48 9.18 9.09 9.51
Prob > χ2 0.0344 0.0025 0.0026 .002
Equals Acceptances
χ2(1) 3.83 10.91 6.31 7.62
Prob > χ2 0.0504 0.001 0.012 0.0058
Fiscal Stress Per Capita
Meets Acceptances
χ2(1) 3.85 2.72 2.07 4.04
Prob > χ2 0.0496 0.099 0.15 0.0445
Equals Acceptances
χ2(1) 28.12 8.03 12.98 17.04
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0046 0.0003 0.0000
Each cell represents a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that the coefficient from the Vocational acceptance rate regression
is equal to the coefficient from the Meets or Equals acceptance rate regressions. This hypothesis test is performed through a Wald
test.
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Table 1.8: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable (in logs): SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptances Acceptances Acceptances Acceptances
Time Limit 5.942** 6.302** 7.936* 7.373**
(2.521) (3.005) (4.011) (3.044)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 1.280* 1.018** 1.271** 0.637
(0.640) (0.491) (0.629) (0.563)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 21.86 76.54* -50.39 48.72
(56.36) (39.44) (61.33) (37.81)
Unemployment Rate -3.101** -2.670** -0.218 3.480***
(1.283) (1.117) (1.383) (0.702)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.873* 0.509 1.053* 1.045**
(0.466) (0.475) (0.579) (0.454)
Poverty Rate -0.662 -0.662 -1.212* -1.689***
(0.577) (0.435) (0.603) (0.559)
HPI -8.587** -2.640 -0.659 -0.384
(3.331) (2.535) (3.934) (1.340)
Fraction Black -0.752 -3.358 -2.617 -5.078**
(2.818) (2.115) (2.694) (2.406)
Minimum Wage 0.591 -0.831 0.978 -2.791
(2.653) (1.910) (2.233) (1.684)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 88.56* -12.13 53.66 19.53
(50.67) (28.03) (52.76) (17.00)
Obesity Rate 0.890 0.279 0.333 0.453
(0.936) (0.695) (0.867) (0.643)
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.254 0.663 0.561 0.447
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one
on an independent variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percent increase in
the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time
limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available
than expected per capita.
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Chapter 2
Voting on Delegation: Evidence
from the Passage of the 1996
Welfare Reform
2.1 Introduction
When legislators are deciding whether to delegate rule-making authority to states, their expectations
of how that authority will be used will influence their decision to support delegation. If the policy
preferences of those to whom rule-making power is delegated diverge substantially from the policy
preferences of legislators, the legislators should be more likely to oppose delegation. The federal
system in the United States provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. Whether Congress
delegates rule-making authority to the states should depend upon the expectations of members of
the House with respect to how states may change policy.
In 1996, President Clinton signed Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The passage of this law allows for an empirical analysis of how
legislators vote when delegating power to the states. This legislation replaced the old federal
welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with the Temporary Assistance
29
to Needy Families (TANF) program. The reform opened up a set of policy options for states
looking to either expand or restrict welfare payments and eligibility. The 1996 reform transitioned
federal funding of welfare to a block grant system which led to states having significantly more
freedom in how they could spend federal funds designated for welfare and the rules they could
make for restricting cash transfers. Thus, voting on the legislation may have been influenced by
the expectations of members of the House of how their home states would change rules governing
welfare. This chapter examines the way in which expectations influenced voting on welfare reform
among Democratic members of the House given the preferred policies of members of the House. I
find that as expectations of state-level welfare policy diverged from the typical voting patterns of
Democratic members of the House, Democrats were less likely to vote in favor of welfare reform.
There is a long-standing debate on the role of constituent interests and ideology in legislative
voting. Voting in the U.S. Congress appears to be a function of more than constituent interests,
at least as far as these interests are reflected by district-level economic and demographic variables.
Measures of legislator ideology often have much greater predictive power than constituent interest
variables alone when explaining how legislators vote (Kalt and Zupan 1984; Peltzman 1985; Levitt
1996; Adkisson and Daniel 2001).1 This may be because ideology variables more accurately capture
the interests of the specific electoral coalition of the legislator than can a set of district-level economic
variables (Peltzman 1984, Richardson and Munger 1990). Indeed, policy-specific constituent interests
seem to play a much more significant role in the voting behavior of legislators than do general
demographic variables (Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast 1989; Fleck 2002).
This study contributes to this debate by showing that when legislatures vote on laws that
delegate rule-making authority, it is not only legislator policy preference (whether a function of
constituency preferences, special interest preferences, party-line factors, logrolling, or of “pure
ideology”) that influences voting behavior but how that policy preference interacts with the
expectations of how delegated power will be used.
1These measures often take the form of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores or Poole and Rosenthal
NOMINATE scores, both of which are constructed based off of roll-call votes. For a more extensive review of this
literature, see Lott and Davis (1992).
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2.2 Historical Context
In the summer of 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress was set to put forth a plan
to significantly change the way the federal cash welfare system operated. Since taking over both
chambers of Congress in 1994, Republicans had sent two major pieces of welfare legislation to the
President’s desk, both of which were vetoed. However, several factors made this version of welfare
reform more likely to succeed. First, by the summer of 1996, the presidential campaign was in full
swing and President Clinton was facing criticism from the presumptive Republican nominee, Sen.
Dole, on grounds that he had failed in his promise to “end welfare as we know it.” Second, strong
economic growth had led to a low unemployment rate, making the work requirements of the 1996
welfare reform more palatable with liberal legislators and voters. Additionally, states had already
begun to work on shifting their welfare programs towards a “work-first” model, and several governors
were asking for more flexibility in how they distributed welfare funds. The most prominent of these
instances was the Wisconsin waiver bill, which was designed to give a special exemption from some
federal welfare rules to Wisconsin so the state government could go forward with significant welfare
reforms. The bill passed the House of Representatives but went no further. However, many states
obtained some type of waiver from Congress before the passage of the 1996 reform, though the
legislation brought in much more significant changes than were allowed under the waivers (Haskins
2007).
The 1996 welfare reform includes several restrictions on who was eligible for cash assistance
and restrictions on assistance duration. The 1996 welfare reform restricts the duration of assistance
for adults to five years during their lifetime, though states can (and some have) restricted this
further.2 Most recipients are also required to be actively involved in a “work activity” within two
years to continue receiving cash assistance (Schoeni and Blank 2000). However, states can determine
what qualifies as a work activity, resulting in significant heterogeneity in these rules. The reform
also placed restrictions on the ability of immigrants to collect welfare benefits. Under the 1996
welfare reform, states can also vary their rules for cash assistance along many other dimensions
such as limits to additional cash assistance based on having children, requirements that the children
of welfare recipients be in school, and reducing benefits after a number of months of consecutive
receipt.
2States can exempt up to 20% of their welfare recipients from these time limits. Some states choose not to enforce
this limit and continue funding welfare recipients after the initial five-year period using state funds.
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Because TANF funds are given as a block grant, states have great flexibility with regard
to how they spend the funds. The legislation lists four goals of welfare reform: (i) end dependence
of needy parents upon government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (ii)
aid needy families so that children may be cared for in their homes or those of relatives; (iii) reduce
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish goals for reducing their incidence; and (iv) encourage
formation and maintenance of two-parent families (Schoeni and Blank 2000). Since the passage of
the 1996 welfare reform, states are able to choose how to allocate funds toward policies that further
one or more of these goals.
On the initial vote in the House of Representatives, 226 Republicans and 30 Democrats voted
for the bill. Four Republicans and 165 Democrats voted against the bill. The bill was then changed
and passed by the Senate and was sent back to the House for an approval of the Conference Report.
In the vote on the Conference Report (a reconciliation of the House version and the Senate version
of the bill), 230 Republicans and 98 Democrats voted to pass. Two Republicans and 98 Democrats
voted against passing the Conference Report (H.R. 3734, 104th Congress: Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.). These details can be found in Table 2.1.
Leading up to the initial vote in the House of Representatives, there was reasonable
uncertainty as to whether welfare reform would become law. President Clinton had vetoed two
previous welfare reform bills, and he had yet to come out in support of the most recent version of
the legislation. Because of this threat, the Democratic opposition could have affected the the policy
provisions of the bill. Republicans may have been willing to compromise to make the bill’s passage
seem bipartisan, which would make it harder for the President to veto.
2.3 Theoretical Model
To illustrate how state-level policy may have influenced members of the House voting on
welfare reform, consider the following simple theoretical model. Each state s has an ideal point, (Is)
for each type of policies, x and y, where
Is,x, Is,y ∈ [0, 1].
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This can be thought of as a mapping of the preferences of the median voter in the state to a
two-dimensional policy space. For each policy, higher values indicate a more restrictive welfare
policy for recipients. The state policies are initially uniform and set at the federal level.3 The
federal policies can be written as Fx and Fy where
Fx, Fy ∈ [0, 1].
Legislators consider whether to vote for a policy that would delegate freedom to set these policies
at the state-level, with exogenously determined minimum level of restrictiveness on the y policy but
no minimum (within the range of policies from 0 to 1) on the x policy.4 Should the proposal be
accepted, states would be able to set their state policies to their own ideal points, subject to the
minimum on the y policy. The minimum on y policies can be written as
My ∈ (0, 1]
and
My > Fy
by assumption.5 If the proposal is passed, each state would set their x policy to Ps,x = Is,x and
their y policy to Ps,y = Is,y if Is,y > My and Ps,y = My if Is,y ≤My.
A legislator l from a district in state s has preferences over each policy
Zl,s,x, Zl,s,y ∈ [0, 1].
I model each legislator as placing some weight on the policy in place in their district and the
policy that is in place for the entire country. While the outcome for specific districts was largely
determined by how their state changed welfare policy following the passage of welfare reform, the
overall national outcome was not in question. Both national political conditions and the specific
policies of the legislation (putting in place minimum levels of policy restrictiveness My) meant that
3The reality was that before the passage of welfare reform there was some inter-state variation in welfare policies
due to the passage of waivers (see Figures 2.2-2.4). However, the variation in welfare policies was much less than what
came after the passage of welfare reform.
4Of course, these minimums were not exogenously set in reality. Within the context of welfare reform, these
minimums emerged from the legislative process and each legislator could potentially influence how these minimums
were set. This assumption greatly simplifies the model and still generates testable predictions.
5The the half-open interval for My is necessary to preclude the possibility of My = Fy = 0.
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welfare policy would become more restrictive on average. Indeed, the significant drop in welfare
caseloads since the passage of the reform is evidence that this perception of the reforms effect at the
time was accurate.
The loss (relative to a policy regime that exactly sets state policy to the legislator’s ideal
policies) for the legislator from the pre-policy regime is the Euclidean distance between each policy
and the preference of the legislator.
LossPre−policy =
√
(Zl,s,x − Fx)2 + (Zl,s,y − Fy)2. (2.1)
The loss after the policy is enacted can be written as
LossPost−policy =α
√
(Zl,s,x − Is,x)2 + (Zl,s,y −My)2+
(1− α)
√
(Zl,s,x −Ax)2 + (Zl,s,y −Ay)2
(2.2)
if Is,y ≤My and
LossPost−policy =α
√
(Zl,s,x − Is,x)2 + (Zl,s,y − Is,y)2+
(1− α)
√
(Zl,s,x −Ax)2 + (Zl,s,y −Ay)2
(2.3)
if Is,y > My. The weight placed on district level welfare policy is represented by α where
α ∈ [0, 1]. The average welfare policy in the United States post-welfare reform is represented by
Ax(I1,x, I2,x, ..., I50,x) and Ay(I1,y, I2,y, ..., I50,y,My) where Ax > Fx and Ay > Fy. Therefore,
legislator l will vote for welfare reform if LossPost−policy < LossPre−policy. I will denote
the part of LossPost−policy generated by the state-level policies of a legislator’s own state
(
√
(Zl,s,x − Is,x)2 + (Zl,s,y −My)2 or
√
(Zl,s,x − Is,x)2 + (Zl,s,y − Is,y)2) as LossState,Post−policy.
The part of LossPost−policy generated by the average welfare restrictiveness in the country
(
√
(Zl,s,x −Ax)2 + (Zl,s,y −Ay)2) will be denoted as LossNational,Post−policy.
Two hypotheses follow from this simple model. First, more conservative legislators are
more likely to vote for the proposal, ceteris paribus. This is driven by the constraint on the y policy
becoming more conservative (My > Fy) and by the average welfare restrictiveness rising nationwide
(Ax > Fx and Ay > Fy). Second, the closer the state’s ideal point is to the legislator’s ideal point,
the more likely the legislator will vote for the proposal.
34
Figure 2.1 illustrates the second hypothesis of the model. Initially, assume that α = 1. The
coordinates (I1,x, I1,y) represent the ideal point for state 1 while (I2,x, I2,y) represent the ideal point
for state 2. The coordinates (Zx, Zy) represent the ideal point for a legislator whose district resides
in one of these hypothetical states. The initial loss (relative to the legislator’s ideal point) before the
passage of the proposal is the distance between (Zx, Zy) and (Fx, Fy) (the imposed policies by the
federal government). If this legislator is from state 1, then LossPre−policy > LossState,Post−policy,1
and the legislator will vote for the proposal. State 2 cannot enact their ideal policy due to the
constraint My on the value of their y policy. The best (from state 2’s perspective) feasible policy is
(I2,x,My). Therefore, if the legislator was instead from state 2, LossPre−Proposal < LossProposal,2
and the legislator would vote against the policy. This simple example shows that the prediction
depends critically on the interaction between the legislator’s ideal point and how the legislator
expects state-level policy to change following the passage of the proposal.
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Figure 2.1: Cost of Passing Policy Conditional on State Ideal Points
If α < 1, liberal legislators will be less likely to vote for welfare reform (the first hypothesis).
If a state’s ideal point is closer to the legislator’s ideal point, holding LossNational,Post−policy
constant, that legislator should be more likely to vote for welfare reform (the second hypothesis).
For very conservative or very liberal legislators, the effect of the first hypothesis may be so large that
changes in a state’s ideal point may matter little for the probability of voting for welfare reform.
However, for any legislator outside of these extremes, changes to their state’s ideal point will matter
on the margin. The predictions made by this model can be tested within the context of Democratic
voting on the 1996 welfare reform. Many policies which were initially set at the federal level (Fx)
were delegated to the states. Some select policies (e.g., restrictions on benefits for immigrants) were
delegated in a constrained fashion (Ps,y ≥My).
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2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
The 1996 welfare reform delegated policy decisions to the states and, thus, the expected
effect in each state depended on how changing policy constraints allowed for state-level political
decisions to shape policy. Thus, the model predicts that voting in Congress on the 1996 welfare
reform would be influenced by the expectations of the members of the House regarding how their
states’ policies would change after welfare reform was passed. The response of a member of Congress
to these expectations depends on their “policy preferences,” whether these are “purely ideological”
or a function of constituent preferences. If a member of Congress expects their state to become
more lenient with welfare benefits, and if they are conservative in a one-dimensional policy space,
they will be less likely to vote for welfare reform. If members of the House accurately predict the
direction of policy change in their state, then observed changes in welfare policy can be used as a
stand-in for the expectations of members of the House.
The paper that is most closely related to this study is Adkisson and Daniel (2001), where
the authors present an empirical analysis that employs several measures of constituent preferences
over policy as well as estimates of legislator “ideology” to predict voting outcomes on PRWORA.6
Adkisson and Daniel find that more liberal members of the House and members of the House from
districts with constituents that would be negatively impacted by restrictions to welfare benefits were
less likely to vote for welfare reform.
My approach differs from the approach taken by Adkisson and Daniel in several respects.
First, Adkinsson and Daniel pool votes by both parties and analyze them together. In contrast,
I limit my analysis to Democratic voting in the House of Representatives. The modern era of
congressional voting is highly partisan, and treating Democratic and Republican votes in the same
way may obscure the true effect (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). By excluding Republican votes from
my analysis, I avoid this problem. Another significant difference is the way in which I make use of
measures of general voting patterns. While I find that the general voting patterns of legislators did
play an important role in the votes on welfare reform, my paper builds on this by focusing on the
interaction between these interests and the expectations of state-level welfare policy change.7
6In Adkisson and Daniel (2001) “ideology” is measured by scores constructed by the Americans for Democratic
Action and by the American Conservative Union.
7Indeed, I find more conservative members of the House were more likely to vote for welfare reform which is in line
with the findings of Adkisson and Daniel (2001).
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2.4.1 Data
In the years since the passage of the 1996 welfare reform, researchers have tracked various
state-level welfare policy changes. In this chapter, I will use three measures of welfare policy change
at the state-level: Behavioral Rules, Eligibility Rules, and Limitation Rules. These measures are the
result of analysis by De Jong et al. (2005) in their work for the Population Research Institute.8 They
use data from the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database. The authors identify 78 dimensions
of variation of welfare policy. These variables include a wide range of eligibility restrictions, such
as a prohibition on individuals convicted of a drug felony from receiving benefits and limitations on
refugee benefits. Each variable was coded such that lower values indicate a more lenient set of rules
governing welfare benefits.
Employing factor analysis, the authors identify the three second-order latent measures of the
restrictiveness of welfare policy that I use in this chapter. Behavioral Rules captures restrictions such
as requiring an active job search if not employed and ensuring dependents attend school. Eligibility
Rules is a summary measure of various restrictions on eligibility to receive TANF benefits such as
restrictions on those who are able to work over a certain number of hours per week. Eligibility
Rules also captures policy variation having to do with what qualifies as work. Because of the federal
work requirements imposed by the 1996 welfare reform, a state wishing to make the requirement
less burdensome for welfare recipients can greatly expand the legal definition of work activities and
the timeline for complying with these requirements. The latent variable Limitation Rules captures
policies which give exemptions for certain activity requirements based on circumstances such as an
illness or the lack of approved activity programs in the area.9
Although using variables of this type has disadvantages (e.g., no clear interpretation of the
units), the key advantage is that they provide a tractable method to measure state-level welfare policy
changes from before the passage of the 1996 welfare reform. Therefore, I can measure the change
in a state’s welfare policy along these three dimensions as a result of the passage of welfare reform.
Another advantage of these variables is that they capture variation in state-level welfare policy prior
to the passage of welfare reform due to state policy waivers. Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 show how these
8The terms De Jong et al. (2005) use for each of these latent variables are as follows: Behave is called “Behavioral
Eligibility Responsibilities”; Eligibility is “Eligibility Requirements for Group Scale Score”; Limits is “Eligibility
Limits & Exceptions Scale Score”. See Table 40 in Appendix B.1 for details.
9Activity requirements include school or work in restrictive states, but a wider range of activities in more lenient
states such as various government-sponsored programs. Many of the details with regard to how what each latent
policy measure captures are explained in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2.
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latent policy variables change over time. On average, Behavioral Rules and Limitation Rules become
more restrictive in the years following the passage of welfare reform. However, the variance of both
latent policy variables increases as states change their welfare rules. Eligibility Rules becomes less
restrictive on average, but the variance also increases as time passes. The increase in variance for all
three variables follows from the delegation of welfare policy to the states following the 1996 reform.
With greater freedom, states implemented a much greater variety of welfare programs.
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Figure 2.2: Behavior Rules
Figure 2.3: Eligibility Rules
Figure 2.4: Limitation Rules
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I also make use of DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation)
scores (see Poole and Rosenthal 2011 and Carroll et al. 2011). DW-NOMINATE scores are an
extension of the NOMINATE scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985). These scores place
legislators on a two-dimensional roll-call vote-predicting space based on a type of factor analysis of
roll call votes. The first dimension, which I will call P&R1, captures political issues that fall along a
left-right divide. Most policy issues, especially in the modern political era, are captured in the first
dimension. The second dimension, which I will call P&R2, captures policy issues that cut across
the left-right divide. For example, civil rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s was a policy issue
primarily captured by P&R2. While legislators are allowed to move in the NOMINATE issue space,
they are only allowed to move linearly and monotonically, and most move very little (Poole and
Rosenthal 2011).
I employ P&R1 as a measure of general voting behavior. A legislator responding to the
policy preferences of constituents or guided by political ideology should engage in logrolls to advance
his policy position. NOMINATE scores pick up this phenomenon by collapsing an N-dimensional
policy space to two-dimensional policy space.10 Because my paper focuses on the interaction between
congressional district concerns and state-level policy changes, collapsing this policy space makes the
problem more tractable.11 In contrast, using a robust set of congressional-district level variables,
each interacted with state-level policy variables, would make inference difficult.
One concern with using P&R1 to measure legislator ideology is that a policy specific ideology
score may be more appropriate. I do not believe this is a substantial concern. Most votes in the
modern era can easily be mapped to a one-dimensional policy space. For example, Poole and
Rosenthal (2011) duplicate Kalt and Zupan (1984) and replace Kalt and Zupan’s issue-specific
variable measuring a Senator’s environmental ideology with their own 1st dimension NOMINATE
scores. Poole and Rosenthal find that their NOMINATE score outperforms the issue specific measure
employed by Kalt and Zupan. In a similar way, it is reasonable to believe that preferences over welfare
policy are not distinct from left vs. right in P&R1 space.
Finally, I obtain data on the percent of the population within a congressional district on
10In the modern era, the vast majority of the explanatory power of this measure lies in the first dimension of the
roll-call space.
11Fleck and Kilby (2002) use roll-call data from the 103rd to the 105th Congress to that two-dimensional
NOMINATE scores are a good summary measure of influence of constituency variables on voting behavior. They
find that constituency variables are a good out-of-sample predictor of a legislator’s voting behavior largely through
their ability to predict where a legislator will fall along the first dimension of NOMINATE space. Peltzman (1984)
similarly argues that ADA ideology scores proxy for a robust set of constituency (and special interest) variables.
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any form of public assistance from the Decennial Census of 1990. Summary statistics for each of my
variables are presented in Table 2.2.
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The focus of this chapter is on the voting of Democrats in the House of Representatives
on PRWORA. Republicans were united enough in their support of the bill that there is not much
variation in their votes on the legislation.12
I have two hypotheses. First, the more conservative a Democratic member of Congress
was, the more likely they were to vote for welfare reform.13 While it is true that the 1996 welfare
reform delegated welfare policy to the states, it also enacted some federal restrictions such as a
work requirements. These elements of the policy would make a conservative member of Congress
more likely to vote for the reform, ceteris paribus. Second, Democratic members of the House would
be less likely to vote for welfare reform in the initial vote as the disparity between their preferred
policy position and the state-level policy with regard to welfare becomes greater. For example, a
conservative member of Congress would have been less likely to vote in favor of welfare reform if their
state as a whole would have become less restrictive on welfare policy following the passage of welfare
reform. These less restrictive welfare rules would have conflicted with their policy preferences. Thus,
their expectations of future state-level policy would make them less likely to vote in favor of welfare
reform ceteris paribus.
Within this context, it is unlikely that the probability of voting for welfare reform will rise
for liberal Democrats as their state becomes less restrictive on welfare policy. This is driven by the
constrained way in which power was delegated to the states. It is not difficult for state governments
to become more lenient with certain policies. Thus, the policy alignment affect (hypothesis 2) is
unlikely to overwhelm the effect of hypothesis 1. In other words, some of the difference between the
preferred policy of the legislator and the state’s effective policy will never close, regardless of the
political condition within the state. This limitation does not hold for more conservative members of
congress.
12In the initial vote, only four Republicans voted against the measure, and for the Conference Report, only two
voted against passage.
13The degree to which a member of Congress is “conservative” is measured by DW-NOMINATE first dimension
scores. Higher scores represent more conservative voting behavior.
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My main specification is
Pr(V otei,s|X ) = Φ(β1P&R1i,s + β2P&R2i,s + γ1∆EligibilityRuless
+ γ2∆BehavioralRuless + γ3∆LimitationRuless
+ η1P&R1i,s ×∆EligibilityRuless + η2P&R1i,s ×∆BehavioralRuless
+ η3P&R1i,s ×∆LimitationRuless + ψPercentPublicAssistancei,s)
(2.4)
where V otei,s is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Democratic member of Congress i in state
s voted for PRWORA in the initial vote in the House of Representatives. The probability of
voting for welfare reform is conditional on X , a vector of the covariates. The DW-NOMINATE
first and second dimension scores are represented by P&R1i,s and P&R2i,s, respectively.
14 The
variables ∆BehavioralRuless, ∆EligibilityRuless, and ∆LimitationRules measure the changes
between 1996 and 2001 in welfare policy along each of the latent policy variables.15 The variable
PercentPublicAssistance represents the percentage of households that receive public assistance
income in Representative i’s district. I include this variable to account for issue specific constituent
interests that may not be accounted for by P&R1. I estimate Equation (4) using a heteroskedastic
probit regression.
The interaction terms are included to capture the divergence between the policy preferences
of members of the House and state-level policy changes. The P&R1 scores are constructed such that
higher scores indicate a more conservative position in the roll-call voting space. Higher values of the
three latent policy variables indicate a movement towards more restrictive policies. Therefore, if my
second hypothesis is correct, when P&R1 scores are large (indicating a more conservative member
of Congress), lower values of the latent policy variables should reduce the probability of voting in
favor of welfare reform.
There are two important assumptions that underlie the use of the three latent state-level
policy variables in this model. First, I assume that the initial vote to pass is a function of expectations
of the future welfare policies adopted by their states. Because of the focus on shifting control of
welfare policies to the states leading up to the passage of welfare reform, I believe this is a reasonable
assumption.
14I have re-scaled the DW-NOMINATE variables by multiplying them by 100. This yields a more easily interpretable
average marginal effect when interpreting the coefficient as a probability.
15These dates were chosen due to most of the state level policy changes being completed before the year 2001. The
results of regressions from alternative years are shown in Appendix B.3.
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Second, I assume that these expectations of future state-level policy shifts were accurate. If
I were relying on specific policy outcomes directly, this would seem implausible. Welfare legislation
at the state-level changed rules on cash assistance along many dimensions, which would be very
difficult to predict ahead of time. However, the measures of state-level welfare policy from De Jong
et al. (2005) capture latent variables behind a large number of specific policy changes. These latent
measures capture the general direction of welfare policy in three areas. It seems plausible that a
member of Congress would be sufficiently knowledgeable of the political environment of their home
state to be able to predict these general directions of welfare policy (Fenno 2002).
2.5 Results
My first hypothesis that more conservative members of the House were more likely to vote
for welfare reform can easily be examined by looking at the average marginal effect of P&R1 in
my regressions. Table 2.3 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (2.4). P&R1 is highly
statistically significant and positive in each specification. The results show that the average effect of
a one unit increase in P&R1 increases the probability of voting for welfare reform by approximately
1 percentage point.16 A one standard deviation increase in P&R1 from the mean increases the
probability of voting for welfare reform by 34 percentage points.17
My second hypothesis must be examined by looking at the interaction between P&R1
and my latent welfare policy measures. However, a point estimate of a continuous-by-continuous
interaction in a non-linear model will reveal little about the validity of my hypothesis. In particular,
marginal effects for such an interaction are impossible to calculate. An alternative approach is to
examine how the average probability of voting for welfare reform changes as I impose different values
of the interacted variables.
I estimate Equation (2.4) and present the results in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. I calculate the
probability of voting for welfare reform conditional on a range of values for the latent policy variables
and P&R1. Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show the plots of these conditional probabilities. For each of
the three latent variables, the probability of voting for welfare reform is low or indistinguishable from
zero when P&R1 is at the mean (−34.8718) or one standard deviation below the mean (−49.0489).
16I have re-scaled P&R1 to fall between −100 and 100.
17This standard deviation is calculated based upon the relevant sample of Democratic members of the House who
voted on welfare reform.
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For each of the interactions, the probability of voting for welfare reform rises considerably when
P&R1 is one or two standard deviations above the mean. Not only does the level rise when P&R1
increases (supporting my first hypothesis), but the probability rises as the latent policy variable
increases (supporting my second hypothesis). While Limitation Rules exhibit this feature most
clearly, both Behavioral Rules and Eligibility Rules show a similar pattern.18
Figure 2.5: Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals
Notes: The vertical axis shows the probability of voting for welfare reform. The variable P&R1 represents the
Poole and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE “ideology” scores. These scores represent general voting behavior, with lower
(higher) scores representing more liberal (conservative) legislator voting behavior. The top-left graph represents the
probability of voting for welfare reform for Democratic representatives with P&R1 scores one standard deviation
below the mean (for Democrats). This probability changes as my measure of welfare rules restrictiveness increases.
Each subsequent graph (moving right then down then right) shows the change in the probability of voting for welfare
reform for Democratic legislators with one standard deviation higher P&R1 scores.
18In particular, a straight line (indicating no increase in the probability of for welfare reform) could be drawn
through the 95% confidence intervals for Behavioral Rules and Eligibility Rules. That cannot be done for Limitation
Rules.
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Figure 2.6: Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals
Notes: The vertical axis shows the probability of voting for welfare reform. The variable P&R1 represents the
Poole and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE “ideology” scores. These scores represent general voting behavior, with lower
(higher) scores representing more liberal (conservative) legislator voting behavior. The top-left graph represents the
probability of voting for welfare reform for Democratic representatives with P&R1 scores one standard deviation
below the mean (for Democrats). This probability changes as my measure of welfare rules restrictiveness increases.
Each subsequent graph (moving right then down then right) shows the change in the probability of voting for welfare
reform for Democratic legislators with one standard deviation higher P&R1 scores.
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Figure 2.7: Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals
Notes: The vertical axis shows the probability of voting for welfare reform. The variable P&R1 represents the
Poole and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE “ideology” scores. These scores represent general voting behavior, with lower
(higher) scores representing more liberal (conservative) legislator voting behavior. The top-left graph represents the
probability of voting for welfare reform for Democratic representatives with P&R1 scores one standard deviation
below the mean (for Democrats). This probability changes as my measure of welfare rules restrictiveness increases.
Each subsequent graph (moving right then down then right) shows the change in the probability of voting for welfare
reform for Democratic legislators with one standard deviation higher P&R1 scores.
I have no ex ante reason to expect that the pattern that matches my hypothesis should
be more prevalent in Limitation Rules than in Behavioral Rules or Eligibility Rules. In particular,
it seems that for the most conservative (liberal) Democrats, an increase in the restrictiveness of
Eligibility Rules does not increase (decrease) the probability of voting for welfare reform. This can
be seen in the bottom right (and top left) panel of Figure 2.7.
These results are consistent with the theory that Democrats in Congress were influenced by
the divergence between their own policy preferences and the policy direction of the state government
with regard to welfare policy. While Democrats in Congress were more likely to support welfare
reform if they were conservative, expectations about state-level policy changes played an important
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role. A conservative Democrat was less likely to vote for welfare reform if they expected their state
to become more restrictive along these welfare policy dimensions.
While I estimate my model using Democratic votes in the House of Representatives, I also
make out-of-sample predictions for Republican votes. The results are reported in Tables 2.7-2.10.
The coefficients represent predicted probabilities of voting for welfare reform, given the observed
district and state-level characteristics of Republican Representatives. Republican votes showed far
less variation than did Democratic votes (only four Republicans voted against PRWORA in the
initial House vote). The model correctly predicts 92.37 percent of Republican votes. However,
it fails to predict the four votes against welfare reform by Republicans. The model also predicts
that Republicans from states such as Massachusetts would have voted against welfare reform when
in reality they voted for the legislation. This prediction is driven by the disparity between the
welfare policy of the state (more lenient than average) and the relatively high P&R1 scores of
the Republicans from the state. The high number of accurate predictions is primarily driven by
Republicans in the House having higher Poole and Rosenthal scores, which my estimation shows
have a substantial positive impact on the probability of voting for welfare reform.
2.6 Extensions and Robustness
While each of these latent policy variables summarizes a set of welfare policies, that does
not imply that each latent variable will have an economically (or statistically) significant impact on
welfare participants.19 For example, a latent policy variable that captures variation in a number
of policies that have little impact on welfare participants may not have much explanatory power in
predicting welfare outcomes. Because of this, it is difficult to say which of the three latent policy
variables should matter to members of the House voting on welfare reform. An alternative approach
would be to estimate a specification with a single measure of the expectations of members of the
House.
Instead of exploiting variation in welfare policy in the years after the passage of welfare
19Cadena, Danziger, and Seefeldt (2006) argue that the measures provided by De Jong et al. (2005) do not have
much explanatory power for some welfare outcomes such as the number of individuals on welfare. They suggest that
other measures such as the maximum benefit more accurately capture welfare restrictiveness. Their findings result
from applying state and year fixed effects to a simple model of welfare participation. However, with so few data,
state and year fixed effects absorb almost all of the meaningful variation. Indeed, when you include other variables
that they suggest have more explanatory power, such as the maximum allowed benefit, they are also statistically
insignificant in the full fixed-effects model.
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reform, I employ Shor and McCarty’s scores (Shor and McCarty 2011), an adaptation of Poole
and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE scores for state legislatures. Shor and McCarty link scores across
state-legislatures through the Project Vote Smart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT), a
national survey of state legislators on a number of policy issues. Because the survey asks a standard
set of questions on nationally relevant policy issues, the survey provides a way to match voting
behavior across states. Legislators in one state who respond in a similar way to legislators in
another state are assumed to have similar voting behavior. I interact this state-level measure with
the Poole and Rosenthal scores (specific to each member of the House of Representatives).
This measure has drawbacks and advantages over the three latent welfare policy measures
for identifying my model. One drawback is that, unlike Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE scores,
Shor and McCarty’s scores cannot be linked across legislatures purely through roll calls, and must
instead rely on survey data. While not ideal, these scores have less measurement error than party
identification, which are a less accurate measure of voting behavior. Another drawback of Shor and
McCarty scores is that they measure the general policy preferences over many issues, not welfare in
particular. However, political positions on welfare policy, like many issues in the modern political
era, are largely captured by a one-dimensional roll call space (Poole and Rosenthal 2011).
The advantage that Shor and McCarty’s scores have is that they do not rely on the
assumption that members of the House of Representatives accurately predict how welfare policy will
change over time. Instead, each member of the House observes the political environment (which I
directly measure through Shor and McCary’s scores) of the state government and forms expectations
of how that political environment will shape welfare policy going forward.
I estimate
Pr(V otei,s|X ) = Φ(β1P&R1i,s + β2P&R2i,s + γShor&McCartys
+ ηP&R1i,s × Shor&McCartys
+ ψPercentPublicAssistancei,s)
(2.5)
where Shor&McCarty is the average of Shor and McCarty’s scores for the lower house of state s. I
also use the average of Shor and McCarty’s scores for the majority party in the lower house.
The results of my estimation of Equation (2.5) (using the averages of Shor and McCarty
scores for the lower house of each state) are reported in Table 2.11, however, it is easier to see the
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results in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals
Notes: The vertical axis shows the probability of voting for welfare reform. The variable P&R1 represents the Poole
and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE “ideology” scores. These scores represent general voting behavior, with lower (higher)
scores representing more liberal (conservative) legislator voting behavior. The top-left graph represents the probability
of voting for welfare reform for Democratic representatives with P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean
(for Democrats). This probability changes as the Shor and McCarty scores for state legislatures increase (indicating
more conservative state legislatures). Each subsequent graph (moving right then down then right) shows the change
in the probability of voting for welfare reform for Democratic legislators with one standard deviation higher P&R1
scores.
The probability of voting for welfare reform rises if Democratic members of the House were
more conservative (as P&R1 rises). Conditional on being a conservative Democrat (the two lower
graphs in Figure 2.8), an increase in how conservative the state government of a member of Congress
was increased the probability they would vote for welfare reform. For average and liberal Democrats
(the two upper graphs in Figure 2.8), changes to the general voting patterns of their state-legislatures
had no effect.
A similar pattern can be seen by estimating Equation (2.5) using only the average of the
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scores for the majority party in the lower house. The results of this estimation are shown in Table
2.12 and Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: Conditional Predictive Margins with Confidence Intervals
Notes: The vertical axis shows the probability of voting for welfare reform. The variable P&R1 represents the Poole
and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE “ideology” scores. These scores represent general voting behavior, with lower (higher)
scores representing more liberal (conservative) legislator voting behavior. The top-left graph represents the probability
of voting for welfare reform for Democratic representatives with P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean
(for Democrats). This probability changes as the Shor and McCarty scores for state legislatures increase (indicating
more conservative state legislatures). Each subsequent graph (moving right then down then right) shows the change
in the probability of voting for welfare reform for Democratic legislators with one standard deviation higher P&R1
scores.
In both Figures 2.8 and 2.9, the vast majority of the rise in the probability of voting
for welfare reform occurs for moderately conservative Democrats. For the most conservative
(liberal) Democrats, voting for (against) welfare reform will likely happen regardless of the political
environment of their state. These results add further support to my hypothesis that voting on
whether to delegate welfare policy to the states is, in part, governed by the expectations of members
of Congress regarding how that policy-making power will be used.
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2.7 Conclusion
While there is a large literature on the role of constituency interests in roll-call voting,
this chapter is the first to examine the interaction between congressional policy preferences and
state-level policy changes in the context of policy delegation. To proxy for the expectations of
members of the House, I employ the factor variable analysis of state-level welfare restrictions from
De Jong et al. (2005). I use first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores as a summary measure of
congressional district constituency variables. I use these measures to test two hypotheses. First,
among Democrats, the more conservative representatives are more likely to vote for welfare reform.
I find robust evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. Second, Democrats were less likely to
vote for welfare reform as their expectations of state-level policy changes diverged from their policy
interests. I find evidence that is consistent with my second hypothesis. Indeed, interacting each
of the three latent measures of welfare policy with DW-NOMINATE scores shows that for more
conservative members of the House, increasing expected welfare restrictiveness at the state-level
made them more likely to vote in favor of delegating power to the states. I also show the robustness
of these results by using an alternative measure of state-level policy expectations. The results using
Shor and McCarty’s scores show a similar story to the welfare-specific policy measures.
This chapter has implications for how economists and political scientists understand the
role of constituent interests in roll-call voting. This chapter shows that the decision to vote for
the delegation of rule-making power is significantly impacted by the interaction between constituent
interests and expectations of future policy changes.
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Table 2.1: House Votes by Party on PRWORA
Initial House Bill Conference Report
Party For Against No Vote For Against No Vote
Republican 226 4 5 230 2 3
Democrat 30 165 3 98 98 2
Independent 0 1 0 0 1 0
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Democrats Republicans
Voted for Vote Against All All
PRWORA PRWORA
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
∆Behavioral Rules 1.000 0.751 1.090 0.823 1.076 0.811 1.301 0.826
∆Eligibility Rules -1.881 0.717 -2.336 0.591 -2.266 0.632 -2.213 0.657
∆Limitation Rules 1.890 0.559 1.665 1.069 1.699 1.010 1.856 0.884
P&R1 -15.753 9.930 -38.348 11.887 -34.872 14.177 47.305 18.250
P&R2 44.413 35.324 -0.393 41.302 6.500 43.489 7.237 35.327
Percent PA 7.190 3.266 9.863 5.144 9.452 4.989 6.091 2.617
Observations 30 165 195 230
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Table 2.3: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
P&R1 0.0128*** 0.0129*** 0.0118***
(0.00154) (0.00166) (0.00190)
P&R2 -0.000440 -0.000495 -0.0000644
(0.000460) (0.000968) (0.000596)
∆Eligibility Rules 0.0491 0.0525 0.0518**
(0.0352) (0.0386) (0.0251)
∆Behavioral Rules -0.0166 -0.0157 -0.00254
(0.0219) (0.0421) (0.0324)




Interaction Terms? No Yes Yes
N 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable
equals 1 if the member of Congress voted for PRWORA.
I employ a heteroskedastic robust probit estimation method
for each specification. The coefficients represents individual
average marginal effects. When interaction terms are included,
they are included between the latent welfare policy variables
(∆Eligibility Rules, ∆Behavioral Rules, ∆Limitation Rules) and
P&R1. For each of the latent policy variables, I define them as
the difference in values between 1996 and 2001.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Limitation
Rules Changes
∆Limitation Rules P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
= −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-1.4 0.0991*** 0.00613 0.000533 0.00406
(0.0319) (0.00857) (0.00281) (0.0183)
-1 0.0763*** 0.00700 0.00175 0.0138
(0.0242) (0.00835) (0.00709) (0.0417)
-.6 0.0601 0.00818 0.00557 0.0382
(0.0371) (0.00833) (0.0167) (0.0764)
-.2 0.0414 0.00981 0.0160 0.0901
(0.0559) (0.00861) (0.0331) (0.118)
.2 0.0227 0.0121 0.0396 0.188
(0.0319) (0.00921) (0.0537) (0.152)
.6 0.0119 0.0153 0.0833 0.334**
(0.0156) (0.0102) (0.0718) (0.154)
1 0.00636 0.0197* 0.150* 0.495***
(0.00992) (0.0116) (0.0808) (0.147)
1.4 0.00383 0.0257* 0.236*** 0.630***
(0.00701) (0.0139) (0.0834) (0.155)
1.8 0.00271 0.0337* 0.327*** 0.729***
(0.00553) (0.0180) (0.0876) (0.162)
2.2 0.00226 0.0440* 0.415*** 0.797***
(0.00499) (0.0251) (0.0941) (0.159)
2.6 0.00217 0.0568 0.491*** 0.840***
(0.00513) (0.0356) (0.0980) (0.149)
3 0.00234 0.0722 0.553*** 0.867***
(0.00586) (0.0496) (0.0970) (0.139)
3.4 0.00274 0.0899 0.601*** 0.884***
(0.00727) (0.0664) (0.0929) (0.131)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a
member of Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table
shows the predictive margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given
the average observed values of all other variables and the imposed values of the
latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The column on the far left represents P&R1
scores one standard deviation below the mean (for Democrats). Each subsequent
column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores. These variables are
interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit estimation
method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Behavioral Rules Changes
∆Behavioral Rules P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
= −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-.7 0.173 0.149 0.286* 0.434**
(0.144) (0.138) (0.157) (0.216)
-.4 0.0936 0.0915 0.289** 0.496***
(0.0744) (0.0859) (0.129) (0.171)
-.1 0.0466* 0.0583 0.293*** 0.551***
(0.0268) (0.0505) (0.106) (0.143)
.2 0.0220 0.0403 0.298*** 0.598***
(0.0201) (0.0306) (0.0903) (0.133)
.5 0.00462 0.0305 0.303*** 0.637***
(0.00570) (0.0209) (0.0817) (0.137)
.8 0.00124 0.0252 0.310*** 0.669***
(0.00270) (0.0168) (0.0808) (0.144)
1.1 0.000771 0.0224 0.316*** 0.694***
(0.00192) (0.0156) (0.0858) (0.150)
1.4 0.000641 0.0213 0.323*** 0.714***
(0.00166) (0.0162) (0.0942) (0.154)
1.7 0.000598 0.0213 0.331*** 0.729***
(0.00158) (0.0181) (0.104) (0.158)
2 0.000604 0.0221 0.338*** 0.742***
(0.00160) (0.0212) (0.114) (0.160)
2.3 0.000652 0.0236 0.346*** 0.751***
(0.00172) (0.0254) (0.123) (0.162)
2.6 0.000742 0.0258 0.353*** 0.758***
(0.00196) (0.0307) (0.131) (0.164)
2.9 0.000880 0.0286 0.361*** 0.763***
(0.00236) (0.0374) (0.138) (0.166)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Predictive Margins from Equation (2.4) as ∆Eligibility
Rules Changes
∆Eligibility Rules P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
= −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-2.8 0.000345 0.0164 0.258*** 0.645***
(0.000983) (0.0170) (0.0766) (0.179)
-2.5 0.000887 0.0248 0.290*** 0.655***
(0.00197) (0.0188) (0.0765) (0.154)
-2.2 0.00218 0.0364 0.323*** 0.663***
(0.00378) (0.0230) (0.0766) (0.130)
-1.9 0.00504 0.0518 0.355*** 0.671***
(0.00742) (0.0319) (0.0766) (0.110)
-1.6 0.0108 0.0716 0.387*** 0.678***
(0.0157) (0.0463) (0.0770) (0.0953)
-1.3 0.0210 0.0963 0.418*** 0.684***
(0.0322) (0.0655) (0.0792) (0.0887)
-1 0.0367 0.126 0.447*** 0.690***
(0.0583) (0.0886) (0.0847) (0.0923)
-.7 0.0578 0.160 0.475*** 0.695***
(0.0903) (0.114) (0.0950) (0.105)
-.4 0.0824 0.199 0.501*** 0.699***
(0.122) (0.142) (0.110) (0.125)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a
member of Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table
shows the predictive margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given
the average observed values of all other variables and the imposed values of the
latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The column on the far left represents P&R1
scores one standard deviation below the mean (for Democrats). Each subsequent
column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores. These variables
are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Out-of-Sample Predictions AK1-FL10
District Coefficient SE District Coefficient SE
AK1 0.993 (0.0656) CA40 0.984 (0.138)
AL1 0.992 (0.0776) CA41 0.995 (0.0604)
AL2 0.993 (0.0794) CA43 0.993 (0.0753)
AL6 0.999 (0.0183) CA44 0.989 (0.106)
AR3 0.994 (0.0649) CA45 0.998 (0.0328)
AR4 0.981 (0.164) CA46 0.993 (0.0886)
AZ1 0.998 (0.0365) CA47 0.999 (0.0160)
AZ3 0.998 (0.0404) CA48 0.998 (0.0279)
AZ4 0.998 (0.0311) CA49 0.997 (0.0429)
AZ5 0.997 (0.0385) CA51 0.998 (0.0241)
AZ6 0.992 (0.106) CA52 0.990 (0.113)
CA1 0.982 (0.143) CO3 0.996 (0.0476)
CA2 0.978 (0.221) CO4 0.999 (0.0235)
CA4 0.996 (0.0563) CO5 0.999 (0.0147)
CA10 0.999 (0.0202) CO6 1.000 (0.00813)
CA11 0.966 (0.268) CT4 0.277 (0.486)
CA15 0.995 (0.0409) CT5 0.388 (0.514)
CA19 0.977 (0.219) CT6 0.423 (0.478)
CA21 0.968 (0.224) DE1 0.645 (0.556)
CA22 0.997 (0.0509) FL1 0.998 (0.0352)
CA23 0.996 (0.0518) FL4 0.999 (0.00994)
CA25 0.997 (0.0414) FL6 0.999 (0.0154)
CA27 0.993 (0.0788) FL7 0.999 (0.00947)
CA28 0.997 (0.0433) FL8 0.999 (0.00969)
CA38 0.975 (0.139) FL9 0.999 (0.0109)
CA39 0.998 (0.0469) FL10 0.999 (0.0174)
58
Table 2.8: Out-of-Sample Predictions FL12-LA7
District Coefficient SE District Coefficient SE
FL12 0.998 (0.0271) IL10 0.999 (0.0158)
FL13 0.999 (0.0116) IL11 0.999 (0.0233)
FL14 0.999 (0.0118) IL13 0.999 (0.00965)
FL15 0.999 (0.0110) IL14 0.999 (0.0144)
FL16 0.999 (0.0103) IL15 0.998 (0.0268)
FL18 0.982 (0.136) IL16 0.999 (0.0219)
FL21 0.993 (0.0583) IL18 0.997 (0.0350)
FL22 0.999 (0.0126) IN2 0.789 (0.433)
GA1 0.991 (0.109) IN4 0.855 (0.434)
GA3 0.996 (0.0575) IN5 0.831 (0.370)
GA4 0.999 (0.0220) IN6 0.894 (0.414)
GA6 0.999 (0.0185) IN7 0.826 (0.291)
GA7 0.995 (0.0773) IN8 0.807 (0.496)
GA8 0.988 (0.123) KS1 0.998 (0.0264)
GA9 0.996 (0.0639) KS2 0.998 (0.0343)
GA10 0.994 (0.0810) KS3 0.997 (0.0278)
IA1 0.703 (0.270) KS4 0.998 (0.0335)
IA2 0.809 (0.450) KY1 0.990 (0.0963)
IA3 0.781 (0.397) KY2 0.994 (0.0745)
IA4 0.788 (0.361) KY4 0.996 (0.0572)
IA5 0.818 (0.429) KY5 0.948 (0.292)
ID1 0.998 (0.0359) LA1 0.997 (0.0342)
ID2 0.999 (0.0237) LA3 0.990 (0.0960)
IL5 0.998 (0.0218) LA5 0.994 (0.0698)
IL6 0.999 (0.0110) LA6 0.996 (0.0481)
IL8 0.999 (0.0122) LA7 0.893 (0.219)
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Table 2.9: Out-of-Sample Predictions MA3-NY20
District Coefficient SE District Coefficient SE
MA3 0.00208 (0.0228) NC10 0.996 (0.0493)
MA6 0.00239 (0.0247) NC11 0.994 (0.0810)
MD1 0.995 (0.0495) NE1 0.997 (0.0340)
MD2 0.999 (0.0205) NE2 0.999 (0.0217)
MD6 0.998 (0.0268) NE3 0.998 (0.0277)
MD8 0.987 (0.0607) NH1 0.994 (0.0620)
ME1 0.995 (0.0458) NH2 0.995 (0.0619)
MI2 0.000147 (0.00382) NJ2 0.997 (0.0414)
MI3 0.0000624 (0.00154) NJ3 0.998 (0.0228)
MI4 0.0000724 (0.00168) NJ4 0.993 (0.0537)
MI6 0.0000603 (0.00138) NJ5 0.997 (0.0256)
MI7 0.0000903 (0.00223) NJ7 0.999 (0.0168)
MI8 0.0000769 (0.00195) NJ8 0.995 (0.0488)
MI11 0.0000444 (0.00112) NJ11 0.999 (0.0111)
MN1 0.991 (0.119) NJ12 0.999 (0.0131)
MN3 0.996 (0.0480) NM1 0.995 (0.0478)
MO2 0.998 (0.0293) NM2 0.991 (0.0820)
MO7 0.989 (0.150) NV1 0.997 (0.0535)
MS1 0.961 (0.266) NV2 0.998 (0.0261)
MS4 0.798 (0.216) NY1 0.996 (0.0303)
NC2 0.994 (0.0870) NY2 0.998 (0.0207)
NC3 0.990 (0.0978) NY3 0.999 (0.00915)
NC4 0.997 (0.0414) NY4 0.999 (0.0151)
NC5 0.995 (0.0669) NY13 0.997 (0.0339)
NC6 0.998 (0.0348) NY19 0.999 (0.0128)
NC9 0.998 (0.0365) NY20 0.995 (0.0360)
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Table 2.10: Out-of-Sample Predictions NY22-WY1
District Coefficient SE District Coefficient SE
NY22 0.999 (0.0135) PA5 0.978 (0.127)
NY23 0.989 (0.0707) PA7 0.994 (0.0501)
NY24 0.995 (0.0526) PA8 0.995 (0.0447)
NY25 0.995 (0.0449) PA9 0.989 (0.101)
NY27 0.999 (0.0129) PA10 0.975 (0.128)
NY30 0.983 (0.121) PA13 0.997 (0.0331)
NY31 0.988 (0.0800) PA16 0.997 (0.0493)
OH1 0.974 (0.283) PA17 0.995 (0.0578)
OH2 0.992 (0.0841) PA19 0.995 (0.0467)
OH4 0.986 (0.123) PA21 0.987 (0.128)
OH5 0.985 (0.102) SC1 0.996 (0.0873)
OH6 0.945 (0.320) SC2 0.995 (0.0599)
OH7 0.982 (0.138) SC3 0.995 (0.0644)
OH8 0.993 (0.0872) SC4 0.996 (0.0603)
OH10 0.983 (0.132) TN1 0.983 (0.124)
OH12 0.970 (0.193) TN2 0.996 (0.0695)
OH15 0.993 (0.0743) TN3 0.994 (0.0816)
OH16 0.978 (0.143) TN4 0.991 (0.128)
OH18 0.953 (0.240) TN7 0.996 (0.0566)
OH19 0.993 (0.0679) TX3 0.987 (0.140)
OK1 0.997 (0.0472) TX6 0.986 (0.141)
OK2 0.991 (0.141) TX7 0.986 (0.126)
OK4 0.997 (0.0426) TX8 0.978 (0.186)
OK5 0.998 (0.0318) TX9 0.944 (0.493)
OK6 0.994 (0.0742) TX13 0.933 (0.383)
OR2 0.984 (0.214) TX14 0.455 (0.172)
OR5 0.977 (0.118) TX19 0.963 (0.227)
WA1 1.000 (0.00691) TX21 0.975 (0.182)
WA2 0.999 (0.0205) TX22 0.981 (0.181)
WA3 0.997 (0.0346) TX23 0.809 (0.434)
WA4 0.996 (0.0516) TX26 0.988 (0.137)
WA5 0.997 (0.0418) UT1 0.893 (0.483)
WA8 0.999 (0.00944) UT2 0.897 (0.463)
WA9 0.999 (0.0223) VA1 0.997 (0.0301)
WI1 0.992 (0.125) VA6 0.998 (0.0349)
WI2 0.993 (0.0639) VA7 0.999 (0.0134)
WI3 0.970 (0.157) VA10 0.999 (0.0160)
WI6 0.994 (0.0701) VA11 0.999 (0.0125)
WI8 0.991 (0.0920) VT1 0.000248 (0.000686)
WI9 0.998 (0.0403) WY1 0.998 (0.0301)
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Table 2.11: Predictive Margins from Equation (2.5) as Shor McCarty Scores
Change (Average of Lower House)
Shor & McCarty P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
Rules Scores = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-1 0.000170 0.00148 0.0118 0.658*
(0.000695) (0.00211) (0.0534) (0.365)
-.8 0.000342 0.00194 0.0339 0.666***
(0.000895) (0.00230) (0.145) (0.254)
-.6 0.000570 0.00255 0.0888 0.670***
(0.00103) (0.00272) (0.221) (0.174)
-.4 0.000843 0.00347 0.175 0.669***
(0.00119) (0.00359) (0.201) (0.120)
-.2 0.00117 0.00502 0.272** 0.666***
(0.00142) (0.00532) (0.135) (0.0865)
0 0.00157 0.00783 0.362*** 0.659***
(0.00180) (0.00898) (0.114) (0.0719)
.2 0.00208 0.0140 0.436*** 0.651***
(0.00243) (0.0161) (0.129) (0.0713)
.4 0.00280 0.0385 0.492*** 0.642***
(0.00367) (0.0423) (0.135) (0.0775)
.6 0.00398 0.111 0.533*** 0.632***
(0.00644) (0.113) (0.126) (0.0857)
.8 0.00620 0.226 0.562*** 0.621***
(0.0127) (0.175) (0.109) (0.0938)
1 0.0118 0.345* 0.582*** 0.611***
(0.0302) (0.184) (0.0947) (0.101)
N 193 193 193 193
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values
of all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score.
The column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean
(for Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1
scores. These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic
robust probit estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Predictive Margins from Equation (2.5) as Shor McCarty Scores
Change (Average of Lower House Majority)
Shor & McCarty P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
Rules Scores = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-1 0.000334 0.00371 0.315*** 0.608***
(0.00116) (0.00600) (0.117) (0.104)
-.8 0.000340 0.00383 0.334*** 0.614***
(0.00118) (0.00613) (0.105) (0.0933)
-.6 0.000346 0.00398 0.354*** 0.620***
(0.00120) (0.00633) (0.0975) (0.0843)
-.4 0.000353 0.00417 0.373*** 0.625***
(0.00122) (0.00662) (0.0936) (0.0777)
-.2 0.000359 0.00446 0.393*** 0.631***
(0.00125) (0.00704) (0.0936) (0.0739)
0 0.000366 0.00493 0.413*** 0.636***
(0.00128) (0.00772) (0.0970) (0.0733)
.2 0.000373 0.00580 0.434*** 0.642***
(0.00132) (0.00894) (0.103) (0.0759)
.4 0.000381 0.00744 0.454*** 0.648***
(0.00136) (0.0110) (0.111) (0.0812)
.6 0.000389 0.0104 0.474*** 0.653***
(0.00140) (0.0140) (0.120) (0.0887)
.8 0.000397 0.0156 0.495*** 0.659***
(0.00145) (0.0186) (0.130) (0.0978)
1 0.000405 0.0237 0.514*** 0.664***
(0.00151) (0.0274) (0.141) (0.108)
N 193 193 193 193
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values
of all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score.
The column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean
(for Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1
scores. These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic
robust probit estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Is State-Level Welfare Spending
Subject to Political Cycles?
3.1 Introduction
Those who hold political office may distribute political goods in a manner that strengthens their
support. In an effort to signal their ability to transfer political goods efficiently, the magnitude
of transfers may increase in the lead-up to a reelection bid. One common category of transfers
in the United States is cash welfare to low-income households. However, after the 1996 welfare
reform, state governments have many more options for how they spend welfare funds, and the
majority of welfare funds are now used for purposes other than cash welfare.1 This chapter explores
whether election cycles affect state “welfare” spending composition. Specifically, do states spend
welfare funds differently when an incumbent governor seeks reelection and do these changes differ
by partisan affiliation?
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is a cash welfare program
in the United States. TANF expenditures come from two sources. States are required to spend
state funds on welfare programs as a part of Maintenance of Effort (MOE) spending.2 States have
1In 1996, Congress passed and the President signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This legislation ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
and changed welfare funding from a matching grant system to a block grant system.
2States are required to spend at least 80% of their pre-welfare reform spending. This number was lowered to 75%
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the authority to allocate TANF block grant funds among the variety of programs that fall under
TANF. Both the federal TANF block grant and state MOE funds are required to be spent on one of
four policy goals listed in the 1996 welfare reform: (i) provide assistance to needy families so that
children may be cared for in their homes or those of relatives; (ii) end dependence of needy parents
on government support by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (iii) prevent and reduce
out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (iv) encourage formation and maintenance of two-parent families.3
As a result of the 1996 welfare reform, many types of “welfare” expenditures do not fall
under traditional cash welfare (see Figure 3.1).4 If welfare spending can have a significant effect on
gubernatorial reelection probability, then rational governors should spend funds differently in the
lead up to a reelection bid.5 There has been some empirical work showing that welfare expenditures
have a negative effect on reelection probability. Peltzman (1992) uses data from 1950-1988 to show
that governors are particularly penalized for expanding welfare spending. His results hold for both
Democratic and Republican governors, without a significant difference between the two with regard
to welfare spending. Kim and Kwon (2015) come to a similar finding using data from 1978 to
2006, though they question the presence of a political business cycle with respect to general fiscal
expansionary spending.6 Both Peltzman (1992) and Kim and Kwon (2015) use Census data on
“public welfare” spending, an extremely broad category of welfare spending. However, “welfare”
spending has become more heterogeneous in the years since the 1996 welfare reform. It is possible
that the negative effect of public welfare spending on reelection probability found in these papers is
not capturing the effect of cash welfare per se.
I use state-level data from 1997-2014 to test the existence of a political welfare spending
cycle.7 In particular, I am interested in the effect of incumbent governors running for reelection.
While an overall effect may exist, it is more reasonable to expect that the incumbent effect will differ
by partisan affiliation and by the exact type of welfare spending in question. My results show little
evidence of a political welfare spending cycle at the state level. I find some evidence of a political
for states that met their work requirement goals.
3See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996: Conference Report to Accompany
H.R. 3734 .
4Cash welfare is typically described as “Basic Assistance” in government data.
5Incumbents need not be purely motivated by holding their office. It is only necessary that reelection probability
has some marginal impact on their policy decisions.
6In contrast, Singer (2011) analyzes the effect of welfare spending on the reelection probabilities of state legislators
and finds that welfare benefits have little direct effect or partisan effect. Instead, Singer finds that more generous
welfare benefits lessen the electoral impact of economic performance.
7There is an extensive literature on political business cycles in economics (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988;
Rogoff 1990; Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992). (See Drazen (2000) for a survey of these early models.) These
authors argue that politicians change their behavior in the lead up an election to improve their odds of winning.
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spending cycle in “public welfare” spending. However, I find no evidence that state and federal
TANF spending exhibit spending cycles. It is important to note that the point estimates I find are
imprecisely estimated for the most detailed categories of welfare spending. I can reject neither a
zero effect nor a quite substantial effect.
Figure 3.1: Basic Assistance As a Fraction of TANF Expenditures Over Time
There are reasons why one may not expect to observe a political welfare spending cycle.
Previous work which has found policy differences between states with a governor seeking reelection
and those without examined policies that are salient to a large segment of voters.8 For example,
Alesina (1988) presents empirical evidence that transfer payments (all government transfers to
individuals net of contributions) increase during election years.9 Alesina argues that these transfers
provide a highly visible signal of quality to imperfectly informed voters. Mechtel and Potrafke (2013)
uses panel data from former West German states to show that government-sponsored employment
programs increased during election years. In contrast to the policies examined by these studies,
welfare spending affects a narrow group of voters that do not exert disproportionate political
8Besley and Case (1995) exploits variation due to gubernatorial term limits to show that states governments with
governors who are eligible for reelection enact different policies than those without the possibility of reelection. They
find that states with a governor facing a binding term limit have higher sales and income tax rates. However, they
find that these effects are driven by Democratic governors. Besley and Case emphasize that gubernatorial discretion
over policy is key to their results.
9Alesina (1988) examines both Presidential and midterm elections.
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influence. This study contributes to the literature on political spending cycles by empirically testing
whether welfare spending exhibits the same political spending cycles as transfer payments, broadly
defined.
3.2 Empirical Specification
To test my hypothesis that welfare funds will be spent differently in the lead up to a
reelection bid, I examine many different categories of state government expenditure, focusing on a
breakdown on types of “welfare” expenditure. I estimate
ln(GovernmentExpenditurest) =α+ β1IncumbentRunningst + β2Democratst
+ β3Democratst × IncumbentRunningst + β4TELIndexst
+ γXs,t + φs + δt + ηs,t + εst
(3.1)
where ln(GovernmentExpenditurest) represents spending in state s in year t. The variable
IncumbentRunningst is a dummy variable that equals one if an incumbent governor is running
for reelection in year t. I consider an election to occur in year t if it happens after July 1st. To
be considered an incumbent, the sitting (or acting) governor must have held the office for one year
prior to the reelection bid. This can occur during cases when the sitting governor leaves office due
to resignation, removal, or death.10
The dummy variable Democrat equals one if the incumbent governor is a member of the
Democratic Party. To capture the effect of state tax and expenditure limits (TELs), I include the
variable TELIndex from Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann (2009). This index captures the significant
interstate heterogeneity in TELs.11 I also include a vector of state-level control variables, X . This
includes variables such as the log of the population, the unemployment rate, the Gross State Product,
personal income, poverty rate, the fraction of the lower house that is Democratic, the fraction
of the upper house that is Democratic, and the fraction of the population that is black.12 The
10If I limit IncumbentRunningst to only equal one if the governor running has served a complete first term, the
results do not change significantly.
11Rose (2006) finds evidence that fiscal rules (such as more stringent tax and expenditure limits) reduce the
prevalence of the political business cycle at the state level.
12There is an extensive literature showing the importance of term limits on policy outcomes (Crain and Tollison
1993; Besley and Case 1995; Besley and Case 2003; List and Sturm 2006; Nogare and Ricciuti 2011). In my case, there
is no effective way of controlling for gubernatorial term limits while including state fixed effects. Simply interacting a
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variables φs, δ, ηs,t represent state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time
trends, respectively.13
I estimate Equation (3.1) using data from 1997-2014. I exclude Nebraska from my analysis
as they have a unicameral and non-partisan legislature. I discuss these variables in more detail in
the next section.
If election cycles cause cycles in welfare spending, it is likely that these changes will differ by
partisan affiliation. Thus, one might expect Democratic governors to spend more on basic assistance
(cash welfare) and child care programs, and that this effect will be greater during gubernatorial
reelection years (β2 and β3 will be positive). The coefficients on IncumbentRunning, Democrat,
and Democratst × IncumbentRunningst will likely have differential effects based on the category
of spending. Republicans (who make up the vast majority of non-Democratic governors) may be
more likely to increase spending on programs designed to promote two-parent families or prevent
out-of-wedlock pregnancies. However, the previous literature has found less evidence of changes in
spending or taxation by Republicans running for office. While I do find some evidence of partisan
spending differences, these differences do not tend to vary during gubernatorial reelection years.
Overall, I find little evidence in support of this hypothesis.
3.3 Data
I use data from several sources to estimate Equation (1). Data on categories of TANF
expenditures come from the TANF Financial Data files published by the Department of Health
and Human Services. These data represent the most detailed publicly available state-level data
on welfare spending. However, these data have several shortcomings. First, some variables are
not measured consistently across time, thus limiting the years available for my sample. Second,
states have moved funds in an unusual manner on occasion, resulting in anomalies such as negative
expenditures on basic assistance in a given year. I also make use of data from the Annual Survey
of State Government Finances published by the Census Bureau. Data on governors, reelection bids,
and party membership were gathered from www.ourcampaigns.com. To ensure accuracy, I compared
these data to the data from Sieg and Yoon (2017) for the years and states where my sample overlaps
dummy variable with the already interacted term (β3Democratst × IncumbentRunningst × TermLimitedst) results
in a failure to estimate several coefficients. This is due to the co-linearity of term limits with the IncumbentRunning
dummy variable and state fixed effects.
13Estimating Equation (3.1) without state-specific linear time trends does not significantly change the results.
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with their sample. My state-level control variables come from the Kentucky Center for Poverty
Research National Welfare Data and the National Center for Health Statistics.
In this chapter, I examine welfare spending categories at three levels of detail. Figure 3.2
shows the relationship between each level of analysis. First, I consider public welfare spending.
Public welfare spending is a category of spending that includes various kinds of transfers such as
TANF spending, the state component of Supplemental Security Income, and transfer payments to
medical care providers through Medicaid. Public welfare spending is an extremely broad measure
of a state’s welfare spending.
The second level of welfare spending which I analyze is “assistance” and “non-assistance”
spending. Funds used for welfare programs come from the federal government (TANF block grant
funds) and state MOE funds. These funds can be used for a variety of programs that could fall under
“assistance” or “non-assistance”. Traditional cash welfare or basic assistance is a sub-category of
assistance spending.
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Figure 3.2: Welfare Expenditures
State Expenditures
Public Welfare Other State Expenditures
Total TANF Exp.SSI Exp. Medicaid ReimbursementsOther Exp.
Assistance Exp. Non-Assistance Exp.
Basic Assitance Child Care Transportation
Child CareTransportation Work-Related Activities IDA EITCOther Tax Credits Non-Recurrent Benefits
Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy Prevention Two Parent Family Formation
Finally, I examine specific categories of assistance and non-assistance TANF spending.
Child care and transportation are categories that appear under both assistance and non-assistance
spending. While these categories capture slightly different types of spending, I combine the assistance
and non-assistance components of these categories.14 Examining Figure 3.2 reveals that there are
many categories of spending that do not fall under cash welfare. TANF funds are spent on refundable
tax rebates, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs),
child care programs, and programs that promote two-parent family formation such as marriage
counseling.15
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics broken down whether an incumbent governor is
running for reelection. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the summary stats broken down by party and
14See Appendix C.2 for more details.
15IDAs are typically matched savings accounts for low-income families.
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whether an incumbent is running.
3.4 Election Timing
Figures 3.3-3.8 show a preliminary investigation of the relationship between election timing
and welfare spending. I regress a year dummy on the log of welfare spending while including a basic
set of control variables (X ) and state fixed effects. I run this regression separately for the three
years leading up to the election year and three years after. I exclude governors who have not served
a full first term, have a full first term less than four years, or run for reelection more than once.
I run these regressions on the sub-sample of states with Democratic governors and those without
Democratic governors. While not intended for making causal inference, this approach does provide
some insight into the general patterns in the data. It is important to note that the years following
year t are contingent upon a governor successfully winning the reelection bid, while the years leading
up to year t are unconditional.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the pattern for public welfare spending, the broadest measure of
welfare spending (see Figure 3.2). Figure 3.3 shows a slight increase in public welfare expenditures
leading up to and following a reelection bid by a Democratic governor. This could be driven by
selection effect for years t+1 through t+3. Figure 3.4 shows lower levels of public welfare expenditures
during the year leading up to the election and the year of the election. That being said, one cannot
reject the hypotheses that the percent change in spending in year t − 3 is the same as year t − 2,
t− 1, and t.
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Figure 3.3: Election Cycle and Public Welfare Spending (Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(PublicWelfareExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to the year dummy
variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The regressions represented in
this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with Democratic governors.
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Figure 3.4: Election Cycle and Public Welfare Spending (Non-Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(PublicWelfareExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to the year dummy
variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The regressions represented in
this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with non-Democratic governors.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 shows the relationship between the election cycle and the log of total
welfare spending (ln(Assistance+NonAssistanceExp.)). Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the relationship
between the election cycle and the log of basic assistance spending. Once again, it is difficult to see
any clear pattern in the data. The point estimate for the year of the election is positive and higher
than the other years in Figure 3.7. However, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the election year
is the same as prior years or the years that follow.
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Figure 3.5: Election Cycle and Total Welfare Spending (Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(Assistance+NonAssistanceExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to
the year dummy variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The
regressions represented in this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with Democratic governors.
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Figure 3.6: Election Cycle and Total Welfare Spending (Non-Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(Assistance+NonAssistanceExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to
the year dummy variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The
regressions represented in this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with non-Democratic governors.
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Figure 3.7: Election Cycle and Basic Assistance Spending Spending (Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(BasicAssistanceExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to the year
dummy variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The regressions
represented in this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with Democratic governors.
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Figure 3.8: Election Cycle and Basic Assistance Spending (Non-Democratic Governors)
Notes: Year t is the year in which a gubernatorial reelection bid takes place. The dependent variable in each
regression is ln(BasicAssistanceExp.). Thus, the y-axis can be interpreted as percent change due to the year
dummy variable going from zero to one. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The regressions
represented in this figure are performed on a sub-sample of states with non-Democratic governors.
3.5 Results
I begin by examining several broadly defined categories of state government expenditure to
see if they are characterized by political spending cycles. As outcome variables, I use state public
welfare, police, corrections, health, hospital, and education expenditures. I also examine whether
total expenditures are subject to political spending cycles.16
I present the results in Table 3.4. Of the spending categories included, only state public
welfare and hospital expenditures exhibit a political spending cycle. Column (1) shows that, in
the lead up to a gubernatorial reelection bid, states with a Democratic governor spend 2% more on
public welfare than states with a non-Democratic governor. Column (5) shows that, in the lead up to
16Definitions of each of these spending categories from the Census Bureau’s Government Finance and Employment
Classification Manual can be found in Appendix C.1.
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a gubernatorial reelection bid, states with a Democratic governor spend 7% less on hospitals. Public
welfare, education, and total expenditures all show partisan effects during non-election years, with
Democratic governors spending 3.8%, 1.6%, and 1.9% more on these categories, respectively. Figure
3.10 shows the average marginal effects of my variables of interest with 95% confidence intervals.17
Figure 3.9: Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.4
Evidence of a partisan spending cycle in public welfare expenditures does not necessarily
indicate changes in TANF expenditures or cash welfare spending in reelection years. To gain more
insight into how TANF funds are spent, I use my model to explore various categories of welfare
spending. I present the results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.5 shows no evidence of partisan
spending cycles for assistance, non-assistance, or total welfare spending. Column (3) shows that
state with Democratic Governors spend approximately 12% more on welfare programs in non-election
17The average marginal effect is calculated by taking each observation, imposing a value of zero for the respective
dummy variable, and calculating the expected response. The same process is repeated for the case where the dummy
variable equals one. The difference between these calculations yields the marginal effect for every observation. These
individual marginal effects are then averaged, and robust standard errors are calculated.
78
years.
Figure 3.10: Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.5
Table 3.6 shows the results of the model for more detailed categories of spending. In
some cases, a spending category is separated between assistance and non-assistance based on how
it is used. For examples, some child care expenditures fall under assistance spending and some
under non-assistance spending.18 Some spending categories (e.g. basic assistance) only fall under
assistance spending. In cases where a broadly defined spending category is separated into assistance
and non-assistance spending, I add the two categories together. There is no evidence of partisan
spending cycles for any of the sub-categories of welfare spending. These (non)results hold without
any Bonferroni correction for multiple testing.
18The details of how these funds are designated can be found in the instructions for filling out the Instruction for
Completion of Form ACF-196, published by the Administration for Children and Families under the Department of
Health and Human Services. Sections of these instructions are included in Appendix C.2.
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Figure 3.11: Average Marginal Effects from Table 3.6
3.6 Alternative Specifications
3.6.1 Per Capita Expenditures
One possible explanation for the apparent lack of a political welfare spending cycle is the
way in which I have normalized expenditures. In this section, I put my variables in per capita
terms instead of taking the log of expenditures. I present the results in Table 3.7. There is very
little evidence of a political spending cycle when welfare spending is in per capita terms. Column (2)
shows that states with non-democratic governors spend $1.44 less per capita on child care. While this
result is statistically significant, the magnitude is quite small (approximately one-tenth of a standard
deviation). There are partisan differences in spending in non-election years. States with Democratic
governors spend $5.38 more per capita on Basic Assistance during years when the governor is not
running for reelection.
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3.6.2 Election Anticipation Effects
Another possibility is that states change welfare spending in the year prior to the election.
To test for this possibility, I include an additional dummy variable, IncumbentRunningt−1, which
equals one in the year before a gubernatorial reelection year. The results are presented in Table 3.8.
There is no evidence that the year of gubernatorial reelection, nor the year prior matter for any of
the categories of welfare spending which I examine. There is also no evidence of partisan effects in
reelection years or in the lead up to a reelection year.
3.6.3 No Year Fixed Effects
One possible concern is that the true effect of gubernatorial election years is being absorbed
by the inclusion of year fixed effects. This is possible due to the concentration of gubernatorial
elections in certain years. If there is a common increase or decrease in spending across states in
years with many gubernatorial elections, the effect could be absorbed by year fixed effects. Table
3.9 shows the results excluding time fixed effects. Even with the exclusion of time fixed effects, there
is no evidence of political spending cycles for any category of welfare spending.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the evidence of a political welfare spending cycle. I found very
little evidence that cash welfare spending exhibits such a pattern. I investigate the existence of
a political spending cycle in broad categories of state spending. I find that only public welfare
spending and hospital spending are characterized by a political spending cycle. In both cases, the
effect was only statistically significant for states with Democratic governors. However, public welfare
spending involves many categories of state spending that are not cash welfare. These include transfers
made through state Supplemental Security Income payments as well as Medicaid reimbursements.
When I examined TANF spending broadly (assistance and non-assistance expenditures), I found no
reelection year effect. I also find no evidence of a political spending cycle for any of the specific
categories of welfare spending I analyzed.
What are we to make of these (non)results? First, failure to reject the null hypothesis is
not the same as accepting the null hypothesis. Indeed, many of the estimates have large confidence
intervals that include many values which would indicate a substantial political spending cycle. This
81
is particularly the case for the most detailed categorization of welfare spending (see Figure 3.11
and Table 3.6). The imprecision in the estimates means neither large nor zero effects can be ruled
out. Second, the highly concentrated nature of welfare benefits may make it a poor candidate for
signaling to voters. Even other TANF spending categories such as child care and EITC benefits
go to primarily low-income citizens, a group unlikely to have disproportionate political power. It is
reasonable to be skeptical of political welfare spending cycles, though more empirical work is needed.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: By Incumbent Running
Incumbent Running=0 Incumbent Running=1
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Federal and MOE expenditures on Assistance and Non-Assistance 554529.74 (1120230.05) 536642.89 (1082699.61)
Basic Assistance Expenditures 214789.79 (593203.5) 205846.15 (522208.17)
Child Care Expenditures 72846.36 (158701.67) 70672.43 (168346.24)
Transportation Expenditures 8792.73 (26191.4) 9402.27 (31928.75)
IDA Expenditures 56.37 (427.84) 37.81 (176.05)
Refundable EITC Expenditures 15953.94 (81256.75) 15806.4 (85275.27)
Non-recurring Benefit Expenditures 7996.2 (22856.26) 7269.22 (20661.18)
Expenditures on Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies 22552.05 (80468.84) 20673.3 (76182.29)
Expenditures on Two-Parent Family Formation 3799.06 (11115.48) 3433.07 (9860.58)
Other Refundable Tax Credit Expenditures 4264.32 (43743.5) 3892.35 (42957.6)
Expenditures on Work Related Activities 47367.92 (86776.24) 46110.76 (89492.37)
TEL Index 8.73 (8.16) 8.09 (8.02)
Next Term is Term Limited = 1 0.23 (0.42) 0.62 (0.49)
ln(Population) 15.12 (1) 15.03 (1.05)
Unemployment Rate 5.71 (2.05) 5.35 (1.73)
Gross State Product 306148.1 (363782.43) 296207.2 (384779.12)
Personal Income 258025811.56 (300140647.13) 249660704.82 (317338934.22)
Poverty Rate 12.55 (3.34) 12.35 (3.47)
Fraction State House Democrat 0.51 (0.16) 0.52 (0.16)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.5 (0.17) 0.5 (0.17)
Fraction Black 0.11 (0.1) 0.1 (0.09)
N=753 N=147
All expenditure amounts are in thousands of 2015 dollars. Adjustments made using the CPI-U.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: By Party
Incumbent Running=1
Democrat=0 Democrat=1
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Federal and MOE expenditures on Assistance and Non-Assistance 467383.36 (929871) 637069.22 (1274014.01)
Basic Assistance Expenditures 190353.16 (517226.29) 228310.98 (532920.58)
Child Care Expenditures 47855.08 (124928.1) 103757.58 (213308.46)
Transportation Expenditures 5962.1 (19138) 14390.5 (44114.22)
IDA Expenditures 37.83 (188.13) 37.79 (158.45)
Refundable EITC Expenditures 7937.5 (27711.26) 27216.3 (129041.75)
Non-recurring Benefit Expenditures 5862.06 (14187.26) 9309.6 (27492.1)
Expenditures on Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies 18137.33 (75462.91) 24350.46 (77703.86)
Expenditures on Two-Parent Family Formation 3633.44 (10105.19) 3142.53 (9571.59)
Other Refundable Tax Credit Expenditures 529.1 (3006.55) 8769.04 (67174.64)
Expenditures on Work Related Activities 37723.91 (70968.34) 58271.68 (110558.27)
TEL Index 8.52 (8.27) 7.47 (7.71)
Next Term is Term Limited = 1 0.64 (0.48) 0.58 (0.5)
ln(Population) 15.03 (1.06) 15.03 (1.04)
Unemployment Rate 5.23 (1.67) 5.53 (1.81)
Gross State Product 290277.02 (362808.72) 304805.96 (417586.6)
Personal Income 244334399.76 (296576005.19) 257383847.15 (347689877.53)
Poverty Rate 12.77 (3.74) 11.74 (2.95)
Fraction State House Democrat 0.48 (0.18) 0.56 (0.13)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.47 (0.18) 0.55 (0.16)
Fraction Black 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.09)
N=87 N=60
All expenditure amounts are in thousands of 2015 dollars. Adjustments made using the CPI-U.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: By Party
Incumbent Running=0
Democrat=0 Democrat=1
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Federal and MOE expenditures on Assistance and Non-Assistance 549926.41 (1178032.66) 560526.75 (1041879.44)
Basic Assistance Expenditures 232254.39 (690433.29) 192037.75 (435135.06)
Child Care Expenditures 66512.33 (155350.52) 81098.04 (162833.63)
Transportation Expenditures 7665.91 (24820.54) 10260.71 (27846.71)
IDA Expenditures 69.23 (555.18) 39.62 (141.14)
Refundable EITC Expenditures 9029.80 (29719.36) 24974.38 (118046.36)
Non-recurring Benefit Expenditures 6190.67 (15370.36) 10348.36 (29786.97)
Expenditures on Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies 17347.99 (74168.97) 29331.64 (87656.42)
Expenditures on Two-Parent Family Formation 3629.85 (11257.76) 4019.49 (10940.6)
Other Refundable Tax Credit Expenditures 809.28 (5459.85) 8765.37 (65872.34)
Expenditures on Work Related Activities 46199.38 (90595.60) 48890.23 (81645.16)
TEL Index 8.6 (8.25) 8.89 (8.04)
Next Term is Term Limited = 1 0.25 (0.43) 0.21 (0.41)
ln(Population) 15.1 (1.05) 15.16 (0.94)
Unemployment Rate 5.47 (2.01) 6.01 (2.06)
Gross State Product 314431.69 (395341.59) 295356.64 (318283.55)
Personal Income 263414454.94 (322039328.49) 251005744.03 (269278318.79)
Poverty Rate 12.65 (3.49) 12.43 (3.14)
Fraction State House Democrat 0.49 (0.18) 0.53 (0.14)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.48 (0.17) 0.53 (0.16)
Fraction Black 0.11 (0.1) 0.11 (0.09)
N=426 N=327
All expenditure amounts are in thousands of 2015 dollars. Adjustments made using the CPI-U.
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Table 3.4: State Political Spending Cycles by General Spending Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Public Welfare Exp.) ln(Police Exp.) ln(Correction Exp.) ln(Health Exp.) ln(Hospital) ln(Education Exp.) ln(Total Exp.)
Incumbent Running = 1 -0.00419 -0.0136 0.00629 -0.0172 0.0349 0.00734 0.00190
(0.00745) (0.0165) (0.00954) (0.0132) (0.0353) (0.00789) (0.00496)
Democrat = 1 0.0379*** 0.0152 -0.00318 -0.0327 -0.0818 0.0155** 0.0185***
(0.00988) (0.0206) (0.0113) (0.0319) (0.0633) (0.00716) (0.00603)
Incumbent Running = 1 × Democrat = 1 0.0240** 0.0111 -0.00860 -0.00803 -0.0762** -0.0169 0.000673
(0.00999) (0.0242) (0.0146) (0.0222) (0.0370) (0.0105) (0.00549)
TEL Index 0.00122 0.00297 0.00218 0.00505 0.00478 -0.000962 0.000824
(0.00159) (0.00280) (0.00214) (0.00376) (0.00535) (0.00158) (0.000646)
ln(Population) 0.624 1.190*** 0.180 2.207** 1.386 1.645*** 1.289**
(0.450) (0.430) (0.478) (0.943) (2.389) (0.536) (0.553)
Unemployment Rate 0.000723 -0.0128 -0.00191 -0.0285** -0.0243 -0.00471 0.00122
(0.00699) (0.00993) (0.00654) (0.0132) (0.0242) (0.00499) (0.00316)
Gross State Product -436.9 -372.3 -202.8 788.6 -164.4 -37.07 242.7
(275.9) (574.5) (399.6) (1223.4) (1013.2) (427.5) (216.2)
Personal Income 0.795 0.172 0.408 0.290 -0.636 0.455 0.309
(0.489) (0.945) (0.596) (1.833) (1.504) (0.540) (0.348)
Poverty Rate 0.000318 0.00409 -0.00119 0.00331 0.00652 -0.00149 0.00123
(0.00257) (0.00423) (0.00280) (0.00463) (0.0110) (0.00247) (0.00121)
Fraction State House Democrat -0.164 -0.0659 0.0761 0.423* -0.00602 -0.0831 -0.138
(0.101) (0.148) (0.131) (0.249) (0.425) (0.0899) (0.0826)
Fraction State Senate Democrat -0.0714 -0.0140 -0.0576 -0.160 0.178 0.0401 -0.0302
(0.107) (0.147) (0.100) (0.196) (0.270) (0.104) (0.0590)
Fraction Black -4.470 2.388 3.015 -3.487 16.90 -1.743 -4.777
(4.538) (7.484) (3.463) (10.46) (16.65) (3.630) (4.882)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 882 882 882 882 881 882 882
R2 0.918 0.721 0.718 0.650 0.517 0.912 0.959
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent
variables are measured in 2015 dollars.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: State Welfare Spending
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Assistance Exp.) ln(Non-Assistance Exp.) ln(Assistance+Non-Assistance Exp.)
Incumbent Running = 1 -0.0266 0.0389 0.0312
(0.272) (0.0426) (0.0397)
Democrat = 1 0.227 0.0580 0.129***
(0.235) (0.0399) (0.0394)
Incumbent Running = 1 × Democrat = 1 0.201 -0.0555 -0.0329
(0.247) (0.0543) (0.0501)
TEL Index 0.0305 0.000549 0.00684
(0.0211) (0.0126) (0.00664)
ln(Population) 9.241 -1.661 -1.087
(9.039) (2.780) (2.312)
Unemployment Rate 0.0227 0.00435 -0.000848
(0.110) (0.0593) (0.0570)
Gross State Product -1184.1 2023.3 1934.0**
(5749.1) (1210.3) (929.6)
Personal Income 3.559 -0.553 -1.548
(9.658) (2.118) (1.912)
Poverty Rate 0.0135 -0.00285 -0.00591
(0.0529) (0.0166) (0.0156)
Fraction State House Democrat -1.544 -0.373 -0.602*
(1.411) (0.457) (0.353)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 1.498 0.210 0.602
(1.750) (0.532) (0.518)
Fraction Black -98.96* 14.02 -5.778
(52.69) (24.22) (17.89)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 882 882
R2 0.162 0.380 0.203
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are
measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent variables are measured in 2015 dollars.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: State Welfare Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Basic Assistance) ln(Child Care) ln(IDA) ln(EITC) ln(Non-Recurring Benefits) ln(pregnancy Prev) ln(Work-Related Activity) ln(Other Tax Credits)
Incumbent Running = 1 -0.00563 0.129 0.466 -0.520 0.812 0.195 -0.276 0.258
(0.288) (0.371) (0.347) (0.420) (0.593) (0.406) (0.391) (0.281)
Democrat = 1 0.101 0.660 0.429 -0.266 -0.157 1.074* 0.358** -0.218
(0.253) (0.401) (0.420) (0.632) (0.728) (0.570) (0.164) (0.398)
Incumbent Running = 1 × Democrat = 1 0.245 0.212 -0.570 0.989* 0.232 -0.490 -0.346 -0.414
(0.289) (0.457) (0.562) (0.580) (0.716) (0.789) (0.482) (0.269)
TEL Index 0.0492 0.0256 0.00847 -0.379*** -0.0830 -0.116 0.000931 -0.0364
(0.0379) (0.0359) (0.0782) (0.0768) (0.113) (0.139) (0.0379) (0.0367)
ln(Population) 6.030 32.21 -11.66 5.942 21.49 -3.369 21.11* -10.11
(9.688) (24.49) (13.99) (11.47) (29.21) (21.04) (12.56) (9.885)
Unemployment Rate 0.0928 0.147 0.214 0.461 0.215 0.426 0.0336 0.0246
(0.123) (0.305) (0.288) (0.308) (0.464) (0.416) (0.190) (0.185)
Gross State Product -830.7 -23849.3 4726.4 3819.4 46322.2** 61656.9*** 19820.8* -4178.7
(5523.1) (22470.4) (11968.4) (10666.8) (19069.3) (21953.4) (10469.4) (6834.3)
Personal Income 6.579 27.01 -16.38 9.684 -43.91 -39.77 -6.384 10.92
(9.672) (29.87) (27.68) (15.66) (28.15) (29.96) (16.58) (12.46)
Poverty Rate -0.0235 0.0205 -0.0114 -0.0173 0.120 0.0369 0.0268 0.0241
(0.0677) (0.120) (0.0998) (0.128) (0.193) (0.116) (0.107) (0.0580)
Fraction State House Democrat -2.232 -1.945 -2.167 -4.189 1.742 1.440 0.848 -2.006
(1.801) (3.321) (4.376) (5.483) (6.071) (5.388) (4.621) (3.637)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.959 5.381 0.551 -2.203 0.478 -0.255 1.233 1.581
(1.860) (3.569) (3.545) (3.674) (6.347) (4.400) (2.513) (3.158)
Fraction Black -132.2* 168.8 135.5 -9.725 146.0 381.7 -190.5 -142.2
(74.93) (237.1) (159.8) (229.2) (259.3) (238.0) (149.8) (125.0)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 882
R2 0.159 0.335 0.256 0.581 0.565 0.643 0.205 0.494
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent variables are measured in 2015
dollars.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: State Welfare Spending Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic Assistance Per Capita Child Care Per Capita IDA Per Capita EITC Per Capita Non-Recurring Benefit Per Capita Pregnancy Prevention Per Capita Work Related Activity Per Capita Other Tax Credit Per Capita
Incumbent Running = 1 -0.712 -1.445** 0.00266 -0.0862 0.0369 0.280 -0.523 0.187
(1.410) (0.568) (0.00442) (0.359) (0.175) (0.359) (0.479) (0.183)
Democrat = 1 5.382** 1.603* -0.00345 0.317 -0.0723 -0.417 -0.286 0.214
(2.169) (0.879) (0.00391) (0.572) (0.221) (0.501) (0.381) (0.310)
Incumbent Running = 1 × Democrat = 1 3.185 0.181 0.00281 0.383 -0.229 -0.565 0.668 -0.245
(2.291) (1.502) (0.00522) (0.539) (0.270) (0.859) (0.549) (0.203)
TEL Index 0.366 -0.0704 0.000194 -0.0410 0.0339* 0.00275 -0.120 0.0849**
(0.282) (0.0642) (0.000610) (0.0397) (0.0186) (0.0441) (0.158) (0.0378)
Unemployment Rate 1.451 0.0402 -0.0000921 0.339 -0.0262 0.0134 0.279 0.134
(1.123) (0.662) (0.00250) (0.325) (0.132) (0.257) (0.549) (0.108)
Gross State Product Per Capita -842.7 -109.8 0.517 51.10 20.85 83.78 -148.3 15.27
(797.8) (250.1) (0.943) (50.59) (32.00) (137.6) (164.8) (24.65)
Personal Income Per Capita 0.265 0.380 -0.00193 0.107 -0.0285 -0.0222 0.0528 0.0425
(0.910) (0.380) (0.00191) (0.148) (0.106) (0.240) (0.567) (0.0627)
Poverty Rate -0.0914 -0.0815 0.000612 0.0599 -0.0269 -0.0648 -0.0411 0.0114
(0.317) (0.177) (0.00108) (0.0996) (0.0472) (0.121) (0.210) (0.0188)
Fraction State House Democrat -13.44 5.977 -0.0324 -7.465 -1.062 -0.279 5.846 -1.613
(15.21) (8.739) (0.0430) (5.781) (1.769) (4.909) (5.813) (2.063)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 16.89 -1.091 0.0442 1.681 -0.685 1.430 -0.229 0.648
(16.52) (6.213) (0.0519) (4.125) (1.231) (3.465) (3.676) (1.606)
Fraction Black -422.5 205.6 -0.252 -54.42 -51.22 24.88 -353.1 -12.16
(376.9) (459.7) (2.706) (241.1) (102.5) (182.5) (393.4) (60.86)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 882
R2 0.653 0.389 0.232 0.665 0.507 0.559 0.570 0.566
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent variables are measured in 2015 dollars.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: State Welfare Spending with Lead in Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Basic Assistance) ln(Child Care) ln(IDA) ln(EITC) ln(Non-Recurring Benefits) ln(pregnancy Prev) ln(Work-Related Activity) ln(Other Tax Credits)
Democrat=1 0.113 0.685* 0.420 -0.387 0.0167 1.041* 0.401** -0.338
(0.255) (0.384) (0.462) (0.614) (0.753) (0.588) (0.190) (0.430)
Incumbent Runningt = 1 -0.0502 0.189 0.475 -0.638 0.992 0.227 -0.268 0.248
(0.337) (0.417) (0.411) (0.464) (0.670) (0.469) (0.413) (0.347)
Incumbent Runningt = 1 × Democrat=1 0.234 0.177 -0.559 1.146 0.00595 -0.453 -0.400 -0.266
(0.341) (0.444) (0.670) (0.703) (0.832) (0.830) (0.502) (0.343)
Incumbent Runningt−1 = 1 -0.324 0.354 0.0801 -0.580 0.904* 0.274 -0.0208 0.153
(0.349) (0.553) (0.439) (0.511) (0.526) (0.610) (0.488) (0.446)
Incumbent Runningt−1 = 1 × Democrat=1 -0.0676 -0.117 0.0483 0.591 -0.845 0.170 -0.216 0.607
(0.424) (0.634) (0.612) (0.685) (0.844) (0.755) (0.600) (0.605)
TEL Index 0.0538 0.0219 0.00711 -0.376*** -0.0887 -0.121 0.00268 -0.0426
(0.0370) (0.0374) (0.0791) (0.0772) (0.110) (0.140) (0.0391) (0.0382)
ln(Population) 6.218 32.20 -11.74 5.538 22.04 -3.646 21.34* -10.80
(9.575) (24.35) (13.93) (11.35) (29.08) (21.17) (12.59) (10.01)
Unemployment Rate 0.0866 0.151 0.216 0.460 0.218 0.433 0.0303 0.0354
(0.120) (0.308) (0.288) (0.309) (0.470) (0.418) (0.190) (0.183)
Gross State Product -1382.7 -23387.4 4886.6 3360.8 47094.6** 62208.9*** 19627.6* -3489.5
(5729.7) (22078.9) (12084.5) (10462.2) (18949.2) (21994.3) (10379.7) (6995.7)
Personal Income 7.539 26.19 -16.65 10.57 -45.38 -40.72 -6.075 9.793
(9.830) (29.12) (27.65) (15.53) (28.23) (30.07) (16.48) (13.03)
Poverty Rate -0.0183 0.0160 -0.0129 -0.0124 0.112 0.0318 0.0285 0.0180
(0.0706) (0.120) (0.102) (0.131) (0.194) (0.118) (0.107) (0.0574)
Fraction State House Democrat -2.114 -1.998 -2.209 -4.261 1.824 1.295 0.939 -2.290
(1.780) (3.345) (4.395) (5.524) (6.124) (5.298) (4.736) (3.631)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.958 5.418 0.545 -2.337 0.673 -0.275 1.271 1.476
(1.819) (3.547) (3.556) (3.657) (6.335) (4.411) (2.472) (3.189)
Fraction Black -135.8* 172.8 136.3 -16.38 156.4 384.7 -190.6 -140.8
(77.66) (240.7) (162.6) (228.0) (258.2) (237.6) (148.6) (127.6)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 882
R2 0.162 0.335 0.256 0.582 0.566 0.643 0.205 0.497
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent variables are measured in 2015 dollars.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: State Welfare Spending Without Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Basic Assistance) ln(Child Care) ln(IDA) ln(EITC) ln(Non-Recurring Benefits) ln(pregnancy Prev) ln(Work-Related Activity) ln(Other Tax Credits)
Incumbent Running=1 0.208 -0.0763 0.00142 -0.0481 -0.0241 -0.649 -0.0937 0.229
(0.176) (0.335) (0.317) (0.435) (0.548) (0.472) (0.326) (0.256)
Democrat=1 0.0501 0.808** 0.323 0.402 0.778 1.320* 0.267 0.314
(0.237) (0.327) (0.420) (0.727) (0.694) (0.723) (0.277) (0.461)
Incumbent Running=1 × Democrat=1 0.0709 0.263 -0.257 0.723 0.789 0.0307 -0.313 -0.386
(0.226) (0.408) (0.589) (0.621) (0.705) (0.903) (0.418) (0.252)
TEL Index -0.0163 0.150*** 0.0460 -0.0331 0.0204 -0.104 0.0699*** -0.163*
(0.0170) (0.0417) (0.0430) (0.0655) (0.0536) (0.116) (0.0251) (0.0952)
ln(Population) -0.751 14.99* 6.047* -11.52 20.60** 21.06** 6.222 -5.917
(3.710) (7.880) (3.498) (7.047) (8.689) (9.955) (4.024) (5.678)
Unemployment Rate 0.0830 -0.0304 0.168** 0.809*** 0.410* 0.546*** 0.0491 0.296*
(0.0693) (0.0647) (0.0831) (0.212) (0.222) (0.183) (0.0541) (0.154)
Gross State Product 5220.0 -21223.5 4351.5 20870.4 22353.2 17869.0 9759.8 36435.9*
(4381.3) (13633.4) (8607.8) (24092.8) (26774.9) (29901.7) (6878.2) (18571.6)
Personal Income -8.785 20.77 -8.751 -12.24 -7.736 6.614 -7.430 -35.10**
(5.306) (16.53) (10.61) (26.13) (31.31) (31.28) (7.794) (16.50)
Poverty Rate 0.0286 -0.172 -0.147* 0.112 -0.354* -0.514*** 0.000928 -0.0154
(0.0622) (0.125) (0.0830) (0.133) (0.194) (0.162) (0.109) (0.0608)
Fraction State House Democrat -2.231* -1.549 -1.348 -8.304 8.198 3.447 3.669 -0.203
(1.230) (3.013) (3.960) (5.244) (5.099) (5.850) (3.751) (2.925)
Fraction State Senate Democrat 0.549 0.208 0.538 7.275 -3.858 -3.435 0.288 2.889
(1.322) (4.153) (2.641) (5.481) (6.108) (5.210) (2.711) (3.799)
Fraction Black -35.72* -43.01 -53.85** 193.7** 241.4*** 95.86 -34.32 106.6
(19.80) (37.06) (24.44) (86.76) (72.75) (73.60) (29.56) (65.22)
Year FE? No No No No No No No No
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 882
R2 0.021 0.058 0.019 0.191 0.282 0.237 0.040 0.106
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The variables Gross State Product and Personal Income are measured in hundreds of millions of 2015 dollars. All dependent variables are measured in 2015
dollars.




Appendix A Additional Chapter 1 Material
A.1 Additional Charts and Graphs
Table 10: Condensed Vocational Grid
Age Work Experience Education Disabled
50+ Less than High School Unskilled Disabled
Less than High School Specific Skill Disabled
Less than High School Non-Specific Skill Not Disabled
High School or more Unskilled Disabled
High School or more Specific Skill Disabled
High School or more Non-Specific Skill Not Disabled
45-49 Illiterate/no English Unskilled Disabled
Less than High School Any Not Disabled
High School or more Any Not Disabled
18-44 Any Any Not Disabled
Table adapted from Michaud, Nelson, and Wiczer (2016). See Appendix 2 to
Subpart P of Part 404 of Code of Federal Regulations for full table
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Table 11: Minimum Earnings Requirement for SSDI Work
Credit
Year Earnings Year Earnings Year Earnings
1978 250 1993 590 2008 1050
1979 260 1994 620 2009 1090
1980 290 1995 630 2010 1120
1981 310 1996 640 2011 1120
1982 340 1997 670 2012 1130
1983 370 1998 700 2013 1160
1984 390 1999 740 2014 1200
1985 410 2000 780 2015 1220
1986 440 2001 830 2016 1260
1987 460 2002 870 2017 1300
1988 470 2003 890 2018 1320
1989 500 2004 900
1990 520 2005 920
1991 540 2006 970
1992 570 2007 1000
Source: SSA Website, https://www.ssa.gov/planners/index.html
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Table 12: Number of Work Credits Needed
Born after 1929, Became Disabled At Age Number of Credits You Need










62 or older 40
Note: These requirements apply to any disability besides blindness. 20 credits must be
earned in the preceding 10 years to the time in which the individual was disabled.
Source: SSA Website, https://www.ssa.gov/planners/index.html
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Table 13: Standard of Substantial Gainful Activity by Year and Disability Type
Year Blind Non-blind Year Blind Non-blind Year Blind Non-blind
1975 200 200 1990 780 500 2005 1380 830
1976 230 230 1991 810 500 2006 1450 860
1977 240 240 1992 850 500 2007 1500 900
1978 334 260 1993 880 500 2008 1570 940
1979 375 280 1994 930 500 2009 1640 980
1980 417 300 1995 940 500 2010 1640 1000
1981 459 300 1996 960 500 2011 1640 1000
1982 500 300 1997 1000 500 2012 1690 1010
1983 550 300 1998 1050 500 2013 1740 1040
1984 580 300 1999 1110 700 2014 1800 1070
1985 610 300 2000 1170 700 2015 1820 1090
1986 650 300 2001 1240 740 2016 1820 1130
1987 680 300 2002 1300 780 2017 1950 1170
1988 700 300 2003 1330 800 2018 1970 1180
1989 740 300 2004 1350 810
Source: SSA Website, https://www.ssa.gov/planners/index.html
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Table 14: Maximum SSI Benefit by Year
Year COLA Eligible Eligible Year COLA Eligible Eligible
individual couple individual couple
1975 8 $157.70 $236.6 2000 2.5 $513 $769
1976 6.4 167.8 251.8 2001 3.5 531 796
1977 5.9 177.8 266.7 2002 2.6 545 817
1978 6.5 189.4 284.10 2003 1.4 552 829
1979 9.9 208.2 312.3 2004 2.1 564 846
1980 14.3 238 357 2005 2.7 579 869
1981 11.2 264.7 397 2006 4.1 603 904
1982 7.4 284.3 426.4 2007 3.3 623 934
1983 7 304.3 456.4 2008 2.3 637 956
1984 3.5 314 472 2009 5.8 674 1011
1985 3.5 325 488 2010 0 674 1011
1986 3.1 336 504 2011 0 674 1011
1987 1.3 340 510 2012 3.6 698 1048
1988 4.2 354 532 2013 1.7 710 1066
1989 4 368 553 2014 1.5 721 1082
1990 4.7 386 579 2015 1.7 733 1100
1991 5.4 407 610 2016 0 733 1100
1992 3.7 422 633 2017 0.3 735 1103
1993 3 434 652 2018 2 750 1125
1994 2.6 446 669
1995 2.8 458 687
1996 2.6 470 705
1997 2.9 484 726
1998 2.1 494 741
1999 1.3 500 751
COLA is the Cost of Living Adjustment percentage. Source: SSA Website,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSIamts.html
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Figure 12: SSDI Expenditures Over Time
Source of SSDI data: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 13.1 Source of SSI data: The 2017
Annual Report of the Supplemental Security Income Program, Tables IV.E1 and IV.C2. All dollar amounts in Figure
12 are nominal.
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Figure 13: SSDI Expenditures Over Time
Source of SSDI data: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 13.1 Source of SSI data: The 2017
Annual Report of the Supplemental Security Income Program, Tables IV.E1 and IV.C2. All dollar amounts in Figure
13 are in 1982-1984 dollars.
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Figure 14: Diagnosis Prevalence Among Disabled Workers
Source: Social Security
Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2015 (Washington, DC: Social
Security Administration, 2015), table 21.
All Other Diseases category includes congenital anomalies, infectious and parasitic diseases, endocrine, nutritional,
and metabolic diseases, diseases of blood and blood-forming organs, neoplasms, diseases of the digestive system,
genitourinary system, respiratory system, and skin diseases.
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A.2 Data Sources
Table 15: Data Sources
Variable Data Source Notes
SSDI Acceptances by Freedom of Information Act request (SSA-2018-000763)
Reason for Decision
Welfare Time Limits Welfare Rules Database published by the Urban Institute I construct my time limit variable to equal
one if any of the following time limits exist:
tl lamos, tl paxmo, tl ramos,
tl lbmos, tl pbxmo, tl rbmos,
tl lcmos, tl pcxmo, or tl rcmos.
An alternative variable can be constructed
based on tl illex which yields similar results.
Fiscal Stress Per Capita National Association of State Budget Officers’ Fiscal Stress is deflated using CPI-U
State Fiscal Survey base year 2015.
AFDC/TANF Caseloads University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) Personal Income Per Capita was
Poverty Rate National Welfare Data deflated using CPI-U
Personal Income Per Capita base year 2015.
Unemployment Rate
Minimum Wage Monthly data were graciously provided by Michael Makowsky Deflated by CPI-U base year 2015
Housing Price Index (HPI) Federal Housing Finance Agency I took the average of the quarterly,
state-level (non-seasonally adjusted) data.
Population Age 18 to 64 United States Department of Health and Human Services
Fraction Black in collaboration with the Census Bureau
Obesity Rate The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
published by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
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A.3 Full Regression Tables
Table 16: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.739** 2.709*** 1.097 1.770**
(0.813) (0.858) (0.837) (0.796)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.911*** 0.274* 0.540*** 0.585***
(0.121) (0.162) (0.131) (0.138)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.552 -3.057 3.342 3.646
(11.46) (12.01) (10.93) (11.30)
Unemployment Rate -0.940*** -0.770** -0.934*** -1.001***
(0.321) (0.357) (0.321) (0.329)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.666*** 0.524** 0.545** 0.562**
(0.178) (0.244) (0.211) (0.215)
Poverty Rate -0.233* -0.144 -0.161 -0.171
(0.132) (0.146) (0.130) (0.132)
HPI -0.407 0.386 -0.0353 0.0869
(0.746) (1.022) (0.778) (0.823)
Fraction Black -2.039** -1.477** -1.924** -1.948***
(0.772) (0.672) (0.726) (0.709)
Minimum Wage 0.268 -0.0952 0.159 0.0672
(0.597) (0.624) (0.586) (0.576)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 13.79 -0.659 9.230 4.943
(9.125) (8.564) (8.131) (8.190)
Obesity Rate 0.196 0.226 0.217 0.224
(0.162) (0.192) (0.159) (0.173)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.421 0.344 0.450 0.402
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. This table corresponds to Panel
A in Table 1.3.
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Table 17: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Vocational Disability Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.404** 2.315*** 1.257** 1.903***
(0.530) (0.682) (0.494) (0.559)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.535*** 0.240** 0.305*** 0.364***
(0.0845) (0.108) (0.0838) (0.0914)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -0.410 -3.066 2.926 3.126
(8.354) (10.95) (8.233) (7.984)
Unemployment Rate -0.741*** -0.566* -0.477** 0.194
(0.254) (0.313) (0.221) (0.160)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.259** 0.303* 0.296* 0.394***
(0.124) (0.170) (0.150) (0.129)
Poverty Rate -0.104 -0.133 -0.0940 -0.244**
(0.0923) (0.112) (0.0841) (0.101)
HPI -0.530 0.0508 0.0473 -0.100
(0.522) (0.857) (0.531) (0.400)
Fraction Black -1.470** -1.343** -1.272** -1.641***
(0.656) (0.585) (0.553) (0.594)
Minimum Wage -0.0563 0.115 -0.0741 -0.0136
(0.395) (0.529) (0.325) (0.314)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 2.395 -8.366 -0.209 -1.053
(5.952) (8.236) (5.866) (3.505)
Obesity Rate 0.237* 0.171 0.157 0.271**
(0.125) (0.164) (0.110) (0.118)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.319 0.514 0.364 0.356
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. This table corresponds to Panel A in Table 1.4.
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Table 18: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Meets Disability Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit -0.0153 -0.0688 -0.379 -0.180
(0.452) (0.311) (0.358) (0.340)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.340*** 0.0646 0.195*** 0.197***
(0.0633) (0.0687) (0.0562) (0.0580)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.925 -2.944 -0.437 -0.227
(6.946) (5.306) (6.068) (6.010)
Unemployment Rate -0.132 -0.0400 -0.308* -0.229*
(0.170) (0.116) (0.159) (0.137)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.329*** 0.148* 0.185** 0.186**
(0.0911) (0.0809) (0.0774) (0.0766)
Poverty Rate -0.103 -0.0472 -0.0730 -0.0725
(0.0636) (0.0474) (0.0579) (0.0522)
HPI 0.248 0.472 0.0770 0.323
(0.437) (0.367) (0.397) (0.382)
Fraction Black -0.642* -0.410* -0.693** -0.661**
(0.376) (0.223) (0.308) (0.286)
Minimum Wage 0.153 -0.299 0.122 -0.0257
(0.322) (0.234) (0.312) (0.260)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 10.22 7.747 7.602 7.035
(6.533) (4.919) (5.244) (5.403)
Obesity Rate -0.0541 0.0364 0.0390 0.0176
(0.0858) (0.0648) (0.0765) (0.0724)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.441 0.701 0.688 0.659
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. This table corresponds to Panel A in
Table 1.5.
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Table 19: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Equals Disability Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.347 0.343 0.229 0.303
(0.322) (0.327) (0.286) (0.295)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.0696** -0.0330 0.0438* 0.0294
(0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0231) (0.0258)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 0.816 2.741 0.723 2.106
(2.569) (3.906) (2.499) (2.893)
Unemployment Rate -0.0675 -0.169 -0.147* -0.147
(0.0856) (0.112) (0.0844) (0.0912)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.0880*** 0.0883** 0.0657** 0.0791**
(0.0257) (0.0435) (0.0303) (0.0331)
Poverty Rate -0.0189 0.0286 0.00548 0.00723
(0.0256) (0.0325) (0.0225) (0.0243)
HPI -0.159 -0.234 -0.156 -0.184
(0.197) (0.280) (0.195) (0.226)
Fraction Black 0.0884 0.311 0.0555 0.133
(0.150) (0.216) (0.167) (0.167)
Minimum Wage 0.156 0.0661 0.104 0.105
(0.170) (0.190) (0.148) (0.159)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 1.715 0.894 1.968 1.086
(2.601) (3.138) (2.163) (2.491)
Obesity Rate 0.00887 0.0204 0.0215 0.0200
(0.0368) (0.0407) (0.0301) (0.0340)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.114 0.224 0.246 0.215
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. This table corresponds to Panel A in Table
1.6.
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A.4 Additional Robustness Checks
A.4.1 Welfare Caseloads and Disability Acceptance Rates
An alternative approach to examining the effect welfare time-limit policies on SSDI
acceptances is to utilize TANF caseloads directly. While welfare time-limit policies have been shown
to have a significant effect on TANF caseloads, other policies may matter as well. Variation in
welfare caseloads will capture changes in all welfare policies, conditional on demographic controls. I
estimate
AcceptanceRates,t =α+ β1ln(WelfareCaseloads)s,t−1 + β2FiscalStressPerCaps,t+
+ γZs,t + δt + νs + εs,t
(2)
using lagged caseloads because welfare caseloads and SSDI acceptances are simultaneously (partially)
determined by demographic control variables. By lagging ln(WelfareCaseloads), I avoid the bias
this could create.
The results of the estimation of Equation (4) are reported in Tables 20-23. Column (4)
of Table 20 shows that a 1% decrease in lagged welfare caseloads leads to a 1.48 percentage point
increase in the SSDI acceptance rate and a $1,000 increase in fiscal stress per capita leads to a .58
percentage point increase in the SSDI acceptance rate. Lagged welfare caseloads seem to play no
significant role in SSI, concurrent, or total disability acceptance rates. Table 21 tells a similar story
for Vocational acceptances. However, the results for Meets and Equals acceptances show a smaller
effect or no effect for the variables of interest.
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Table 20: Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
ln(Lag Welfare Caseloads) -0.673 -2.242** -1.211 -1.477*
(0.953) (0.842) (0.811) (0.837)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.905*** 0.272* 0.541*** 0.583***
(0.120) (0.155) (0.130) (0.134)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -3.893 -7.189 1.545 0.941
(11.39) (11.88) (10.74) (11.22)
Unemployment Rate -0.957*** -0.789** -0.940*** -1.013***
(0.336) (0.378) (0.336) (0.349)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.633*** 0.440* 0.503** 0.506**
(0.171) (0.227) (0.199) (0.202)
Poverty Rate -0.235* -0.148 -0.163 -0.173
(0.133) (0.149) (0.133) (0.135)
HPI -0.406 0.442 0.00173 0.124
(0.737) (1.004) (0.766) (0.810)
Fraction Black -1.961** -1.323** -1.853** -1.847**
(0.813) (0.655) (0.741) (0.729)
Minimum Wage 0.258 -0.154 0.124 0.0286
(0.602) (0.634) (0.592) (0.585)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 15.02 1.995 10.49 6.685
(9.118) (8.320) (8.010) (7.979)
Obesity Rate 0.189 0.209 0.209 0.213
(0.160) (0.182) (0.154) (0.167)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.418 0.347 0.452 0.403
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. All standard errors are clustered
at the state level. A coefficient of one on an independent variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a
one percentage point increase in the dependent variable.
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Table 21: Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
ln(Lag Welfare Caseloads) -0.416 -1.364* -0.942* -0.901
(0.677) (0.743) (0.537) (0.631)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.529*** 0.235** 0.303*** 0.364***
(0.0848) (0.106) (0.0822) (0.0891)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -2.249 -6.372 1.049 -0.644
(8.284) (11.05) (8.152) (9.027)
Unemployment Rate -0.755*** -0.586* -0.486** -0.639**
(0.264) (0.327) (0.233) (0.283)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.236* 0.246 0.259* 0.268*
(0.119) (0.164) (0.139) (0.143)
Poverty Rate -0.105 -0.135 -0.0956 -0.108
(0.0918) (0.112) (0.0847) (0.0934)
HPI -0.535 0.0735 0.0690 -0.0907
(0.519) (0.851) (0.520) (0.630)
Fraction Black -1.411** -1.226** -1.203** -1.316**
(0.660) (0.560) (0.557) (0.590)
Minimum Wage -0.0604 0.0844 -0.0977 -0.0507
(0.406) (0.551) (0.344) (0.419)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 3.313 -6.437 0.962 -1.312
(6.036) (8.359) (5.851) (6.515)
Obesity Rate 0.232* 0.159 0.149 0.180
(0.123) (0.157) (0.107) (0.131)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.312 0.511 0.365 0.424
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
A coefficient of one on an independent variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the
dependent variable.
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Table 22: Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
ln(Lag Welfare Caseloads) -0.118 -0.475 -0.152 -0.339
(0.441) (0.455) (0.412) (0.404)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.341*** 0.0680 0.198*** 0.200***
(0.0642) (0.0694) (0.0573) (0.0585)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.955 -3.055 -0.0480 -0.151
(6.913) (5.263) (5.959) (5.946)
Unemployment Rate -0.131 -0.0362 -0.303* -0.225
(0.170) (0.118) (0.159) (0.139)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.326*** 0.135* 0.184** 0.178**
(0.0906) (0.0729) (0.0764) (0.0736)
Poverty Rate -0.103 -0.0476 -0.0729 -0.0727
(0.0640) (0.0483) (0.0582) (0.0531)
HPI 0.254 0.495 0.0908 0.342
(0.438) (0.364) (0.396) (0.384)
Fraction Black -0.639* -0.399* -0.701** -0.658**
(0.375) (0.219) (0.301) (0.280)
Minimum Wage 0.149 -0.316 0.114 -0.0389
(0.324) (0.241) (0.315) (0.266)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 10.29 8.006 7.517 7.159
(6.570) (4.851) (5.288) (5.372)
Obesity Rate -0.0546 0.0344 0.0393 0.0165
(0.0859) (0.0652) (0.0765) (0.0724)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.435 0.601 0.474 0.531
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. All standard errors are clustered at the
state level. A coefficient of one on an independent variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage
point increase in the dependent variable.
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Table 23: Welfare Caseloads, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
ln(Lag Welfare Caseloads) -0.164 -0.316 -0.107 -0.209
(0.207) (0.315) (0.228) (0.259)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.0685** -0.0331 0.0431* 0.0289
(0.0318) (0.0327) (0.0233) (0.0255)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 0.337 2.204 0.408 1.661
(2.403) (3.735) (2.481) (2.795)
Unemployment Rate -0.0707 -0.172 -0.149* -0.149
(0.0879) (0.111) (0.0854) (0.0919)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.0806*** 0.0767* 0.0609* 0.0708*
(0.0284) (0.0453) (0.0327) (0.0355)
Poverty Rate -0.0193 0.0281 0.00525 0.00686
(0.0253) (0.0329) (0.0225) (0.0244)
HPI -0.158 -0.225 -0.155 -0.180
(0.194) (0.280) (0.196) (0.225)
Fraction Black 0.105 0.331 0.0662 0.149
(0.162) (0.209) (0.173) (0.170)
Minimum Wage 0.153 0.0576 0.102 0.100
(0.169) (0.181) (0.146) (0.155)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 1.980 1.250 2.141 1.358
(2.509) (3.063) (2.132) (2.429)
Obesity Rate 0.00727 0.0181 0.0204 0.0183
(0.0371) (0.0411) (0.0306) (0.0346)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.111 0.226 0.245 0.215
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. All standard errors are clustered at the state
level. A coefficient of one on an independent variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point
increase in the dependent variable.
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A.4.2 Deficits and Disability Acceptance Rates
The measure of fiscal stress I use captures the effect of unexpected changes in fiscal
conditions. However, this measure is necessarily dependent on budget forecasts. An alternative
to this approach is to use deficits to measure fiscal stress. Therefore, I estimate
AcceptanceRates,t =α+ β1TimeLimitss,t + β2DeficitsPerCaps,t+
+ γZs,t + δtνs + εs,t
(3)
and present my finding in Tables 24-27. Comparing the findings to the results in Tables 1.3-1.6, the
coefficients on DeficitPerCap are very similar (though slightly larger for the overall disability
acceptance rate and slightly smaller for the vocational acceptance rate) to the coefficients on
FiscalStressPerCap. These findings suggest that my results are robust to the exclusion of fiscal
forecasts in my measure of fiscal stress.
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Table 24: Disability Acceptance Rates and Deficits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.732** 2.716*** 1.107 1.776**
(0.812) (0.839) (0.830) (0.786)
Deficit Per Cap 1.209*** 0.244** 0.610*** 0.662***
(0.132) (0.114) (0.136) (0.117)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -2.624 -2.892 2.949 3.242
(11.36) (12.03) (10.97) (11.32)
Unemployment Rate -0.957*** -0.780** -0.944*** -1.013***
(0.319) (0.358) (0.321) (0.329)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.651*** 0.521** 0.537** 0.553**
(0.182) (0.244) (0.214) (0.217)
Poverty Rate -0.227* -0.139 -0.155 -0.165
(0.131) (0.145) (0.129) (0.131)
HPI -0.443 0.362 -0.0559 0.0625
(0.744) (1.024) (0.779) (0.825)
Fraction Black -2.063*** -1.487** -1.940** -1.965***
(0.768) (0.671) (0.724) (0.707)
Minimum Wage 0.230 -0.116 0.132 0.0385
(0.597) (0.624) (0.585) (0.575)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 14.96* -0.687 9.673 5.431
(8.808) (8.588) (8.125) (8.191)
Obesity Rate 0.193 0.219 0.214 0.221
(0.162) (0.193) (0.159) (0.173)
Observations 991 991 991 991
R2 0.424 0.343 0.449 0.402
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable
indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time
Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Deficit
Per Cap indicates that the state has an increase of $1,000 in the deficit per capita.
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Table 25: Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates and Deficits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 1.377** 2.316*** 1.239** 1.906***
(0.524) (0.662) (0.486) (0.545)
Deficit Per Cap 0.658*** 0.332*** 0.351*** 0.432***
(0.120) (0.0971) (0.113) (0.101)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -0.923 -2.887 2.823 2.927
(8.420) (11.04) (8.299) (8.025)
Unemployment Rate -0.752*** -0.581* -0.486** 0.188
(0.255) (0.314) (0.222) (0.160)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.250* 0.299* 0.292* 0.388***
(0.128) (0.170) (0.152) (0.131)
Poverty Rate -0.102 -0.127 -0.0917 -0.241**
(0.0921) (0.111) (0.0840) (0.101)
HPI -0.555 0.0130 0.0245 -0.109
(0.524) (0.862) (0.534) (0.401)
Fraction Black -1.480** -1.353** -1.278** -1.656***
(0.656) (0.584) (0.552) (0.595)
Minimum Wage -0.0750 0.0940 -0.0887 -0.0392
(0.395) (0.529) (0.324) (0.316)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 3.088 -8.324 0.0802 -0.696
(6.045) (8.321) (5.930) (3.558)
Obesity Rate 0.234* 0.161 0.152 0.266**
(0.125) (0.165) (0.111) (0.118)
Observations 991 991 991 991
R2 0.320 0.515 0.364 0.358
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one
unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals
one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Deficit Per Cap indicates that the state has an increase of $1,000
in the deficit per capita.
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Table 26: Disability Meets Acceptance Rates and Deficits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.00238 -0.0697 -0.356 -0.165
(0.450) (0.308) (0.356) (0.339)
Deficit Per Cap 0.448*** -0.0856 0.202** 0.163**
(0.118) (0.0630) (0.0838) (0.0791)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -2.393 -2.978 -0.675 -0.442
(6.934) (5.356) (6.107) (6.048)
Unemployment Rate -0.136 -0.0344 -0.309* -0.229
(0.169) (0.116) (0.159) (0.137)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.323*** 0.148* 0.182** 0.184**
(0.0913) (0.0807) (0.0777) (0.0769)
Poverty Rate -0.0998 -0.0480 -0.0705 -0.0707
(0.0632) (0.0471) (0.0573) (0.0519)
HPI 0.242 0.488 0.0803 0.329
(0.437) (0.367) (0.397) (0.382)
Fraction Black -0.654* -0.408* -0.700** -0.667**
(0.374) (0.223) (0.307) (0.285)
Minimum Wage 0.136 -0.297 0.113 -0.0337
(0.323) (0.234) (0.311) (0.260)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 10.61 7.718 7.721 7.154
(6.444) (4.972) (5.256) (5.421)
Obesity Rate -0.0532 0.0407 0.0410 0.0201
(0.0860) (0.0648) (0.0763) (0.0724)
Observations 991 991 991 991
R2 0.443 0.702 0.688 0.659
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy
variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Deficit Per Cap indicates that
the state has an increase of $1,000 in the deficit per capita.
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Table 27: Disability Equals Acceptance Rates and Deficits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.349 0.351 0.233 0.307
(0.320) (0.326) (0.284) (0.293)
Deficit Per Cap 0.109*** -0.0277 0.0587* 0.0428
(0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0320) (0.0295)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 0.716 2.791 0.669 2.078
(2.572) (3.913) (2.504) (2.901)
Unemployment Rate -0.0692 -0.170 -0.148* -0.147
(0.0858) (0.113) (0.0847) (0.0915)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.0866*** 0.0887** 0.0649** 0.0785**
(0.0255) (0.0433) (0.0306) (0.0333)
Poverty Rate -0.0183 0.0294 0.00610 0.00789
(0.0254) (0.0323) (0.0223) (0.0242)
HPI -0.163 -0.234 -0.157 -0.186
(0.196) (0.280) (0.195) (0.226)
Fraction Black 0.0860 0.310 0.0537 0.132
(0.150) (0.215) (0.167) (0.167)
Minimum Wage 0.153 0.0653 0.102 0.103
(0.170) (0.189) (0.148) (0.159)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 1.813 0.818 2.004 1.102
(2.579) (3.151) (2.156) (2.491)
Obesity Rate 0.00854 0.0200 0.0215 0.0198
(0.0366) (0.0404) (0.0299) (0.0338)
Observations 991 991 991 991
R2 0.115 0.224 0.246 0.216
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy
variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Deficit Per Cap indicates that the
state has an increase of $1,000 in the deficit per capita.
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A.4.3 Lagged Variables of Interest
It is plausible that time-limit policies have a delayed effect on Disability Insurance acceptance
rates. Time-limit policies, by their very nature, take time to have an effect. If a state imposes a
16-month time limit which limits the number of months one can consecutively receive welfare, that
policy may take more than a year to affect behavior.19 Additionally, mid-year policy changes may
have a reduced effect, while the following year exhibits the full effect.20
To test this, I estimate Equation (2) using a one-year lag of TimeLimit. The results are
presented in Tables 28-29. Comparing the findings presented in Tables 28 and 29 to those presented
in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, the coefficient on the lag of TimeLimit is larger and more statistically
significant than the coefficient on the non-lagged variable. Specifically, the presence of a time-limit
policy in the prior year leads to a 2.39 percentage point increase in the total disability acceptance
rate, an increase of .62 percentage points over the effect of the non-lagged time limit variable. A
similar increase can be seen for Vocational acceptance rates.
19It is also true that time-limit policies may still affect behavior before the limit binds. Welfare recipients may leave
welfare early in order to ”bank” future months of eligibility.
20The dummy variable T imeLimit is based on data from the Welfare Rules Database published by the Urban
Institute. I follow their coding by indicating that a given year has a time-limit policy if the policy was in place before
July 1st of that year.
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Table 28: Disability Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lag Time Limit 2.014** 3.407*** 1.838** 2.389***
(0.767) (0.935) (0.788) (0.764)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.865*** 0.283* 0.548*** 0.581***
(0.116) (0.162) (0.128) (0.134)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.520 -4.333 4.759 4.187
(12.45) (13.09) (12.04) (12.43)
Unemployment Rate -0.855** -0.669* -0.835** -0.889**
(0.323) (0.361) (0.319) (0.335)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.693*** 0.558** 0.565** 0.596**
(0.184) (0.252) (0.218) (0.223)
Poverty Rate -0.192 -0.117 -0.141 -0.142
(0.136) (0.156) (0.138) (0.140)
HPI -0.478 0.426 0.0332 0.0830
(0.793) (1.027) (0.811) (0.859)
Fraction Black -2.024** -1.546** -1.980** -1.992**
(0.858) (0.752) (0.787) (0.790)
Minimum Wage 0.385 -0.0161 0.284 0.174
(0.678) (0.651) (0.654) (0.644)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 15.03 0.325 9.187 5.726
(9.747) (9.318) (9.168) (9.218)
Obesity Rate 0.217 0.229 0.234 0.236
(0.176) (0.197) (0.174) (0.186)
N 939 939 939 939
R2 0.494 0.532 0.446 0.532
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable
indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lag
Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in
Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 29: Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lag Time Limit 1.316** 2.714*** 1.542*** 2.198***
(0.567) (0.794) (0.548) (0.516)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.531*** 0.284** 0.324*** 0.371***
(0.0842) (0.108) (0.0824) (0.0917)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.059 -3.647 2.559 2.597
(9.180) (11.55) (8.729) (9.166)
Unemployment Rate -0.718*** -0.495 -0.427* 0.208
(0.259) (0.310) (0.222) (0.162)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.258* 0.326* 0.304* 0.393***
(0.129) (0.174) (0.155) (0.135)
Poverty Rate -0.0984 -0.153 -0.104 -0.216**
(0.0962) (0.119) (0.0877) (0.103)
HPI -0.600 0.101 0.104 -0.124
(0.530) (0.846) (0.521) (0.389)
Fraction Black -1.562** -1.407** -1.356** -1.746**
(0.761) (0.655) (0.618) (0.663)
Minimum Wage -0.0303 0.181 -0.00611 0.0372
(0.397) (0.507) (0.321) (0.335)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 3.150 -8.531 -0.220 -0.844
(6.440) (8.295) (6.086) (3.645)
Obesity Rate 0.251* 0.178 0.170 0.239*
(0.132) (0.167) (0.116) (0.121)
N 939 939 939 939
R2 0.284 0.481 0.330 0.312
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a
one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lag Time Limit is a dummy variable that
equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000
less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 30: Disability Meets Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lag Time Limit 0.356 0.139 -0.0956 0.130
(0.381) (0.331) (0.331) (0.302)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.305*** 0.0452 0.189*** 0.180***
(0.0557) (0.0687) (0.0527) (0.0540)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -1.209 -3.038 1.486 0.737
(7.249) (5.736) (6.910) (6.509)
Unemployment Rate -0.0768 -0.0157 -0.271* -0.181
(0.152) (0.118) (0.149) (0.127)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.342*** 0.145* 0.184** 0.194**
(0.0872) (0.0776) (0.0752) (0.0734)
Poverty Rate -0.0788 -0.0180 -0.0539 -0.0448
(0.0620) (0.0467) (0.0595) (0.0509)
HPI 0.245 0.467 0.0837 0.323
(0.469) (0.361) (0.427) (0.402)
Fraction Black -0.590 -0.428* -0.697** -0.655**
(0.370) (0.220) (0.316) (0.279)
Minimum Wage 0.226 -0.285 0.169 0.0136
(0.364) (0.223) (0.349) (0.283)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 10.64 8.354 7.269 7.308
(6.829) (5.229) (6.143) (5.964)
Obesity Rate -0.0491 0.0258 0.0377 0.0128
(0.0965) (0.0698) (0.0885) (0.0812)
N 939 939 939 939
R2 0.449 0.706 0.699 0.672
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lag Time Limit is a
dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap
indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 31: Disability Equals Acceptance Rates and Lagged Welfare Time Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lag Time Limit 0.347 0.458* 0.394* 0.413*
(0.259) (0.253) (0.207) (0.216)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.0586* -0.0481 0.0383 0.0199
(0.0299) (0.0323) (0.0237) (0.0247)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 0.733 2.222 0.540 1.961
(2.784) (4.501) (2.849) (3.347)
Unemployment Rate -0.0608 -0.164 -0.135* -0.137
(0.0822) (0.108) (0.0797) (0.0868)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.103*** 0.101** 0.0780** 0.0932***
(0.0267) (0.0446) (0.0306) (0.0342)
Poverty Rate -0.00521 0.0403 0.0162 0.0190
(0.0238) (0.0323) (0.0234) (0.0246)
HPI -0.160 -0.246 -0.152 -0.189
(0.194) (0.275) (0.195) (0.223)
Fraction Black 0.142 0.332 0.0912 0.169
(0.142) (0.205) (0.154) (0.157)
Minimum Wage 0.171 0.0686 0.115 0.114
(0.180) (0.201) (0.161) (0.172)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 2.092 1.469 2.289 1.451
(2.683) (3.363) (2.334) (2.669)
Obesity Rate 0.0113 0.0263 0.0269 0.0242
(0.0363) (0.0416) (0.0306) (0.0344)
N 939 939 939 939
R2 0.128 0.237 0.264 0.235
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lag Time Limit is a dummy
variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates
that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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A.4.4 Leads of Variables of Interest
The effect of future policy changes should have no effect on disability acceptance rates in
today. Therefore, I estimate Equation (2) using three-year leads of the variables of interest. I report
the results in Tables 32-35. The coefficient on LeadT imeLimit is statistically insignificant in all
specifications. However, the coefficient on LeadFiscalStressPerCap is positive and statistically
significant for the SSI acceptance rate and the SSI Vocational acceptance rate.
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Table 32: Three Year Leads (Disability Acceptance Rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lead Time Limit -0.473 0.161 -0.670 -0.616
(2.140) (2.477) (2.353) (2.359)
Lead Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.416*** 0.0483 0.120 0.187
(0.124) (0.191) (0.161) (0.157)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -2.217 0.646 6.370 6.426
(14.16) (14.50) (12.00) (12.77)
Unemployment Rate -1.088*** -0.860** -1.017** -1.129***
(0.381) (0.416) (0.394) (0.393)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.503** 0.444* 0.460* 0.435*
(0.195) (0.263) (0.237) (0.236)
Poverty Rate -0.269* -0.175 -0.190 -0.203
(0.140) (0.157) (0.137) (0.139)
HPI 0.176 0.990 0.575 0.699
(0.643) (0.910) (0.666) (0.698)
Fraction Black -2.333*** -1.693** -2.211*** -2.215***
(0.786) (0.787) (0.770) (0.770)
Minimum Wage -0.194 -0.447 -0.267 -0.345
(0.515) (0.511) (0.498) (0.472)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 11.57 -4.750 7.179 1.759
(10.78) (9.664) (8.431) (8.441)
Obesity Rate -0.0268 0.0433 -0.0493 -0.0190
(0.142) (0.172) (0.132) (0.146)
N 841 841 841 841
R2 0.420 0.303 0.452 0.400
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable
indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lead Time
Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Lead
Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 33: Three Year Leads (Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lead Time Limit 0.651 0.789 0.400 0.526
(1.214) (1.863) (1.404) (1.547)
Lead Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.534*** 0.175 0.151 0.254***
(0.140) (0.165) (0.136) (0.0842)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 4.618 4.602 8.277 7.729
(10.11) (13.44) (9.795) (8.845)
Unemployment Rate -0.782*** -0.606* -0.510* 0.0965
(0.272) (0.360) (0.256) (0.204)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.203 0.246 0.253 0.431***
(0.127) (0.193) (0.169) (0.142)
Poverty Rate -0.140 -0.184 -0.129 -0.307***
(0.0965) (0.114) (0.0844) (0.106)
HPI -0.265 0.491 0.365 -0.167
(0.478) (0.799) (0.505) (0.407)
Fraction Black -1.695** -1.671** -1.509** -1.600**
(0.661) (0.706) (0.597) (0.690)
Minimum Wage -0.206 -0.148 -0.274 0.205
(0.367) (0.492) (0.313) (0.310)
ln(Population Age 55-64) -1.186 -12.97 -3.053 -1.167
(6.510) (10.18) (6.653) (3.390)
Obesity Rate 0.130 0.104 0.0490 0.283**
(0.100) (0.153) (0.0952) (0.114)
N 841 841 841 841
R2 0.344 0.530 0.385 0.368
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one
unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lead Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals
one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Lead Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less
funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 34: Three Year Leads (Disability Meets Acceptance Rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit -0.429 -0.0501 -0.547 -0.464
(0.735) (0.412) (0.646) (0.575)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap -0.0445 -0.111 0.00851 -0.0517
(0.0501) (0.0726) (0.0463) (0.0512)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -3.281 -3.953 -0.810 -1.058
(8.094) (5.241) (5.909) (6.071)
Unemployment Rate -0.221 -0.0536 -0.339 -0.282
(0.221) (0.131) (0.206) (0.175)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.255** 0.156* 0.156 0.148
(0.120) (0.0832) (0.104) (0.0946)
Poverty Rate -0.0992 -0.0374 -0.0743 -0.0678
(0.0671) (0.0507) (0.0597) (0.0539)
HPI 0.543 0.604* 0.331 0.546
(0.414) (0.353) (0.351) (0.353)
Fraction Black -0.827* -0.417 -0.817** -0.778**
(0.440) (0.265) (0.360) (0.338)
Minimum Wage -0.134 -0.383 -0.0831 -0.206
(0.320) (0.249) (0.291) (0.261)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 9.137 7.262 7.429 6.299
(6.935) (4.912) (4.859) (5.112)
Obesity Rate -0.164* -0.0492 -0.0895 -0.0955
(0.0873) (0.0643) (0.0654) (0.0685)
N 841 841 841 841
R2 0.412 0.660 0.676 0.638
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lead Time Limit is a
dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Lead Fiscal Stress Per
Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 35: Three Year Leads (Disability Equals Acceptance Rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Lead Time Limit -0.643 -0.758 -0.525 -0.655
(0.635) (0.566) (0.608) (0.577)
Lead Fiscal Stress Per Cap -0.0725 -0.0201 -0.0454 -0.0440
(0.0560) (0.0465) (0.0332) (0.0405)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -3.223 -0.437 -1.221 -0.778
(3.582) (3.953) (2.826) (2.994)
Unemployment Rate -0.0832 -0.196 -0.166* -0.171
(0.101) (0.122) (0.0972) (0.103)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.0566 0.0613 0.0521 0.0526
(0.0373) (0.0577) (0.0365) (0.0428)
Poverty Rate -0.0215 0.0438 0.0125 0.0158
(0.0342) (0.0378) (0.0276) (0.0293)
HPI -0.126 -0.197 -0.115 -0.145
(0.209) (0.283) (0.198) (0.231)
Fraction Black 0.194 0.417 0.126 0.219
(0.195) (0.272) (0.215) (0.217)
Minimum Wage 0.129 0.0487 0.0809 0.0826
(0.180) (0.195) (0.158) (0.168)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 3.891 2.123 2.921 2.392
(3.376) (3.352) (2.559) (2.801)
Obesity Rate 0.00257 -0.00168 -0.00944 -0.00363
(0.0409) (0.0426) (0.0359) (0.0372)
N 841 841 841 841
R2 0.091 0.202 0.237 0.200
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates
that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Lead Time Limit is a dummy
variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Lead Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates
that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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A.4.5 State-Specific Linear Time Trends
A possible concern with the estimation presented in Section 1.4 is that there may be
pre-existing trends in disability acceptance rates the effect of which is showing up in the coefficients
of the variables of interest. While a visual examination of disability acceptance rates reveals no
such pattern, I show the results of a linear fixed-effect estimation including state-specific linear time
trends in Tables 36-39. The findings are consistent with the findings presented in Section 1.4, though
the magnitudes of the coefficients on the variables of interest are larger in each specification.
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Table 36: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Overall Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI SSDI Concurrent Total Disability
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 3.294*** 3.466*** 2.373*** 3.003***
(0.804) (0.851) (0.875) (0.783)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.983*** 0.409*** 0.683*** 0.697***
(0.172) (0.114) (0.148) (0.137)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -37.41 -49.99* -56.60 -47.89
(44.60) (27.22) (34.78) (33.43)
Unemployment Rate -0.543* -0.492 -0.404 -0.504
(0.282) (0.312) (0.328) (0.305)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.164 0.116 0.185 0.153
(0.156) (0.191) (0.159) (0.170)
Poverty Rate -0.200* -0.148 -0.186* -0.190*
(0.107) (0.115) (0.0943) (0.102)
HPI 2.201*** 3.060*** 2.903*** 2.898***
(0.633) (0.884) (0.708) (0.738)
Fraction Black -1.144 -1.292 -2.157 -1.728
(1.812) (2.083) (1.682) (1.789)
Minimum Wage -0.353 -0.912** -0.666 -0.719*
(0.479) (0.413) (0.463) (0.424)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 49.63 53.56** 65.85** 58.06**
(30.67) (21.25) (24.59) (24.03)
Obesity Rate -0.0951 -0.0790 -0.107 -0.0847
(0.122) (0.132) (0.113) (0.121)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.599 0.561 0.635 0.600
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one unit increase in that
variable leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one
if the state has any sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has
$1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 37: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Vocational Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Vocational SSDI Vocational Concurrent Vocational Total Disability Vocational
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 2.325*** 2.680*** 1.922*** 1.903***
(0.700) (0.663) (0.601) (0.559)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.490*** 0.306*** 0.285*** 0.364***
(0.0846) (0.0833) (0.0749) (0.0914)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -5.904 -11.80 -9.346 3.126
(17.77) (24.03) (14.99) (7.984)
Unemployment Rate -0.513*** -0.519** -0.277* 0.194
(0.173) (0.214) (0.159) (0.160)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.0140 -0.0444 0.00310 0.394***
(0.0970) (0.156) (0.0978) (0.129)
Poverty Rate -0.143* -0.142 -0.119* -0.244**
(0.0731) (0.0942) (0.0653) (0.101)
HPI 1.133** 1.874** 1.682*** -0.100
(0.481) (0.753) (0.529) (0.400)
Fraction Black -0.668 -0.904 -1.128 -1.641***
(1.097) (1.914) (1.090) (0.594)
Minimum Wage -0.385 -0.497 -0.499* -0.0136
(0.314) (0.393) (0.258) (0.314)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 12.75 21.92 17.42** -1.053
(11.73) (14.32) (8.566) (3.505)
Obesity Rate -0.00518 -0.0906 -0.0444 0.271**
(0.0779) (0.114) (0.0746) (0.118)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.593 0.702 0.628 0.664
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable leads to a
one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any sort of welfare time
limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than expected per capita.
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Table 38: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Meets Listing Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SSI Meets SSDI Meets Concurrent Meets Total Disability Meets
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.470 -0.0426 0.0661 0.136
(0.586) (0.349) (0.453) (0.408)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.401*** 0.0880 0.296*** 0.255***
(0.112) (0.0694) (0.0943) (0.0817)
ln(Population Age 18-64) -30.49 -35.04** -40.44* -36.56*
(30.43) (15.05) (24.09) (21.65)
Unemployment Rate 0.0148 0.134 -0.0327 0.00946
(0.184) (0.136) (0.197) (0.153)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.159 0.145* 0.171 0.137
(0.126) (0.0831) (0.111) (0.0937)
Poverty Rate -0.0534 -0.0415 -0.0795* -0.0666
(0.0536) (0.0444) (0.0460) (0.0426)
HPI 0.985** 0.952** 1.087*** 1.057***
(0.403) (0.394) (0.352) (0.344)
Fraction Black -0.826 -0.739 -1.029 -0.988
(1.565) (1.102) (1.346) (1.279)
Minimum Wage -0.0903 -0.412 -0.171 -0.242
(0.291) (0.249) (0.300) (0.248)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 28.48 22.99** 35.69** 29.62**
(19.57) (8.882) (15.94) (13.85)
Obesity Rate -0.0809 0.0245 -0.0538 -0.0235
(0.0728) (0.0526) (0.0605) (0.0555)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.701 0.594 0.721 0.580
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable
leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any
sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available
than expected per capita.
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Table 39: Welfare Time Limits, Fiscal Stress, and Disability Equals Listing Acceptance Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS CRE OLS CRE
SSI Equals SSDI Equals Concurrent Equals Total Disability Equals
Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
Time Limit 0.489 0.771* 0.397 0.569*
(0.377) (0.384) (0.301) (0.337)
Fiscal Stress Per Cap 0.119** 0.0162 0.104*** 0.0813*
(0.0543) (0.0483) (0.0304) (0.0419)
ln(Population Age 18-64) 0.907 -2.814 -7.072 -3.313
(9.405) (9.802) (6.702) (8.128)
Unemployment Rate -0.0447 -0.108 -0.0914 -0.0863
(0.0979) (0.0906) (0.0797) (0.0799)
Personal Income Per Cap 0.00291 0.0418 0.0101 0.0211
(0.0653) (0.0666) (0.0416) (0.0544)
Poverty Rate 0.00261 0.0218 0.0108 0.0111
(0.0231) (0.0276) (0.0195) (0.0210)
HPI 0.0651 0.0874 0.136 0.109
(0.201) (0.196) (0.139) (0.168)
Fraction Black 0.330 0.246 -0.00367 0.162
(0.428) (0.558) (0.397) (0.437)
Minimum Wage 0.103 -0.00411 -0.00339 0.0221
(0.198) (0.181) (0.146) (0.163)
ln(Population Age 55-64) 7.921 9.989 13.01** 10.58*
(7.944) (6.511) (5.434) (6.104)
Obesity Rate -0.0140 -0.00568 -0.00828 -0.00727
(0.0440) (0.0334) (0.0300) (0.0320)
N 988 988 988 988
R2 0.306 0.527 0.512 0.499
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level. A coefficient of one on a variable indicates that a one unit increase in that variable
leads to a one percentage point increase in the dependent variable. Time Limit is a dummy variable that equals one if the state has any
sort of welfare time limit policy. A one-unit increase in Fiscal Stress Per Cap indicates that the state has $1,000 less funds available than
expected per capita.
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Appendix B Additional Chapter 2 Material
B.1 First-Order and Second-Order Factor Analysis
The following table is taken directly from De Jong et al. 2005. The details of how each state
rule was coded can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Table 40: 1st and 2nd Order Factor Variable Analysis (De Jong et al. 2005)
State Rules Contributing to Dimensions Dimensions Based On Dimensions Based On
(item factor loading) 1st Order Factor Analysis 2nd Order Factor Analysis




Work-related Activities Requirements #2 (.97) Activities Requirements
Work-related Activities Requirements #3 (.99) Eigenvalue: 4.7
Work-related Activities Requirements #4 (.98) Variance Explained: 95%
Work-related Activities Requirements #5 (.98) Chronbach’s α: .96
Maximum Hours of Work in 2-Parent Family (.91)

Two-Parent Families
Job Proof Required for 2 Parents (.89) Eigenvalue: 2.5
Unemployment Duration Required for 2 Parents (.96) Variance Explained: 95%
Chronbach’s α: .96 Eligibility Requirements
For Groups of Scale Score
New Immigrant Eligibility in 1st 5 Years (.77)

New/Battered Immigrants Eigenvalue: 2.2
Post-Reform Battered Immigrants Eligible (.92) Eigenvalue: 2.2 Variance Explained: 55%
Pre-Reform Battered Immigrants Eligible (.87) Variance Explained: 73% Chronbach’s α: .72
Chronbach’s α: .81
Eligibility of Immigrants admitted for Emergency Reasons (.92)

Green Card/Refugee
Eligibility of IRCA/Green-card Immigrants in 1st 5 Years (.86) Immigrants
Eligibility of Immigrants admitted for Humanitarian Reasons (.94) Eigenvalue: 3.3
Eligibility of Immigrants admitted with Stay of Deportation (.93) Variance Explained: 83%
Chronbach’s α: .93




Immunization Requirement (.88) Eigenvalue: 3.0
Contract Requires Immunization/Health Screening (.88) Variance Explained: 75%
Contract Requires School Involvement (.84) Chronbach’s α: .89
Personal Responsibilities
Drug/Alcohol Screening Required (.85)

Eigenvalue: 1.4
Parenting/Family Skills Classes Required (.85) Variance Explained: 72%
Chronbach’s α: .61 Behavioral Eligibility
Responsibilities
Income Eligibility Test Value (.64)

Basic Responsibilities Scale Score
Job Search Requirement (.58) Eigenvalue: 1.3 Eigenvalue: 1.7
Drug Felon Eligibility (.75) Variance Explained: 44% Variance Explained: 43%
Chronbach’s α: .35 Chronbach’s α: .56
Noncompliance Penalties
Sanctions for Activities Requirements Noncompliance (.87)

Eigenvalue: 1.5
Most Severe Penalty for Child Support Noncompliance (.87) Variance Explained: 76%
Chronbach’s α:.68
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Table 41: 1st and 2nd Order Factor Variable Analysis (De Jong et al. 2005) Continued
State Rules Contributing to Dimensions Dimensions Based On Dimensions Based On
(item factor loading) 1st Order Factor Analysis 2nd Order Factor Analysis
Illness Exemption

Exempt for Own Illness (.96)

Eigenvalue: 1.8
Exempt to Care for Ill Unit Member (.96) Variance Explained: 92%
Chronbach’s α: .91
Exempt If No Activities Program in Area (.78)

Work Exemption Eligibility Limits &
Exempt if VISTA Volunteer (.76) Eigenvalue: 2.5 Exemptions Scale Score
Unit Exemption (.84) Variance Explained: 63% Eigenvalue: 1.6
Work hours Required for Exemption (.78) Chronbach’s α: .80 Variance Explained: 54%
Chronbach’s α: .56
Time Limits
Time Limit Extensions Implemented (.83)

Eigenvalue: 1.4
Combination of Time Limits Employed (.83) Variance Explained: 69%
Chronbach’s α: .56
Pregnant Women
Pregnant Women Eligible (.98)

Eigenvalue: 1.9
Month Benefits Start for Pregnant Women (.98) Variance Explained: 95%
Chronbach’s α: .95
Transitional Benefits
Child Care Assistance Duration Required (.78)

Eigenvalue: 1.2
Prior Medicaid Duration Required (.78) Variance Explained: 61%
Chronbach’s α: .38
Stepparent Inclusion in Benefit Calculation (.86)

Extended Kin
Deeming of Stepparent Income (.93) Eigenvalue: 1.9
Deeming of Co-resident Grandparent Income (.56) Variance Explained: 64%
Chronbach’s α: .70
Assets/Income
Unrestricted Asset/Resource Limit (.80)

Eigenvalue: 1.3
Earned Income Disregards Value (.80) Variance Explained: .64%
Chronbach’s α: .44
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B.2 Dimensions Based on First-Order Factor Analysis
Note: Neither the original Factor Variable Analysis nor the following coding of welfare
policies is a result of my own work. The Factor Variable Analysis and coding were completed by
De Jong et al. 2005.
1. Eligibility of Pregnant Women
• PREGELG (ep asteg )
Indicates whether pregnant women are ever eligible in the state.
0 = Y es (mother and father, mother and spouse if he lives with, mother and unborn
child)
1 = No
• PREGMO (ep month)
For states that provide assistance to pregnant women, indicates the month of
pregnancy during which eligibility begins for a pregnant woman with no other children.
0 = 6 months and under 1 = 7 months and up 2 = N/A (Pregnant women are not
eligible)
2. Transitional Benefits [trans]
• CHCARDUR (tb tcdur)
Describes the duration of prior assistance receipt required for a unit to be eligible for
Transitional Child Care. 0 = no duration to 1 of last 6 months 1 = 3 of last 6 months
or none provided
• MEDICDUR (tb tmdur)
Describes the duration of prior assistance receipt required for a unit to be eligible for
Transitional Medicaid. 1= no duration requirement 2= 3 of last 6 months, for at least
1 month
3. Extended Kin [x kin]
• STEPRNT (ei stprt)
Indicates whether inclusion of stepparent in the unit is mandatory, optional or
prohibited. 0 = Mandatory 1 = Optional 2 = Prohibited
• GRNDDEEM (di ghmd) Captures whether the income of grandparents in the
household is deemed. 0 = No 1 = Yes
• STEPDEEM (di spwho) Describes to whom a step-parent’s income is deemed, if at
all. 0 = No, not deemed to unit or not applicable 1 = Yes, deemed to spouse and
children
4. Basic (Eligibility) Responsibilities
• INCTEST [Combined Income Eligibility Tests Variables]
Value of income eligibility test value, computed to be comparable to gross income test
value (earned and unearned income). High values indicate most stringent income test
values (i.e., lowest income cutoffs) and lowest values indicate more lenient cutoffs (i.e.,
highest income cutoffs). Range = 0− 3732
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• CA JSREQ (ca jsreq)
Indicates whether job search is required as a condition of eligibility in the state. Details
on this policy are captured in the corresponding notes variable. 0 = No 1 = Y es
• DRUGFEL (ei drgfl) Indicates whether persons convicted of a drug felony are eligible.
0 = Y es 1 = No or NotEligible
5. Eligibility of Two-Parent Families [twopar]
• HUNDRED (tp maxap) Indicates the maximum number of hours a principal earner
in a two-parent, non-disabled applicant unit can work and still be eligible for benefits.
(The 100 hour rule for applicants). 0 = NoLimit 1 = 100 hours 2 = N/A (Not
allowed to work)
• WKHIS (tp wkhis) Captures the required proof of labor force attachment for the
principal earner in a two-parent, non-disabled applicant unit in order to be eligible for
benefits (The work history rule). 0 = N/A and No 1 = If a work history id required
• UNEMWAIT (tp bwait)
Length of time the principal earner of a two-parent, non-disabled family must be
unemployed in order to receive benefits. (The 30 day waiting period rule). 0 =
NoWait
1 = 30 Day Wait (4 weeks)
6. Rules Regarding New and Battered Immigrants [im new]
• VYRNEWIM (nc 5ste$)
Captures whether the state chooses to fund any groups of non-exempt qualified, new
immigrants during their first five years in the country. 0 = Y es 1 = No
• BATIMPOS (nc nbatt)
Captures whether post reform battered immigrants are eligible for benefits. 0 =Some
or eligible 1 =Not applicable or not eligible
• BATIMPRE (nc obatt)
Captures whether pre-reform battered immigrants are eligible for benefits. 0 = Y es
1 = No
7. Rules Regarding Green Card/Refugee Immigrants [im green]
• PERMIMM (nc nperm)
Captures whether the non-exempt group of new immigrants who enter the U.S. with
a green card or are permitted permanent residence under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) or Special Agricultural Worker provisions of the IRCA are
eligible for benefits after their first five years in the country. 0 = Some or eligible 1 =
Not applicable or not eligible
• NODEPORT (nc ndprt)
Captures whether non-exempt non-citizens granted a stay of deportation or who have
had their deportation withheld are eligible for benefits. 0 = Some or eligible 1 = Not
applicable or not eligible
• EMERGIMM (nc nprle)
Captures whether non-exempt persons or immigrant groups that are permitted entry
into the U.S. in cases of emergency or because of an overriding public interest are
eligible for benefits. These entrants are granted temporary residence and are not
likely to become residents. 0 = Some or eligible 1 = Not eligible or Not applicable
135
• REFUGEE (nc nref)
Captures whether the non-exempt immigrant group with humanitarian status based
on conditions abroad (i.e., may face persecution in their homeland) is eligible for
benefits. Refugee status permits non-citizens to enter from abroad, and asylum status
permits non-citizens already in the U.S. to remain.
0 = Some or eligible
1 = Not applicable or not eligible
8. Asset/Income Test [inc]
• DISREGRD
Maximum dollar amount that can be disregarded over a 2-year period, calculated per
year based on the median income in the year for women ever receiving TANF in that
year. (Reverse coded so that high values represent lowest disregards/most stringent
policy)
Range = 0− 56, 264 (recoded)
• UNRESASS (at unres)
Indicates the allowable value of assets that can be held for a particular use, often
referred to as IDAs (Individual Development Accounts). 1 = 3000 and up
2 = 2000− 2999
3 = 1000− 1999
9. Illness Exemption [i exmt]
• ILLEXEM (ae illps) Indicates whether an ill or incapacitated person is exempt from
Activities Requirements.
0 = Y es
1 = No
• CARILLEX (ae illct)
Indicates whether a unit member caring for another ill or incapacitated unit member
is exempt from Activities Requirements.
0 = Y es
1 = No
10. Work Exemption [w exmt]
• NOPROGEX (ae nopgm) Indicates whether a state exempts a person from activities
requirements if they are living in an area where the program is not available.
0 = Y es
1 = No
• VISTAEX (ae vista)
Indicates whether full-time VISTA volunteers are exempt from Activities
Requirements.
0 = Y es
1 = No
• WKHRS (ae wkhrs)
Indicates the number of hours per week a unit member must work in an unsubsidized
job in order to be considered exempt from Activities Requirements.
Other = ActualV alues (Hours)
40 = NoExemption
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• WKHREXEM (ae wkhrs) Indicates whether a unit can be considered exempt from
Activities Requirements.
0 = Y es
1 = No, no exemption
11. Noncompliance Penalties [comply]
• ACTSANCT (as worst)
Describes the worst case sanction for non-compliance with an Activities Requirement.
0 = Partial loss of benefits; time usually not specified (sanctioned individual; or 25%
to 40%)
1 = Partial loss of benefits and sanction; individuals income and assets counted for
income tests (regardless of time)
2 = $100 penalty for 2 months, after which all benefit is lost until compliance
3 = Unit loses eligibility for a specific time or until compliance
4 = Eligibility lost for life or not applicable
• CHSSANCT (ss worst)
Describes the most severe penalty imposed as a result of failing to meet child support
cooperation requirements.
1 = Fixed-rate financial penalty
2 = Calculated penalty
3 = Needs of parent and child in question are dropped from benefit calculation
4 = Unit loses eligibility
12. Time Limits [time]
• TIMELMT (tl mos, tl lamos, tl lawho, tl lbmos, tl lbwho, tl lcmos, tl lcwho)
Indicates the lifetime limit for benefits.
0 = no time limits
1 = 60 month time limit
2 = less than 60 months
• TMLMTEXT (tl extyp)
Captures how the extension policy is implemented in the state. Basically, this variable
describes if the state has a set policy on granting extensions or if each case is evaluated
on its own personal merits.
0 = Not applicable (No time limit)
1 = Case by case
2 = Specific rules
3 = No extension
13. Family Responsibilities [fambeh]
• SCHLREQ (sp screq)
Captures whether the state has any school requirements. 0 = No
1 = Yes
• IMMUMREQ (im imreq) Captures whether the state has an immunization
requirement. 0 = No
1 = Y es
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• CA SAREQ (ca sareq)
Indicates whether school attendance and parental involvement are required in the
state. Details regarding school requirements for parents and children are found in the
School Policies for Dependent Children and Minor Parents Activities Requirements
and Bonuses categories.
0 = No
1 = Y es
• CA IMREQ (ca imreq)
Indicates whether immunizations and/or health screenings are required in the state.
Details regarding immunization and health screening policies are found in the
Immunization and Health Screening Requirements category.
0 = No
1 = Y es
14. Personal Responsibilities [peresp]
• CA DGREQ (ca dgreq)
Indicates whether drug and alcohol screening and/or treatment is required in the state.
Details on this policy are captured in the corresponding notes variable.
0 = No
1 = Y es
• CA PTREQ (ca ptreq)
Indicates whether parenting classes and/or family skills training sessions are required
in the state. Details on this policy are captured in the corresponding notes variable.
0 = No
1 = Y es
15. Activities Requirements [actreq]
• ACTREQ1 (ar #1dsc, ar #1who, ar #1tot)
Describes what is required for Activities Requirement #1.
0 = Wide range of activities, including community service or child care or N.A.
1 = More possibilities than only work or only school related activities
2 = Only work or only school activities
• ACTREQ2 (ar #2dsc, ar #2who, ar #2tot)
Describes what is required for Activities Requirement #2.
0 = Wide range of activities, including community service or child care or N.A.
1 = More possibilities than only work or only school related activities
2 = Only work or only school activities
• ACTREQ3 (ar #3dsc, ar #3who, ar #3tot)
Describes what is required for Activities Requirement #3.
0 = Wide range of activities, including community service or child care or N.A.
1 = More possibilities than only work or only school related activities
2 = Only work or only school activities
138
• ACTREQ4 (ar #4dsc, ar #4who, ar #4tot)
Describes what is required for Activities Requirement #4.
0 = Wide range of activities, including community service or child care or N.A.
1 = More possibilities than only work or only school related activities
2 = Only work or only school activities
• ACTREQ5 (ar #5dsc, ar #5who, ar #5tot)
Describes what is required for Activities Requirement #5.
0 = Wide range of activities, including community service or child care or N.A.
1 = More possibilities than only work or only school related activities
2 = Only work or only school activities
DIMENSIONS BASED ON SECOND-ORDER FACTOR ANALYSES
16. 2nd order Eligibility Requirements for Groups [elig]
Two-Parent Families (twopar) Green Card/Refugee Immigrants (im green) New/Battered
Immigrants (im new) Work-related Activities Requirements (actreq)
17. 2nd Order Behavioral Eligibility Responsibilities [behave]
Noncompliance Rules (comply) Family Responsibilities (fambeh) Personal Responsibilities
(peresp) Basic Responsibilities (eligresp)
18. 2nd Order Eligibility Exemptions and Limits [limits]
Illness Exemption (i exmt) Work Exemption (w exmt) Time Limits (time)
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B.3 Replication of Results for Alternative Definitions of Welfare Rule
Change
I define each latent measure of welfare restrictiveness as the difference between each measure
in 1996 and 2001. In this section, I will present robustness checks that measure the change in these
variables as the difference in their values from 1996-2000 or 1996-2002.
B.3.1 Difference Defined as 1996-2000
Table 42: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Limitation Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-1.456779 0.0584 0.00299 0.000881 0.000796
(0.0408) (0.00737) (0.00530) (0.00604)
-.956779 0.0305 0.00473 0.00281 0.00345
(0.0231) (0.00927) (0.0125) (0.0194)
-.456779 0.0154 0.00722 0.00868 0.0151
(0.0190) (0.0111) (0.0269) (0.0549)
.043221 0.00718 0.0106 0.0253 0.0600
(0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0491) (0.119)
.543221 0.00347 0.0152 0.0649 0.196
(0.00606) (0.0139) (0.0719) (0.168)
1.043221 0.00205 0.0212 0.141* 0.434***
(0.00362) (0.0156) (0.0819) (0.145)
1.543221 0.00154 0.0288 0.256*** 0.652***
(0.00292) (0.0193) (0.0766) (0.168)
2.043221 0.00137 0.0382 0.387*** 0.784***
(0.00290) (0.0267) (0.0832) (0.169)
2.543221 0.00135 0.0495 0.508*** 0.857***
(0.00320) (0.0388) (0.101) (0.150)
3.043221 0.00141 0.0627 0.605*** 0.900***
(0.00376) (0.0554) (0.110) (0.129)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 43: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Behavioral Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-.7 0.0278 0.0396 0.386** 0.686***
(0.0296) (0.0584) (0.157) (0.161)
-.1 0.00970 0.0278 0.345*** 0.685***
(0.0149) (0.0300) (0.111) (0.131)
.5 0.00293 0.0255 0.317*** 0.680***
(0.00282) (0.0216) (0.0811) (0.129)
1.1 0.00190 0.0280 0.301*** 0.671***
(0.00273) (0.0209) (0.0701) (0.147)
1.7 0.00228 0.0342 0.296*** 0.659***
(0.00394) (0.0270) (0.0728) (0.170)
2.3 0.00354 0.0439 0.297*** 0.644***
(0.00661) (0.0402) (0.0828) (0.190)
2.9 0.00595 0.0575 0.305*** 0.628***
(0.0120) (0.0603) (0.0953) (0.203)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 44: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Eligibility Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-2.8 0.000949 0.0198 0.244*** 0.616***
(0.00134) (0.0173) (0.0651) (0.174)
-2.5 0.00140 0.0248 0.271*** 0.634***
(0.00165) (0.0191) (0.0643) (0.156)
-2.2 0.00211 0.0310 0.300*** 0.650***
(0.00231) (0.0235) (0.0668) (0.140)
-1.9 0.00321 0.0388 0.329*** 0.666***
(0.00377) (0.0312) (0.0716) (0.126)
-1.6 0.00491 0.0485 0.360*** 0.682***
(0.00668) (0.0421) (0.0778) (0.116)
-1.3 0.00745 0.0605 0.391*** 0.696***
(0.0118) (0.0562) (0.0851) (0.108)
-1 0.0111 0.0754 0.422*** 0.711***
(0.0201) (0.0734) (0.0933) (0.104)
-.7 0.0161 0.0936 0.453*** 0.724***
(0.0321) (0.0939) (0.102) (0.104)
-.4 0.0226 0.116 0.484*** 0.737***
(0.0478) (0.118) (0.113) (0.107)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values
of all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score.
The column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean
(for Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1
scores. These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust
probit estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.3.2 Difference Defined as 1996-2002
Table 45: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Limitation Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-.8 0.482*** 0.360*** 0.122** 0.229***
(0.0411) (0.0145) (0.0493) (0.0778)
-.4 0.383*** 0.319*** 0.148*** 0.268***
(0.0116) (0.0552) (0.0505) (0.0654)
0 0.321*** 0.272*** 0.179*** 0.309***
(0.00871) (0.0306) (0.0551) (0.0544)
.4 0.235*** 0.225*** 0.206*** 0.350***
(0.00579) (0.0126) (0.0623) (0.0311)
.8 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.238*** 0.414***
(0.00595) (0.0307) (0.0710) (0.0318)
1.2 0.122** 0.140*** 0.269*** 0.472***
(0.0601) (0.0200) (0.0894) (0.0649)
1.6 0.0536*** 0.0918*** 0.305*** 0.550***
(0.00652) (0.0176) (0.0996) (0.114)
2 0.0398*** 0.0697 0.339*** 0.612***
(0.00685) (0.0788) (0.114) (0.161)
2.4 0.0158** 0.0609** 0.374*** 0.662***
(0.00713) (0.0274) (0.123) (0.190)
2.8 0.0176** 0.0668** 0.412*** 0.694***
(0.00744) (0.0341) (0.142) (0.211)
3.2 0.0194** 0.0734* 0.443*** 0.701***
(0.00798) (0.0420) (0.123) (0.203)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 46: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Behavioral Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-.7 0.125*** 0.0745*** 0.155** 0.455***
(0.0337) (0.00757) (0.0696) (0.0809)
-.1 0.0702*** 0.0638*** 0.223** 0.528***
(0.00545) (0.00835) (0.0916) (0.104)
.5 0.0142*** 0.0461*** 0.292*** 0.586***
(0.00337) (0.0124) (0.109) (0.120)
1.1 0.0114** 0.0434** 0.337*** 0.624***
(0.00527) (0.0177) (0.108) (0.132)
1.7 0.0154** 0.0616** 0.382*** 0.632***
(0.00630) (0.0272) (0.115) (0.140)
2.3 0.0203*** 0.0859** 0.420*** 0.636***
(0.00693) (0.0374) (0.106) (0.144)
2.9 0.0266** 0.115** 0.452*** 0.628***
(0.0111) (0.0469) (0.102) (0.156)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 47: Predictive Margins as Values of Interacted Terms Change
P&R1 P&R1 P&R1 P&R1
∆Eligibility Rules = −49.04895 = −34.8718 = −20.69465 = −6.5175
-3 0.195*** 0.228 0.0457* 0.497***
(0.0355) (0.166) (0.0237) (0.00839)
-2.7 0.160*** 0.676*** 0.217*** 0.503***
(0.0166) (0.198) (0.0775) (0.00910)
-2.4 0.200** 0.00138 0.466*** 0.377***
(0.0811) (0.00199) (0.0454) (0.0750)
-2.1 0.497*** 0.0384 0.524*** 0.478***
(0.0548) (0.0442) (0.0560) (0.0207)
-1.8 0.0974*** 0.325** 0.123*** 0.499***
(0.000000436) (0.144) (0.0477) (0.00281)
-1.5 0.0818*** 0.620*** 0.346*** 0.501***
(0.00722) (0.175) (0.0601) (0.00327)
-1.2 0.190 0.00883 0.489*** 0.452***
(0.121) (0.00950) (0.0215) (0.0459)
-.9 0.651*** 0.102 0.508*** 0.493***
(0.129) (0.0632) (0.0238) (0.00944)
-.6 0.0658* 0.414*** 0.254*** 0.500***
(0.0360) (0.0892) (0.0826) (0.000901)
-.3 0.0240 0.561*** 0.434*** 0.500***
(0.0410) (0.116) (0.0372) (0.00112)
N 195 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if a member of
Congress voted for welfare reform in the initial House vote. The table shows the predictive
margins (probability of voting in favor of welfare reform) given the average observed values of
all other variables and the imposed values of the latent policy variable and P&R1 score. The
column on the far left represents P&R1 scores one standard deviation below the mean (for
Democrats). Each subsequent column shows a one standard deviation increase in P&R1 scores.
These variables are interacted in the specification. I employed a heteroskedastic robust probit
estimation method to generate the values in this table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.4 Conditional Average Marginal Effects
Table 48: Average Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms
∆Limitation Rules ∆Behavioral Rules ∆Eligibility Rules
-60 -0.0365 -0.0719 0.0268
(0.0609) (0.109) (0.0495)
-55 -0.0152 -0.0345 0.0155
(0.0226) (0.0485) (0.0309)
-50 -0.00722 -0.0212 0.0118
(0.0111) (0.0297) (0.0204)
-45 -0.00330 -0.0187 0.0136
(0.00718) (0.0229) (0.0161)
-40 0.00340 -0.0191 0.0212
(0.00904) (0.0220) (0.0178)
-35 0.0218 -0.0205 0.0412
(0.0189) (0.0310) (0.0298)
-30 0.0684* -0.0202 0.0807
(0.0351) (0.0501) (0.0509)
-25 0.145*** -0.00619 0.118*
(0.0515) (0.0655) (0.0664)
-20 0.207*** 0.0255 0.116**
(0.0650) (0.0735) (0.0585)
-15 0.219*** 0.0577 0.0794
(0.0742) (0.0776) (0.0823)
-10 0.200*** 0.0779 0.0436
(0.0747) (0.0805) (0.101)
-5 0.175** 0.0867 0.0197
(0.0699) (0.0801) (0.101)
N 195 195 195
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable equals
1 if the member of Congress voted for PRWORA. I employ a
heteroskedastic robust probit estimation method for each specification.
The coefficients represents average marginal effects conditional on the
given values of the P&R1 score. For each of the latent policy variables,
I define them as the difference between the values in 1996 and 2001.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.5 State Policy Change Examples
Figure 15: Behavior Rules
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Figure 16: Eligibility Rules
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Figure 17: Limitation Rules
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Appendix C Additional Chapter 3 Material
C.1 State Expenditure Category Definitions
The following spending category definitions come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Government Finance and Employment Classification Manual.
• Corrections
– Definition: “Residential institutions or facilities for the confinement, correction, and
rehabilitation of convicted adults, or juveniles adjudicated, delinquent or in need of
supervision, and for the detention of adults and juveniles charged with a crime and
awaiting trial.”
– Includes: “Facilities generally referred to as prisons, reformatories, jails, penitentiaries,
correctional farms, workhouses, reception centers, industrial schools, training schools, and
detention centers. Includes hospitals for the criminally insane IF operated by a corrections
agency. Includes expenditure on education, training, and health care programs devoted
to inmates. Includes residential work release units, and residential halfway houses, and
community corrections centers. For prison industries include only amounts involved in
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of articles or services for resale or use outside the
government involved.”
• Public Welfare
– Definition: “All expenditures for welfare activities not classified elsewhere.”
– Includes: “Administration of medical and cash assistance, general relief, vendor, and
other programs; all intergovernmental payments for welfare other than for cash assistance
programs or for Medicare Part D phase-down payments and all intergovernmental
payments to public hospitals for medical assistance other than under the Medicaid
program; regulation of private welfare activities; children services, such as foster care,
adoption, day care, nonresidential shelters, and the like; social services for the physically
disabled, such as transportation; low-income energy assistance and weatherization
intergovernmental payments; temporary shelters and other services for the homeless;
welfare-related community action programs.”
• Hospitals
– Definition: “Hospital facilities providing in-patient medical care and institutions primarily
for care and treatment of handicapped (rather than education) which are directly
administered by a government, including those operated by public universities.”
– Includes: “Hospitals include government operated general hospitals providing in-patient
medical care and facilities that provide specialized care.”
∗ “Institutions for the custody, treatment, or general care of the mentally insane, or
emotionally disturbed.”
∗ “TB sanatoria.”
∗ “Maternity and children hospitals.”
∗ “Orthopedic hospitals.”
∗ “Hospitals for chronic diseases.”
∗ “Institutions for care and treatment of blind, deaf, developmentally disabled, or other
special classes of handicap.”
∗ “Hospitals associated with university medical schools (including paid student help).”
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• Police
– Definition: “Employees of general police, sheriff, state police, and other governmental
departments that preserve law and order, protect persons and property from illegal acts,
and work to prevent, control, investigate, and reduce crime.”
– Includes: “All law enforcement activities of regular police departments, sheriff and
constable offices, and state highway patrols, as well as criminal justice planning.”
∗ “Criminal investigation, forensic services, crime labs, coroners and medical
examiners.”
∗ “Temporary ‘lockups’ and transporting criminals.”
∗ “Police communications and radios services.”
• Health
– Definition: “Provision of services for the conservation and improvement of public health,
other than hospital care.”
– Includes: “General health activities, categorical health activities and programs,
health-related inspections, community health care programs, regulation of air and water
quality, rabies and animal control, and ambulance and emergency medical services ONLY
IF handled separately from the local fire department. Additional examples are listed
below.”
• Education
– Definition: “Employees involved in the operation, maintenance, and construction of public
schools and facilities for elementary and secondary education (kindergarten through high
school), vocational-technical education, and other educational institutions except those
for higher education, whether operated by independent governments (school districts) or
as integral agencies of state, county, municipal, or township governments; and financial
support of public elementary and secondary schools.”
– Includes: “Employees in instructional, support, and auxiliary services operated through
school systems (school lunch, student activities, community services, pupil transportation,
health services, guidance counseling, and the like); administration and supervision of
school systems; special education, classes for the handicapped, and vocational education
provided through school systems; Headstart; libraries operated by public schools; and
plant maintenance and operation.”
C.2 State Expenditure Category Definitions
I give definitions of various TANF spending categories from, “Instruction for Completion of
Form ACF-196” published by the Department of Health and Human Services Office Administration
for Children and Families.
• Assistance
– Basic Assistance
∗ “Include such benefits, even when provided in the form of payments by a TANF
agency, or other public agency on its behalf, to individuals and conditioned on their
participation in work experience or community service (or any other work activity
under 45 CFR 261.30).”
– Child Care
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∗ “Include child care expenditures for families that are not employed, but need child
care to participate in other work activities such as job search, community service,
education, or training, or for respite purposes. Do not include child care provided
as a non-recurrent; short-term benefit (for example, to recently employed families
who need child care extended during a temporary period of unemployment in order
to maintain continuity of care). Do not include expenditures on pre-K activities
or other programs designed to provide early childhood development or educational
services (e.g., following the Head Start model); such activities should be reported as
”other” and identified as such in a footnote to that category).”
– Transportation
∗ “Include expenditures for families that are not employed but need supportive services
to participate in other work activities such as community service, education, or
training, or for respite purposes. Do not include transportation or other supports




∗ This category is the summation of Work Subsidies, Education and Training, and
Other Work-Related Activities. Work Subsidies: “Work subsidies include payments
to employers or third parties to help cover the costs of employee wages, benefits,
supervision, or training. Do not include expenditures related to payments to or on
behalf of participants in community service and work experience activities that are
within the definition of assistance.”
Education and Training: “These are expenditures on educational activities that are
consistent with the recognized work activities at 45 CFR 261.30 or as a supplement to
such activities. Thus, include secondary education (including alternative programs);
adult education, GED, and ESL classes; education directly related to employment;
education provided as vocational educational training; and post-secondary education.
Do not include costs of early childhood education or after-school or summer
enrichment programs for children in elementary or junior high school.”
Other Work-Related Activities: “These are expenditures on work activities or work
expenses that have not been reported as education or work subsidies (including
staff costs related to providing work experience and community service activities,
on-the-job training, job search and job readiness, job skills training, and training
provided as vocational educational training), related services (such as employment
counseling, coaching, job development, information and referral, and outreach to
business and non-profit community groups), and other work-related expenses such as
costs for work clothes and equipment). Include such costs when provided as part of
a diversion program or as transitional services to individuals who ceased to receive
assistance due to employment.”
– Child Care
∗ “Include child care provided to employed families (related either to their work
or related job retention and advancement activities) and child care provided as a
nonrecurrent, short-term benefit (e.g., during applicant job search or to a recently
employed family during a temporary period of unemployment). Do not include
amounts of funds transferred to the CCDF (Discretionary Fund - reported on the
ACF-696) or SSBG programs. Also, do not include expenditures on pre-K activities
or other programs designed to provide early childhood development or educational
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services (e.g., following the Head Start model); such activities should be reported as
“other” and identified as such in a footnote to that category).”
– Transportation
∗ “Include the value of transportation benefits (such as allowances, bus tokens, car
payments, auto insurance reimbursement, and van services) provided to employed
families (related either to their work or related job retention and advancement
activities) and provided as a nonrecurrent, short-term benefit (e.g., during applicant
job search or to a recently employed family during a temporary period of
unemployment).”
– Individual Development Accounts (IDAs)
∗ “...expenditures on contributions to Individual Development Accounts and any other
expenditures related to the operation of an IDA program that fall outside the
definition of administrative costs from October 1st of the Federal fiscal year for which
the report is being submitted through the current quarter being reported.”
– Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits
∗ “...cumulative total expenditures on refundable earned income tax credits paid to
families and otherwise consistent with the requirements of 45 CFR parts 260 and 263
of the TANF regulations from October 1st of the Federal fiscal year for which the
report is being submitted through the current quarter being reported. Include State
and local tax credits that represent a specific portion of the Federal Earned Income
Credit and expenditures on similar State programs designed to defray the costs of
employment for low-income families.”
– Other Refundable Tax Credits
∗ “...any other refundable tax credits provided under State or local law that are
consistent with the purposes of TANF and the requirements of 45 CFR parts 260
and 263 of the TANF regulations from October 1st of the Federal fiscal year for
which the report is being submitted through the current quarter being reported.”
– Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits
∗ “...cumulative total expenditures on one-time, short-term benefits to families in the
form of cash, vouchers, subsidies, or similar form of payment to deal with a specific
crisis situation or episode of need and excluded from the definition of assistance on
that basis, from October 1st of the Federal fiscal year for which the report is being
submitted through the current quarter being reported. Do not include expenditures
on supportive services such as child care or transportation or work activities and
expenses (such as applicant job search) provided under a diversion program; these
items should be reported in other reporting categories.”
– Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies
∗ “...cumulative total expenditures for prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies
activities that have not otherwise been reported from October 1st of the Federal
fiscal year for which the report is being submitted through the current quarter being
reported.”
– Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance
∗ “...cumulative total expenditures for two-parent family formation and maintenance
activities that have not otherwise been reported from October 1st of the Federal
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